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ABSTRACT

A Philosophical Defense of Judicial Minimalism

by

Cory Evans

Advisor: Steven M. Cahn

This dissertation analyzes, criticizes and ultimately defends judicial minimalism, a
contemporary theory of judging that has come to the forefront of American jurisprudence
in the early part of the 21st Century. In this dissertation I offer the first formal definition of
judicial minimalism, apply that definition to case law and the literature, refute many
objections to judicial minimalism including objections based

on tough case

counterexamples, offer a new version of the argument of epistemic humility and offer a
new argument in support of judicial minimalism from the perspective of law and
economics.
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Chapter I

Defining Judicial Minimalism

This dissertation analyzes, criticizes and ultimately defends judicial minimalism, a
contemporary theory of judging that has come to the forefront of American jurisprudence in
the early part of the 21st Century. While reviewing the major components of judicial
minimalism, I put forward the first formal definition of judicial minimalism and offer a new
defense of the theory based on law and economics.
In this first Chapter, I embark on the study of judicial minimalism. First, I discuss
the idea of judicial minimalism and explain why it matters. Second, I offer the first formal
definition of judicial minimalism, an original definition that sharpens the scope of the
theory. Third, I review the previous literature surrounding judicial minimalism, with
reference to my formal definition. Fourth, I review the impact of judicial minimalism at the
Supreme Court by considering the jurisprudence of several prominent American jurists.

1.1. What is Judicial Minimalism?
Judicial minimalism in jurisprudence and constitutional law is the view that judges
should take the minimal action sufficient for resolving a specific dispute in any case that
comes before them. Judges should be aware of their place in a complex and dynamic legal
and political environment. They should rule when they must but they should make an effort
to leave unanswered questions that they need not be the ones to answer.
Judicial minimalists eschew sweeping verdicts and avoid putting forward grand
theories that apply to all possible fact patterns. Instead, a judicial minimalist carefully
constructs narrow judgments, with an eye toward minimizing unintended consequences. A
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judicial minimalist’s decisions are narrow, in that they affect fewer cases, and, in at least
some sense, they are shallow, in that they do not put forward general principles that come
to define all similar cases.
Why should legal philosophers care about judicial minimalism? First, because it is a
real option in the logical space of jurisprudence. It might be true, and if so, it might be
something that should be adopted by many, or even all, judges. I define judicial
minimalism in this Chapter as a purely procedural thesis, but that does not limit the
relevance of the theory. Every judgment follows a procedure, and knowing the right one is
important.
Second, legal philosophers should care about judicial minimalism because
minimalism is, as much as anything, the dominant jurisprudential philosophy of the current
Supreme Court. As many as five current Supreme Court justices can be classified as
judicial minimalists. Even if they are not true minimalists they are certainly highly
influenced by judicial minimalism as a legal philosophy.
The Roberts Court has decided cases on issues ranging from abortion, to euthanasia,
to free speech to right of contract. In these cases, more often than not, the Court has issued
narrow rulings. As Cass Sunstein describes in One Case at a Time, the incremental
approach to law represented by judicial minimalism has become the modus opperandi of
the current Supreme Court since the turn of the 21st century.
In a later text, Radicals in Robes, Sunstein argues that a full majority of the 2000’s
Court was minimalist and I agree with this assessment in the cases of Justices Ginsburg,
O’Connor and Roberts. These justices consider their cases narrowly, and their decisions
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aim only to resolve a specific fact pattern or legal dispute brought directly to the Court’s
attention. Questions that can be put aside are put aside, to be settled by other Courts or,
preferably, by the democratically-elected legislature.
If judicial minimalism is the primary theory of the present Supreme Court, then it
seems very clear that legal philosophers ought to care about it – and care about it deeply.
But what exactly is judicial minimalism? How do we define this theory of judging, and
what objective tests tell us who is a judicial minimalist? The first step in answering these
questions is to take a definition from the literature. Sunstein, in One Case, offers what has
become a good working formula: judicial minimalism is the view that judges should rule
“narrowly” and “shallowly.”
By “narrow” Sunstein means that decisions will not affect a lot of the current body
of law. This is an informal working definition, so there isn’t much in the way of how to
measure that impact. But the basic idea is clear: a narrow ruling is one which doesn’t
change the current law very much. By “shallow” Sunstein means that judicial minimalists
avoid broad unitary theories about the nature of law or the right way to resolve disputes. A
minimalist avoids these “grand theories”, Sunstein argues, limiting himself to resolving the
case before him. Minimalists are pragmatic, resolving individual fact-patterns with
individual rulings.
Minimalism is also marked by a strong deference, seen more frequently than ever in
the Roberts’ Court, to the elected legislature and to state governments. Sunstein elevates
this into the primary argument in support of minimalism. Minimalism, he argues, derives
its motivation from a desire to promote deliberative democracy. Minimalism promotes
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democratic deliberation by leaving what can be left unanswered to the legislative and
executive branches.
That minimalism should emerge as the dominant view of the Supreme Court isn’t
surprising: as the Supreme Court selection process has become increasingly polarized
politically, minimalist justices have increasingly found their way through the maze of
nomination questions they face before being approved by the Senate. This has led to a
disproportionate number of minimalist judges and justices, emphasizing the practical
importance of judicial minimalism.
Sunstein adds that the Supreme Court has maintained its minimalism even in the
face of fact patterns that might be expected to generate broader holdings. In Minimalism at
War, Cass Sunstein argues that the Supreme Court has maintained a position of minimalism
throughout the War on Terror, even though it has come under immense pressure to swing in
one direction or another in response to national emergencies.
Resisting that pressure, Sunstein shows that the Court has rejected liberty
maximalism (giving no special preference for security in times of war) and national
security maximalism (giving great deference to the President in his role as Commander-inChief), instead adopting liberty minimalism, which consists of the defence of congressional
authorization for major intrusions into liberty, hearings over abuse of authority, and highly
narrow rulings that reduce the role of the courts.
Sunstein argues that this position emerges from the two core principles of
minimalism: rulings on national security and personal liberty should be narrow and
shallow. Sunstein means that these rulings should leave as much as possible open to
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democratic deliberation, ensuring the smooth functioning of government while holding
abusive persons to account. While liberty minimalism has precedent historically as
examples from the two World Wars and the Cold War show, Sunstein argues that recent
years have magnified the trend. The Supreme Court has moved to judicial minimalism as a
core tenet, from standards of scrutiny (as Wexler argues) to case selection and ultimately to
legal holdings.
Given the depth and persistence of judicial minimalism in practice at the Supreme
Court, it is surprising that judicial minimalism as a philosophical perspective has never, to
my knowledge, been formally defined. This has often lead to great confusion – for
example, a common contrast, found throughout Sunstein’s work, is between minimalism
and “fundamentalism”, a term Sunstein uses to refer to a rigid adherence to the
Constitution’s original fundamentals.
But this seems like a clear false dichotomy – minimalism is a procedural approach
to jurisprudential change; fundamentalism is a jurisprudential ideology. The proper contrast
for judicial minimalism would instead be judicial radicalism – the view that judges should
make large changes quickly. The false dichotomy arises because Sunstein is not carefully
enough distinguishing between procedural and ideological judicial perspectives.
To resolve the confusion that arises from a purely informal definition, judicial
minimalism should be formally defined. I therefore define “judicial minimalism” as
follows:
Consider a legal dispute A. Let X1, X2, X3, and so forth represent all possible
principled just resolutions of this dispute. Each resolution changes the status
quo of the law to some extent. Let Y1, Y2, Y3, and so forth represent the
changes that each possible resolution (X1, X2, X3…) makes to the status quo of
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the law. Y1 … Yx can be ranked according to the sum magnitude of the total
number of the changes each resolution makes to the law. Judicial minimalism is
the view that the correct resolution, Xα, is the resolution such its corresponding
changes, Yα, are the smallest.
Two clarifying notes regarding this definition. First, the definition requires all of the
possible resolutions (X1, X2, X3 …) to be principled. This prohibits the creation of a purely
ad hoc resolution: a decision that begins, like Bush v. Gore, with the disclaimer never to
use that very decision as precedent. Second, it is immediately apparent on this definition
that judicial minimalism is a purely procedural thesis.
Judicial minimalism is not a full judicial ideology or a complete perspective on the
proper way to arbitrate disputes. Unlike a theory like strict constructivism or law as
integrity, judicial minimalism does not tell us the right way to resolve a case – it doesn’t
tell us what is fair or what is just. It merely tells us that, when considering the range of
possible just resolutions (where some other theory determines ‘justice’) we should select
the narrowest just resolution. My formal definition of judicial minimalism adjusts the
orientation of jurisprudence, from linear to Cartesian. In addition to the more traditional
conservative-liberal axis – in jurisprudence, usually reflected by insistence on textual
fidelity, which loosely aligns but is not coextensive with political ideology – we add an axis
for minimalism-radicalism. Instead of this:
.

Liberal (Living Constitution)

Conservative (Originalism)
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We have a logical space that looks more like this:
Minimalism

Liberal (Living Constitution)

Conservative (Originalism)

Radicalism
Visually illustrating this conceptual change clarifies many of the logical
consequences of judicial minimalism. For example, it is quite possible to believe that all
laws should be interpreted by their original public meaning (strict constructivism) but also
be a judicial minimalist. The first view provides the content of judicial philosophy – the
solution regarded as just. Minimalism adds a purely procedural commitment to
implementing that jurisprudential philosophy incrementally.
Is the definition above descriptive or prescriptive? Does it contain necessary and
sufficient conditions? These worthy questions are worth addressing carefully. First, as to
descriptive and prescriptive, I derive the definition above by combing the case opinions
written by justices, like Chief Justice Roberts and Justice O’Connor, who are
unambiguously minimalists, at least so far as the literature is concerned. In a sense, then,
my definition is descriptive, as I have adopted the “theory of best fit” – the definition that
would lead to the opinions they have actually constructed in practise. In this sense,
therefore, my definition is descriptive, in that I am matching the case law and the opinions
of the Court.
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In another sense, though, my definition above is prescriptive. The literature
surrounding judicial minimalism largely ignores the question of a formal definition.
However, insofar as the literature provides a definition, it generally agrees with Sunstein’s
approach which, as discussed at length later, is actually quite different. By consciously
differing from the standard approach taken in the literature my definition is not descriptive
of the literature but rather prescriptive as to how I think judicial minimalism ought to be
defined. One way of summarizing this point is to say that my definition is prescriptive in
that I think judicial minimalism ought to be defined as it is utilized by minimalist justices,
but descriptive in that I seek to describe how those justices actually deploy the theory.
Judicial minimalism is often confused with judicial restraint; a philosophy I take to
mean that the Supreme Court should take very little action. It’s easy to see why, since both
minimalism and judicial restraint tend toward what Bickel calls “passive virtue” – by
involving itself less in the resolution of questions of policy, the restrained or minimalist
Court encourages a wider scope of democratic deliberation.
The difference between judicial minimalism and judicial restraint is that minimalists
always insist that, at the end of the day, the Court must strike down unjust laws. For
Sunstein, the Court should do that narrowly and shallowly; on my definition, the Court
should do that narrowly and according to their philosophy of jurisprudence. This clearly
differs from judicial restraint – Bickel, for example, would have a restrained justice uphold
laws at times even if she thought they were unjust.
Two cases helpfully illustrate the difference. In both United States v. Virginia and
Romer v. Evans, the underlying value questions considered by the Court were open and
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subject to democratic debate. Judicial restrainters would consequently have the Court
uphold the statutes in both cases, at least until a further consensus develops. By contrast,
judicial minimalists with a range of jurisprudential theories would have reached the same
decision as the majority, striking down both statutes narrowly.
It is perhaps also worth taking the time to contrast minimalism with stare decisis,
the view, taken from the Latin maxim, that judges ought to leave things as they are.
Advocates of minimalism and advocates of a stare decisis approach to judging may be
similarly motivated by a background conservatism. But the views are quite different. Stare
decisis leaves things as they are, even if they are unjust. Minimalism does not at all;
minimalism advocates rectifying the injustice slowly and deliberately. Stare decisis is a
legal principle or legal maxim. Minimalism is a procedural theory. The two are quite
different and quite distinct, even if they are sometimes advocated by the same jurists.
It is worth carefully considering at least one additional objection to this formal
definition. The definition introduced above relies on a concept of magnitude, specifically as
the algorithm for minimalism inputs the magnitude of changes to the status quo of law. One
objection contends that this sense of magnitude is too vague. Consider a case where two
possible verdicts are under consideration, both are just, but one yields one very big change
to law and the other several smaller changes. Which option does the minimalist select?
A tough question. Fortunately, as in many cases, Quine has already put in the heavy
lifting. In his 1955 essay Posits and Reality, Quine puts forward his epistemic Principle of
Conservatism. Quine was an epistemic holist, a view he defended in Two Dogmas. A
consequence of that holism is that reality tests human knowledge as a bloc. Quine pithily
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captured this idea with the quote: “the unit of empirical significance is the whole of
science.”
When we encounter an error in our forecasting and reality, we know that we must
revise our beliefs. Crucially, though, the conflict with experience underdetermines the
specific revision required. In other words, there are scores of ways we can patch our web of
beliefs, ranging from specific claims to general principles to epistemic doubt about the
senses themselves.
Taking the point further, Quine notes that we can hold on to nearly any belief no
matter what the consequences as long as we are willing to make other dramatic changes to
our web of beliefs. Quine’s immediate point was that, consequently, no beliefs are truly
analytic in the sense intended by Kant in the Critique. Nevertheless, his point raises a
profound question: how are we to go about revising our beliefs? What principles should we
follow in revising our web of beliefs in response to experience?
In 1955, Quine argued that we revise our beliefs in accordance with the Principle of
Conservatism. Our goal is to make the smallest possible number of changes to the least
central beliefs that allow us to reconcile our beliefs with experience. We can imbue this
definition with a bit of formality. Let χ be the degree of centrality of a belief, where by
centrality we mean our determination to hold it in the face of contrary evidence. Let ω be
our overall web of beliefs. When we encounter an observation, θ, which conflicts with a
prediction made by ω, we have a range of revision options: ω 1, ω 2, ω 3… ω n. Each of these
webs differs from ω. The magnitude of the difference between a given revised web, ωα and
ω, is some function of the number, η, of beliefs that must be revised and χ. Call this
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function σ. Consider σ(ω 1), σ(ω 2) … σ(ω n). Whichever of these is the smallest, call it σΔ,
constitutes the most conservative change to our beliefs. Following the Principle of
Conservatism, we ought to select as our new web of beliefs the web of beliefs, ωΔ, which
corresponds to σΔ.
We can deploy Quine’s Principle of Conservatism to explain what we mean by the
minimal change in our formal definition of minimalism by replacing webs of belief with
statutory systems and observations to changes to the law required by our theory of justice.
To wit: let χ be the degree of centrality of a statute, where by centrality we mean our
determination to maintain it in the face of changes to the law required by our theory of
justice. Let ω be our overall system of statutes, the body of law. When we encounter a case,
θ, where our theory of justice requires that we make a modification to ω, we have a range
of modification options: ω 1, ω

2,

ω

3…

ω

n.

Each of these systems differs from ω. The

magnitude of the difference between a given revised system, ωα, and ω, is some function of
the number, η, of laws that must be revised and χ. Call this function σ. Consider σ(ω 1), σ(ω
2)

… σ(ω n). Whichever of these is the smallest, call it σΔ, constitutes the most conservative

change to our system of laws. According to judicial minimalism, we ought then to select as
our new system of statutes the system, ωΔ, which corresponds to σΔ.

1.2. Illustration by Example
An example may make minimalism more concrete. Therefore, let us create an
example jurist, called Jones, who is both a strict constructivist and a judicial minimalist.
Jones is in the upper right quadrant on the graph above. Let us now consider a Supreme
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Court case, and work through how Jones would approach the case. Because it is recent, and
because the fact pattern is illustrative, I have chosen D. C. v. Heller as an example.
Sunstein’s Second Amendment Minimalism, from which my reconstruction is
adapted, also uses D. C. v. Heller to illustrate minimalism, although without a sample jurist.
Here, I assume that Justice Jones is: (a) a strict constructivist; (b) agrees with the historical
analysis of the majority opinion in Heller; and, (c) is a minimalist. Justice Jones is a
minimalist Justice Scalia, who wrote the Court’s majority opinion in Heller.
Sunstein, operating from a different definition of minimalism, denies that Justice
Jones is possible, for Sunstein’s understanding of minimalism rules out theories like
original public meaning, which he declares as radical in Robes. We can resolve this
disagreement by working through the example, and seeing if the jurisprudence of Justice
Jones is, in fact, coherent.
Decided on June 26, 2008, District of Columbia, et al. v. Dick Anthony Heller (554
U. S. 570) concerned the application of the FIREARMS CONTROL REGULATIONS ACT of
1975, specially asking whether the ACT, as applied, violated an individual’s right to bear
arms as protected by the Second Amendment. In other words: (i) does the Second
Amendment protect an individual right to arms and, (ii) is that right violated by the ACT?
The Federal District Court initially found in favor of the District. The Court of
Appeals reversed that ruling. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the appellate Court, holding
for the first time that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to own a
firearm unconnected with militia service, and guarantees the right to use that firearm for
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lawful purposes. Justices Scalia, Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito were in the majority,
while justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg dissented.
D. C. v. Heller was the first Supreme Court case to decide whether the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. The fact
pattern questioned whether the Second Amendment protected an individual right within
federal enclaves, not states, since the case arose in the District of Columbia. It was possible
to rule in a way that affected states, or to rule purely regarding enclaves. The Court chose
the latter. The Act that triggered Heller was the Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975,
a D. C. Local Law, which required all firearms to be kept “unloaded and disassembled”. In
Heller, six plaintiffs were recruited by CATO Institute Senior Fellow Robert Levy and
attorney Clark Neily for a test case to broaden Second Amendment rights.
Ultimately only one of these plaintiffs, Mr Dick Heller, was judged to have
standing. At the time of the case, Mr Heller was a licensed special police officer working
for the District. According to Doherty, Mr Heller carried a gun as part of his work,
including in restricted areas like federal buildings. But, because of handgun restrictions
passed by D. C., he was not permitted to possess that handgun in his domicile. Heller lived
in what he considered a high-crime area and wanted to possess his handgun while at home
for self-defence. Mr Heller sought relief only as it regarded his handgun – although the
Firearms Act applied to shotguns and rifles as well.
Two Circuit Courts of Appeals had considered the Second Amendment in the
context of an individual right prior to Heller. In the 2001 Fifth Circuit case United States v.
Emerson, the Circuit Court struck down a handgun ban, while in 2002 the Ninth Circuit
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upheld a handgun ban in Silveira v. Lockyer. Sincere there was no Supreme Court ruling on
an individual right, there was no binding precedent.
Mr Heller et al initially filed their petition challenging the Firearms Act in February
2003. All six plaintiffs filed for an injunction barring the enforcement of the Act, but Judge
Urbina dismissed their suit at the District Court level, on both substantive and jurisdictional
grounds. The plaintiffs immediately appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. In a split decision, the Circuit court reversed the District Court 2-1.
Judges Silberman and Griffith made up the majority, while Judge Henderson dissented.
The first question considered by the Circuit Court was standing. Did the six
plaintiffs have the standing to seek an injunction against the Firearms Act? Only one
plaintiff had applied for a handgun permit and had it denied: Mr Heller. Therefore, the
Court determined, the Act had only harmed Mr Heller. Since only Mr Heller had been
harmed, only Mr Heller had standing to challenge the Act in court.
The Circuit Court therefore dismissed the challenges of the five other plaintiffs.
Since this aspect of the decision resolves the question put before the bench without setting
new precedent (beyond an application of rules of standing), Jones would approve. Judges
Silberman and Griffith found further that Second Amendment does, in fact, protect an
individual right to firearms unconnected to militia service. They base this conclusion on a
close reading of the Second Amendment. Justice Jones is a strict constructivist, which
means that what he cares about is the original public meaning of the text.
What Justice Jones cares about is what the words of the Second Amendment meant
at the time the Amendment became law. Determining that is beyond the scope of this essay,
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and isn’t necessary to illustrate minimalism. Therefore, let us assume, for the sake of
argument, that Justice Jones agrees with Judges Silberman and Griffith on the original
public meaning of the Second Amendment.
After finding that the Second Amendment actually protects an individual right to
arms, two questions arise. First, are handguns arms? Yes. Second, does the Firearms Act
conflict with an individual right? Instead of answering this complex question, let’s assume
again that Jones, after reviewing the Firearms Act, comes down the same way as Judges
Silberman and Griffith. The Firearms Act therefore does violate the individual’s right to
arms. Justice Jones’ theory of justice and interpretation consequently compels her to
resolve the dispute between Mr Heller and the District in favour of Mr Heller.
Now, with the proper resolution in mind, Jones’ minimalism kicks in. Jones has
already decided along with the Court that only Mr Heller has standing. Therefore, the only
relief needed is for Heller, who was denied a license. Mr Heller had previously attempted to
register a 1911 single-action Colt .22 revolver. While the Circuit Court could strike down
all restrictions on handguns, Justice Jones could provide relief to Mr Heller, and change
less law, by limiting her holding to Mr Heller’s particular circumstances.
There seem, to me, to be two principled ways of structuring a holding around the
facts in this case in order to grant relief while minimally affecting existing law. First, Jones
could hold that the Firearms Act, enacted in 1975, could not restrict possession of firearms
manufactured prior to 1975. Here, Jones could cite Article I, Section 9’s restriction on ex
post facto punishment as justification.
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Second, Jones could restrict her holding to the specific weapon used by Mr Heller.
Undoubtedly, many similar weapons would, in time, be permitted by the same reasoning,
but narrowing her holding to the single-action Colt .22 leaves subsequent judgments to
subsequent courts. The principle is that not all weapons should be regulated the same way
(surely, as the Miller standard implies, the Second Amendment doesn’t permit private
nuclear explosives) and so it is better to move one case at a time.
These three possible principled judgments for Mr Heller are as follows:
ɸ1 – The Second Amendment protects an individual right to firearms
unconnected to service in a state-regulated militia. Firearms Act ban
on possession of licensed handguns struck down on the grounds of
the Second Amendment. District Court reversed, case remanded to
District Court for writs to ensure compliance by the District of
Columbia.
ɸ2 – The Second Amendment protects an individual right to firearms
unconnected to service in a state-regulated militia. Firearms Act ban
on possession of licensed handguns manufactured before 1975 struck
down on the grounds of the Second Amendment and Article I,
Section 9. District Court reversed, case remanded to District Court
for writs to ensure compliance by the District of Columbia.
ɸ3 – The Second Amendment protects an individual right to firearms
unconnected to service in a state-regulated militia. Firearms Act ban
on possession of all licensed single-action handguns of .22 caliber or
smaller is struck down on the grounds of the Second Amendment
and the Court’s understanding of weapons in common use. District
Court reversed, case remanded to District Court for writs to ensure
compliance by the District of Columbia.
The changes to the law made by each of these possible decisions are quantifiable: β1
is the impact made by ɸ1, β2 is the impact made by ɸ2, and β3 is the impact made by ɸ3. The
question for the judicial minimalist is now simple: which amongst these three effects – β1,
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β2 or β3 –is the smallest? The answer is β4, which is the impact made by the following
compound ruling:
ɸ4 – The Second Amendment protects an individual right to firearms
unconnected to service in a state-regulated militia. Firearms Act ban
on possession of all licensed single-action handguns of .22 caliber or
smaller manufactured before 1975 is struck down on the grounds of
the Second Amendment, the Court’s understanding of weapons in
common use and Article I, Section 9. District Court reversed, case
remanded to District Court for writs to ensure compliance by the
District of Columbia.
This ruling would agree with the ideology of the jurisprudence used by Silberman
and Griffith since Jones is a strict constructivist. But it would narrow the ruling out of an
interest in minimizing changes to the body of law. Jones’ strict constructivism determines
the verdict he finds just, and his judicial minimalism shapes the narrowness of his decision.
If Jones had served on the Circuit Court panel, would the outcome have been different?
Suppose first that Jones had literally just been added to the panel and that this case had
been heard by four judges, instead of three. Judges Silberman and Griffith would have still
agreed on their majority opinion, but this would have not been controlling since less than a
full majority of judges adopted it.
Judge Henderson would have dissented. Judge Jones would have authored a
concurring opinion by agreeing with the majority (Silberman and Griffith) on their
conclusion, while disagreeing with their reasoning. ɸ4 would have been the holding he
would have sought, and since Judges Silberman and Griffith would, a fortiori, have
supported ɸ4, ɸ4 would have become the holding of the Circuit Court. The final ruling
would have been:
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Silberman (joined by Griffith) finds for Heller, Jones concurs, Henderson
dissents, judgment for Heller, ɸ4 is the holding.
Now suppose instead that Jones were to replace one of the judges on the panel.
Suppose first that Jones replaced Griffith. There would be no majority opinion now: there is
no one to join Silberman. Instead, Judges Silberman and Jones would write separate
concurring opinions, while Judge Henderson would still dissent. The final ruling would
have been:
Silberman finds for Heller, Jones concurs, Henderson dissents, judgment for
Heller, ɸ4 is the holding.
The situation is similar if Jones had replaced Silberman instead of Griffith. Griffith
would have written his own opinion then – perhaps along the lines of Silberman’s opinion –
and the final ruling would be:
Griffith finds for Heller, Jones concurs, Henderson dissents, judgment for
Heller, ɸ4 is the holding.
In both cases Jones’ opinion, ɸ4, would become the opinion of the Court because in
both cases it can be assumed a fortiori that Silberman and Griffith would agree with ɸ4, but
not the converse. While Silberman and Griffith wish to broadly strike down all handgun
restrictions, that opinion would be opposed by Henderson (due to her jurisprudence) and
Jones (due to her minimalism).
In three-fourths of these cases, only ɸ4 would command a majority of judges at the
panel level and, consequently, ɸ4 would emerge as the opinion of the Court. Instead, Judges
Silberman and Griffith’s opinion led to all portions of the law regulating firearms being
struck down, including rules that required guns (including rifles and shotguns) to be kept
unloaded and disassembled. This pattern of overlapping consensus as it applies to the
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holding of the Court is one of the reasons that judicial minimalists have a lot of influence
on the bench since their narrow opinions often command the broadest consensus.
At the panel level, Judge Henderson dissented because of her belief that the “right
of the people to keep and bear Arms” applied only to state militias. Since the District is not
a state, she reasoned, it has no state militia. Therefore, the Second Amendment right to bear
arms does not apply to District residents, including Mr Heller. Consequently, Henderson
argued that the panel should find in favour of the District. Jones, of course, disagrees with
Henderson because Jones’ jurisprudence regards Henderson’s opinion as unjust.
Minimalism doesn’t come in to play since any decision, minimal or not, must be just.
After the panel found in favour of Heller, the District asked for an en banc rehearing
in front of the full Court of Appeals. This petition was denied 6-4 and the ruling of the
panel was affirmed. I believe that Judge Jones would have voted for a re-hearing, since it
would be possible to narrow the scope of the holding while maintaining justice, since ɸ4 is a
possible holding.
It is worth noting that here Judge Jones would not be so influential. If she were
simply added to the decision, it would be 6-5 against en banc review. Even if Jones
replaced one of the six affirmatives, it would be 5-5 for en banc review and still fail. So,
regardless, review would have been denied. It is also worth noting that if the original panel
had ruled ɸ4, then Jones would vote against a re-hearing en banc.
After the panel found in favour of Heller, the District petitioned the Supreme Court
for review. Mr Heller welcomed that, for this was a test case, and he wanted to test the law
at the highest level. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 20th, 2007. If
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Justice Jones were on the Supreme Court would she have voted to grant certiorari? I think
that the answer is no.
Justice Jones holds that Mr Heller is entitled to this particular type of firearm under
the Second Amendment. If the ruling of the panel is permitted to stand, he will enjoy that
right. Consequently, there is no injustice to correct. Nor is there a circuit split or
fundamental legal conflict which would require resolution for consistency. Granting
certiorari would allow the Supreme Court to rule on the case, but virtually any ruling by the
Supreme Court would have more of an impact on the law than virtually any ruling by the
Circuit Court, simply because the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is broader.
Therefore, the minimalist approach would be to deny certiorari and let the panel
holding stand. This illustrates a more general point: minimalists on any court oppose
granting certiorari or reviewing the decision of any lower court, as long as their philosophy
of justice permits that conclusion. In other words, a minimalist will only vote to grant
certiorari if they intend to reverse the decision of a lower court or if a circuit / district split
exists.
This principle provides an objective test for minimalism. Some critics of judicial
minimalism, like Garbus, argue that judicial minimalism is a knowing (or unknowing)
front, a way of disguising jurisprudence to pass political scrutiny. But certiorari is an
objective test: if a judge claims to be a minimalist, their decisions to grant certiorari should
be indicative. If a judge regularly grants certiorari on cases where they do not reverse,
they’re simply not a minimalist. That’s intuitive, for unless your intention is to reverse an
injustice by a lower court, why would you grant certiorari? Justice Scalia, for example,
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voted to grant certiorari in Heller because he wanted to set a precedent, indicating that
Justice Scalia is not a minimalist.
Of course, if Justice Jones actually thought the panel had misinterpreted the Second
Amendment, then she would vote to grant certiorari because the decision of the panel
would be unjust, and unjust disposition trumps procedural considerations for judicial
minimalists. Minimalist justices will, therefore, sometimes vote to review a case, but only
in cases where they intend to reverse, or when it is necessary to resolve a split.
Practical experience backs up these ideas. Chief Justice Roberts is probably the
justice best known for his minimalism on the current bench, and his reluctance in granting
certiorari is well known. Since Roberts took over as Chief Justice, the percentage of
certiorari applications granted has fallen, as has the total number of cases. Meanwhile, the
percentage of granted applications resulting from a circuit split has risen.
This data backs up both the claim that Chief Justice Roberts is actually a minimalist
and the claim that minimalists are less likely to grant certiorari. This lower likelihood
comes from their refusal to grant certiorari for the purpose of setting a precedent, or
establishing a correct interpretation. Justice Jones, as a proper minimalist with original
public meaning jurisprudence, would have consequently voted to deny certiorari in Heller.

1.3. Heller at the Supreme Court
In Heller, the Court’s decision to grant certiorari narrowed the scope of the question
to whether D. C. Code §§ 7-2502.02(a)(4), 22-4505(a), and 7-2507.02 violated the Second
Amendment by restricting the right of individuals unaffiliated with a state militia from
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keeping handguns and other firearms for private use in their homes. Justice Jones would
have looked for an even sharper narrowing, for example by restricting the issue to
handguns.
In granting cert to Heller, the Court considered the application of the Second
Amendment to individuals unaffiliated with a state-run or state-regulated militia for the first
time since United States v. Miller, which was decided in 1939. For many justices, that fact
would be a positive but for Justice Jones, it is a negative. For Jones, reconsidering past law
is a necessary evil, only to be performed to reverse an unjust decision.
Justice Jones’ decision to deny certiorari would certainly have frustrated the
litigants, both of whom wanted the Supreme Court to take the case. Powerful interest
groups backing the test case, like the National Rifle Association (NRA), also wanted the
Court to grant certiorari. But these factors would have little impact on Jones. A notable
amicus curiæ brief filed Heller was the brief by Stephen Halbrook arguing for the panel
decision to be upheld, which was signed by a majority of the members of Congress and by
then-Vice President Dick Cheney. These political forces would be of no impact on Jones,
because Jones is an original public meaning jurist, and jurists with that philosophy aim to
be unaffected by political factors. What matters in original public meaning jurisprudence is
the meaning of the statute and the Second Amendment, as they would have been
understood by the public at the original time in which they were passed. Therefore, the
Halbrook amicus would have no independent consequence to Jones.
For the same reason, a notable amicus authored by Texas Attorney General Greg
Abbott and signed by a majority of states, and an amicus on the other side authored by the
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Department of Justice and signed by five states, would be of little value. These briefs aim to
show broad political support for one side or another, but that would be of little interest to
Justice Jones. For Justice Jones, the most useful of all the amicus briefs would be the brief
by Jeffrey Teichert, which argued from original public meaning that the Second
Amendment protects an individual rights to firearms. That Mr Teichert wrote the brief is
irrelevant, but the arguments the brief outlines are relevant.
The holding in Heller was that the Second Amendment protects an individual right
to own and maintain a private firearm, even if an individual does not have any connection
to a militia. Further, any individual has the right, under the Second Amendment, to use that
firearm for traditionally lawful purposes, including self-defence within a private domicile.
As we have discussed above, Justice Jones would agree that the disposition of the case
ought to favour Heller, but he would craft a concurring opinion with a narrower holding.
One idea would be to limit the holding to the specific type of firearm Mr Heller actually
possessed, and to limit the use of that firearm to the specific conduct which Mr Heller was
actually engaged in. This would satisfy justice with less impact on the law.
It may seem strange to intentionally limit a holding in this way, particularly since
Justice Jones actually thinks the law should go to the same place as the actual holding in
Heller. It is therefore worth recalling that minimalists value continuity of precedent for its
own sake. By allowing the law to only slowly reach the holding in Heller, Jones gives
scope for revision and strengthens the rule of law.
The holding in Heller argued that the first clause of the Second Amendment (“a
well-regulated militia…”) announced a purpose to the right to bear arms but did not limit
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the scope of the second, operative clause (“the right of the people…”). This is the reason
for finding in favour of Heller and, since we previously stipulated that Justice Jones shared
this interpretation, Jones would agree that this is correct.
But how could Justice Jones justify failing to extend the right to arms, which she
agrees is part of the Second Amendment, to other firearms and other lawful uses? Isn’t that
the same as declaring that persons do not have a right to other firearms and other lawful
uses? No, because Justice Jones isn’t denying (or affirming) the right as it pertains to those
cases, because he needn’t do so in order to decide this case.
The Court held in Heller that the text and history of the operative clause of the
Second Amendment show an individual right to arms, which Justice Jones agrees to by
stipulation but which does not affect her disagreements with the holding. The Court held
that the militia referenced by the Second Amendment involved all men capable of acting
for common defense, implying the need for individual arms, which Jones agrees to by
stipulation but which does not affect her disagreements with the holding.
The Court also held that the primary cause of these concerns was a fear that the
Federal government would disarm local militias as a prelude to seizing power. The Court
referenced other state constitutional protections on individual arms rights from similar time
periods to support this interpretation. Justice Jones agrees by stipulation, but this does not
affect her disagreements with the holding.
The holding of the Court noted that the Second Amendment’s drafting history
mentioned three state proposals that certainly meant to refer to an individual right. This is
relevant to Justice Jones since it helps to clarify the meaning of the words in the
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Amendment at the time they were passed, but this does not affect Jones’ procedural
disagreements with the holding.
The Court held that interpretation of the Second Amendment after its ratification
implied an individual right. Justice Jones, presumably, would neither agree nor disagree –
subsequent opinions on the Amendment are irrelevant to her jurisprudence, which relies on
the original public meaning of the text in the Amendment. If the text came to be interpreted
in the same or a different way, that would not be relevant.
The Court noted that the interpretation it was fixing in Heller did not conflict with
prior jurisprudence in cases like Cruikshank, Presser v. Illinois, or Miller. None of these
cases, the Court held, limits an individual right to arms, although some of them do limit the
types of weapons protected to those which would be used by a militia – weapons in
common use for lawful purposes.
Justice Jones would agree with this holding by stipulation, and it would be
important to note this because minimizing conflict with past law minimizes the amount of
subsequent change necessary to integrate a holding into the legal system. Still, Jones would
point out that a narrower holding would also not conflict with any of these past precedents,
and therefore this point would not affect Justice Jones’ disagreement with the holding.
The Court held that the Second Amendment individual right is limited. It does not,
for example, automatically invalidate restrictions on concealed weapons, possession by
felons, possession by the mentally ill or commercial restrictions on the sale and dealing of
weapons. Insofar as these restrictions prevent further changes to the status quo of law,
Justice Jones would strongly agree with this section of the holding.

Page | 26

However, the Court found that the District’s ban and requirement for trigger-locks
violate the Second Amendment. Regardless of her beliefs on the merit of this interpretation,
Justice Jones would have dissented from this holding. Finding either that the trigger-lock
requirement or the ban on handguns was unconstitutional resolves the case for Mr Heller.
Both cause less change, therefore both are superior rulings.
Additionally, the Court considered a preëxisting licensing requirement for all
firearms within the District. Mr Heller did not seek to strike down the licensing requirement
and therefore relief for Mr Heller would not require determining the constitutional
permissibility of this requirement. Therefore, the Court did not consider the licensing
requirement, a decision with which Justice Jones would strongly agree.
A majority opinion written by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Kennedy, Thomas and Alito provides the opinion of the Court. If Jones
replaced Justice Thomas she would have written a concurring opinion to Justice Scalia’s
now four-point majority opinion. Since only the narrower terms of Jones’ concurrence
would have five affirmations, the concurrence would have become the holding of the Court.
Jones would agree with much of the majority opinion. We have stipulated that she
agrees with the historical reconstruction and with the fundamental point that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to arms. She would even support the Sprague and
Ogden approach and the original public meaning reasoning of the majority. None of this is
surprising, as Jones is, by design, a judicial minimalist version of Justice Scalia.
The majority opinion identifies a new self-defense purpose for the Second
Amendment and limits it by the “in common use” standard articulated in Miller. Although
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the limitation provided by Miller is valued by Justice Jones, she would limit the holding
further still. She would nevertheless agree with the remedy of the Court: Mr Heller must be
permitted to register his handgun and must be given a license to keep it in his home.
The Court could have chosen to additionally strike down the licensing requirement
entirely, but did not since that was not requested by Mr Heller. Justice Jones wouldn’t have
struck down the licensing requirement even if it was requested. In the Court’s dicta, the
majority discussed why their opinion would not ban restrictions on assault rifles and
machine guns: these weapons aren’t “in common use” as required by Miller. Justice Jones
would have disagreed again with this dicta, for Justice Jones wouldn’t have added any dicta
at all. Why would a judicial minimalist add content she already knows to be irrelevant to
the just disposition of a dispute? In fact, this suggests another objective principle of how to
identify judicial minimalists: a minimalist never writes dicta, nor adds any content to
decisions beyond the minimum necessary to resolve a dispute.
In the majority opinion, the Court did not indicate what level of judicial review
should be used for future firearms cases – whether that should be strict scrutiny, rational
basis review, or something else. Having identified the right of individual possession for the
first time, the Court left open the right standard to use when considering the scope of that
right. Justice Jones would, of course, favour that ambiguity.
How would Justice Jones respond to the argument of made by the dissenting
justices in Heller? Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer joined the dissent by Justice
Stevens. Since the dissent aims to dispose the case toward the District, we know that Justice
Jones could not have dissented. What would she have thought of the reasoning? Justice
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Stevens begins by criticizing the majority for overturning longstanding precedent. This a
serious concern for Justice Jones – her most serious procedural concern. However, breaking
with precedent, even causing what Justice Stevens calls “a dramatic upheaval” is
permissible – even required – if a just disposition of the case requires it.
Justice Stevens further argues that the original intention of the authors of the Second
Amendment was more similar to militia protections found in statements by Pennsylvania
and Vermont. This latter point would be unpersuasive to Jones, since her jurisprudence
declares that what matters is the original public meaning, not intentions. Similarly, Stevens’
argument that the Founders would have made protection express if they had intended it
does not matter since Jones doesn’t care about the Founders’ intentions.
Justice Stevens argues that the proper public interpretation of the Second
Amendment, particularly the preamble, requires militia service. This argument at least
shares the theoretical priors required by Justice Jones’ jurisprudence, so it might have
persuaded her, had we not stipulated for the sake of argument that Jones agreed with Justice
Scalia’s interpretation of original public meaning in this case.
Justice Stevens further argues that prior interpretation of the Second Amendment by
lower courts emphasized the militia reading, building a body of case-law that supports that
constitutional interpretation. While stare decisis is of defining importance to judicial
minimalism, Justice Jones would be unpersuaded by this claim, since the decisions of lower
courts has no independent precedent value for determining Supreme Court decisions. The
body of that jurisprudence suggests the ruling in Heller will have a major impact, but
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justice lexically trumps procedural considerations and so Jones cannot agree here with
Justice Stevens.
A separate dissent was filed in Heller by Justice Breyer, who argued that even if the
Second Amendment protects an individual right the restrictions placed by the District’s
handgun ban and trigger-lock requirement would nevertheless be a permissible limitation.
Justice Breyer notes that there are many early examples of gun restrictions during the
Founders era, none of which were found unconstitutional.
Justice Breyer provides a few major examples, the most important of which are
early fire-safety laws that restrict the way in which gunpowder is stored, and early
restrictions in Boston on the possession of loaded firearms in municipal buildings.
Additionally, in some cases individuals were fined their firearm or their firearm was seized
as a result of crime, showing, Justice Breyer argues, that no fundamental right existed.
Justice Breyer’s dissent on this point echoes prominent arguments by Professor
Laurence Tribe, who had previously argued that (1) the Second Amendment protects an
individual right to arms, and (2) this individual right is not abridged by simple bans on
handgun possession or by restrictions on gun storage, like the District’s Firearms Control
Act.
This evidence would be relevant to Justice Jones insofar as it suggests that the
original public meaning of the Second Amendment did not protect a fundamental individual
right to arms. However, since we have stipulated that Justice Jones has determined that the
Second Amendment does protect a fundamental individual right, by stipulation Justice
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Jones rejects these arguments. Since, by stipulation, Mr Heller should win the case, the
handgun ban must be struck down.
Justice Breyer proposes that the Court should adopt a balancing-interest test based
on rational basis review for determining if Mr Heller should be awarded relief. Specifically,
Breyer argues that the interest of the people in their Second Amendment protections should
be balanced against the state’s compelling interest of preventing crime. On this standard,
Breyer argues for upholding the District’s present law.
Here, Justice Breyer echoes the views of prominent jurist Erwin Chemerinsky, who
also argues that Second Amendment firearms protections, even assuming they apply to
individuals, ought to be assessed using the rational-basis-review standard – in essence, by
determining whether or not the restrictions have a rational basis, which even Mr Heller
would concede.
Justice Jones would be unmoved by this analysis and would not support this test.
While it is true that tests of this type can seem to generate nuanced or in-between views,
they go against Justice Jones’ stipulated jurisprudence. Justice Jones might find this policy
proposal sensible – perhaps Justice Breyer can run for elected office and amend the
Constitution to permit it. Until then, it is not for the Court.
Instead, the Court must confine itself to applying the Constitution as it is written
according to its original public meaning (Jones’ jurisprudence), rendering verdicts as
narrowly as possible (Jones’ minimalism). That is why Jones would write a concurring
opinion – she would find in favor of Mr Heller, unlike Justice Breyer, but would change the
status quo of law less than Justice Scalia’s majority opinion.
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Justice Breyer also pointed out the common use distinction used by the majority in
Heller could lead to future rights accruing to assault weapons and even machine guns. He
indicates that this would be a terrible policy, but whether it would or would not does not
matter much to Justice Jones. For Jones what matters is the original public meaning, not
whether or not that meaning is good policy.
While Heller was winding its way up to the Supreme Court, the District considered
revising its policy in order to make the case moot. Jones would have been delighted to have
been spared from making any ruling whatsoever on the grounds of mootness. Immediately
after the decision in Heller, the NRA filed lawsuits in Chicago (McDonald) and San
Francisco (Doe) aiming to overturn handgun bans. This predictable outcome gives yet
another reason for Justice Jones to rule narrowly. Justice Jones would respond to these
cases slowly and incrementally – allowing them to work their way through the system over
the years and declining to grant certiorari wherever justice allows.
Clark Neily, one of the attorneys for Dick Heller in the case, has spoken out in his
support of the verdict, arguing that the Court seized an opportunity to take rights seriously
by making meaningful a previously unclear portion of the Second Amendment. Justice
Jones would say that it is not the place of the Court to “take rights seriously” if the Court
steps beyond the boundaries of its proper role in jurisprudence. This despite the fact that
Justice Jones would have found in favor of Mr. Neily’s client.
Noted jurist and judge for the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Richard
Posner sharply criticized Heller. He compared the decision in Heller to the decision in Roe,
arguing that Heller created a constitutional right that did not previously exist. Justice Jones
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disagrees – her jurisprudence and historical understanding find the individual right to bear
arms in the Second Amendment. She agrees, though, that Heller is too broad.
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Chief Judge for the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, largely agreed with Judge Posner’s analysis and criticized the ruling in Heller for
being activist. However, as has been noted, Justice Jones is not worried about activism if it
means upholding what is just. Therefore, Jones would reject Judge Wilkinson’s criticism.
Nevertheless, she would urge the Court to adopt a narrower opinion.
Since Heller was decided, over eighty different cases have arisen challenging gun
restrictions and seeking to expand Heller’s jurisprudence. Many are now making their way
through the Court system. These cases concern a broad range of proposed restrictions, and
Justice Jones would be content to permit them to wind their way through the review
process. Lower federal courts have mostly upheld gun control restrictions, arguing that the
Second Amendment contemplates these restrictions. These rulings accept the existence of
an individual right to keep and bear firearms but deny that the specific statutes proposed
violate that right. Justice Jones would probably agree, since his finding of facts is in line
with the Heller majority.
The District responded to Heller by using city-planning rules to prevent firearms
dealers from doing business in the District. The City Council of the District passed the
Firearms Registration Emergency Amendment Act of 2008 in response to Heller. The Act
created new rules the District hoped would pass the guidelines set out by Heller. These new
rules included a ban on assault weapons and a ban on large capacity ammunition clips.
Justice Jones certainly would not object to this response since it is for the District and her

Page | 33

voters to decide the policy response to Heller. Mr. Heller challenged these provisions in a
civil suit named Heller v. District of Columbia where he sought summary judgment to
vacate. Mr. Heller sought to register a semi-automatic pistol that uses an automatic bottomloading clip, but the District had banned all bottom-loading weapons as machine guns. On
March 26, 2010, District Judge Ricardo Urbina denied Mr. Heller’s motion, concluding that
the District’s new restrictions passed constitutional muster.
Specifically, Judge Urbina found that the restrictions put in place by the District
sought, following Miller and as codified in Heller, to restrict weapons not found in
“common use”. Since, (i) these weapons were not intended to be protected under the Heller
reading of the Second Amendment, and since (ii) a semi-automatic pistol is such a weapon,
it follows that (iii) a ban on these weapons does not violate Heller.
Later, in Palmer v. District of Columbia, the Washington District Court struck down
a new ban on the public carrying of armed handguns by non-residents of the District.
Specifically, the District Court struck down D. C. Code § 7-2502.02(a)(4) and § 224504(a), but left open the constitutionality of new licensing requirements. Justice Jones
would not grant certiorari on this case.
The decision in Heller has slowly wound its way through the judicial system. In
Illinois, the National Rifle Association has filed multiple lawsuits seeking further
Fourteenth Amendment incorporation of the Second Amendment – in Evanston, Morton
Grove, Wilmette and Chicago. Morton Grove, Wilmette and Evanston all revised their
municipal handgun bans after Heller, so the NRA challenges became moot. This minimalist
legislative resolution would surely satisfy Justice Jones. Chicago, however, maintained
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their handgun ban and the NRA lawsuit, McDonald, moved forward. McDonald was
subsequently dismissed at the state level and the NRA immediately appealed.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court ruled in June 2009 that Heller does not apply
to states but rather only applies to the Federal Government and federally administered
territories like the District of Columbia. The Seventh Circuit therefore upheld the trial court
ruling. It is unclear how Justice Jones would rule on McDonald – it would depend on his
understanding of the original public meaning of the Second Amendment as it applies to
states.
On the one hand, the original intent of the Second Amendment, like the whole Bill
of Rights, is to protect states and citizens from the Federal Government. But the Fourteenth
Amendment’s substantive incorporation by due process might incorporate the Second
Amendment. I suspect Justice Jones would have found that the law in Chicago therefore
violated Heller, although he would have narrowed the ruling.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in McDonald. Here, Justice Jones would
almost certainly agree, though he is normally reluctant to grant certiorari. The Seventh
Circuit decision in McDonald directly conflicts with prior Ninth Circuit jurisprudence
applying Heller to the states. Therefore, Supreme Court arbitration is required. After
hearing the case, the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit on June 28, 2010,
remanding the case back to the Seventh to resolve conflicts with the Chicago statutes and
Heller. Chicago’s tug-of-war continues, with Ezell, decided in 2011, finding that Chicago’s
updates after McDonald still violate Heller.
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There is similar uncertainty in the Second Circuit. Maloney originally found that the
Second Amendment does not apply to the states, following the reasoning of the Seventh
Circuit in McDonald. But after the Supreme Court’s verdict in McDonald, the Supreme
Court vacated the Second Circuit decision in Maloney. Maloney has since been remanded.
Meanwhile, in California, the first case after Heller, Doe v. San Francisco, was settled out
of court when the San Francisco Housing Authority building in question chose to permit
legally licensed firearms. Afterward, in San Diego, the Ninth Circuit ruled in 2014 in
Peruta that a municipal ban on concealed carry combined with a state ban on open carry
violated Heller and McDonald.
Working through Heller illustrates how a judicial minimalist would rule in a reallife recent case. Justice Jones also provides an example of a strict constructivist minimalist,
a possibility ruled out by Sunstein’s account of minimalism in One Case at a Time.
Working through this case also illustrates how judicial minimalists often have the
frustrating experience of being equally disliked by jurists on both ends of the political
spectrum.
The theory of judicial minimalism isn’t vacuous, nor are procedural theories less
important. The theory of checks and balances laid out by the Federalist Papers (as analyzed
by, for example, Furtwangler) is a procedural thesis, not an ideological thesis about
government. That doesn’t make the Federalist Papers any less foundational or less
important.
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Rather, all complete theories of jurisprudence should have both a philosophical orientation
(originalism, strict constructivism, law as integrity, etc.) and a procedural orientation
(minimalism or radicalism).
Further, there are real independent reasons for supporting minimalism. The judicial
minimalist changes the law only very slowly and that has significant effects. On the
negative side, it makes the minimalist slow to adapt to justified changes in the law –
minimalists wind up on the tail end of battles over civil rights and social justice. This
drawback will be analyzed comprehensively in Chapter III.
However, on the positive side, judicial minimalism reinforces stare decisis and with
it the reliability and predictability of the law. There is a reason so many businesses choose
to incorporate in Delaware: working within a predictable and slow-moving legal system is a
major asset and one of the main values to look for in assessing the quality of a legal system.
Is a more reliable and predictable body of law – and an avoidance of errors – trending
behind the curve on civil rights and social justice? That’s an interesting and controversial
policy question, and a trade-off that clearly requires a substantive value judgment. It’s not
an easy question, but it’s an important one – and it certainly deserves sustained analysis.
We have now put forward a formal definition, worked through an example and
distinguished several independent observational tests for determining minimalism. Our next
step is to review the literature and to contrast the approach to judicial minimalism presented
in this Chapter with other approaches found in prior work.

1.4. Literature Review
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We’ve established that judicial minimalism is worth discussing. Now let us look at
how this formal definition relates to the informal approaches found in the literature.
Unfortunately, we run into an initial hurdle: jurists don’t tend to write as much about
minimalism, by definition, the view is less ambitious than radicalism. The most important
author is Sunstein, but I will begin by looking at a less well-known but more formal
analysis by Peters.
Peters, writing in Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, comes as close as I’ve
found to providing a formal definition of judicial minimalism with his term “procedural
minimalism” – the view that judges should rule as narrowly and as shallowly as they can.
Unfortunately, the main argument Peters presents is that procedural minimalism
undermines what he calls “substantive minimalism” – the view that the judiciary should
defer out of practice and habit to the other branches of government.
Peters’ argument is that procedural minimalism undermines judicial restraint – for if
the Court should adjudicate cases narrowly and shallowly, it should be confident in its own
competence to do so without reliance on the other branches. Since there is great overlap
between judicial minimalism and judicial restraint, the idea is to point out a contradiction
Peters’ believes many afflicts many judges.
Peters certainly presents an interesting argument, but it seems to me that the
conclusion of the argument (a confident judge should not worry about affecting other
branches) undermines a premise of the argument (a good judge makes minimal changes in
the law). Another way to put this response is to point out that Peters relies on a hidden
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premise – we have no reason to assume that narrow adjudication improves a judge’s
confidence of changing the law independently.
If a judge decides a case with maximal narrowness, by definition he will leave the
maximum amount of law open to interpretation, clarification and addition by other
branches. However, judicial restraint and judicial minimalism are not at all identical.
Though the decisions made by a minimalist judge may overlap with decisions made using a
policy of restraint, cases where the judge finds the legally mandated ruling unjust pry both
theories apart – the restrainer will find as he considers unjust, the minimalist will never do
so.
The broader problem, I think, is that Peters’ definition of procedural minimalism
doesn’t require the minimalist to rule according to what their judicial philosophy
determines is just. But no minimalist holds the view that one should rule minimally if the
ruling is unjust. Peters’ would allow a minimalist judge to rule actively against what he
thought was the right answer (valuing minimalism over justice). No one actually holds this
view. This definitional error causes Peters’ procedural minimalism to morph into a much
more aggressive theory than judicial minimalism– a theory where the process of
minimalism dominates the requirement of justice. No one holds this view, and it’s no
surprise that if anyone did we would find it in contradiction to our other core jurisprudential
convictions.
Peters may present a thorough analysis, but the most well-known analysis certainly
belongs to Cass Sunstein. Even critics of judicial minimalism agree: Bernick writes that
“Sunstein has done more to define and defend minimalism…than any scholar in recent
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years.” Sunstein’s two most-cited texts on the subject of minimalism are the seminal One
Case at a Time and the popular Radicals in Robes. One Case at a Time frames the rulings
of judicial minimalism as marked by two fundamental characteristics: narrowness (limited
to a minimal impact) and shallowness (absent a unitary theory). We are well-familiar with
the former of these two requirements as it is the essence of my formal definition, but the
latter requires more explanation.
By “shallowness”, I take Sunstein to mean that the Court does not resolve, in
making their decisions, core divisions of principle. The Court, in other words, does not seek
to identify a consensus on principle before reaching a verdict. Rather, it leaves questions
open for future cases and for resolution via the democratic legislative and executive
process.
Sunstein gives specific examples of what he means by narrow cases and what he
means by wide cases. Romer, for example, is a narrow case because it impacts only specific
circumstances where discrimination is prohibited. By contrast, Sunstein argues that Roe is a
wide case, since it banned many different kinds of abortion throughout the United States
without regard to circumstances.
Sunstein identifies the substance of minimalism as the promotion of the core value
of democratic deliberation. Proper minimalist decisions, Sunstein argues, improve
democracy because they permit the legislative and executive branches to debate unresolved
legal and moral questions. When a broad ruling takes these questions off the table it stifles
the democratic process.
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Interestingly, in One Case at a Time, Sunstein does not argue for the correctness of
judicial minimalism in all cases. Rather, Sunstein identifies certain key conditions where he
thinks judicial minimalism is appropriate. Sunstein uses this distinction to respond to the
objection I consider in Chapter III: minimalists find themselves on the wrong side of
history in cases like Brown.
Sunstein’s quite simple answer in One Case is that minimalists only find themselves
on the wrong side of history when they wrongly apply minimalism to cases like Brown.
Narrow rules are only appropriate in specific conditions determined, Sunstein argues, by a
four-point test.
According to One Case, Minimalism is appropriate when: (i) a case involves
changing circumstances or factual or moral uncertainty, (ii) any proposed disposition is
likely to be challenged and revised by future cases, (iii) there is no obvious need for
advance knowledge of how the Court must rule in similar cases, and (iv) the very
foundations of democratic self-government are not at stake.
Brown fails to meet these conditions because, Sunstein would argue, (iv) is violated:
segregation of schools threatens the very foundations of democracy. Yet Sunstein’s position
is vulnerable to an obvious criticism, since in nearly every case someone thinks a vital
pillar of democracy is at stake. Who decides when an issue is so critical that minimalism is
suspended? Sunstein acknowledges having no fully worked out theoretical answer. To me,
this makes his argument unacceptable, the resort to what is fundamentally an ad hoc
epicycle.
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After One Case, Sunstein wrote Radicals, where he attacks “judicial radicalism”,
defined as any attempt to render sweeping verdicts from the bench. Sunstein attacks
radicalism of all types, defending a minimalist approach of incremental, narrow
jurisprudence.
Sunstein begins by rightly noting that it is insufficient to label a jurist ‘liberal’ or
‘conservative’, as is commonly done in ordinary political discourse. Instead, though, of
moving to the two-dimensional graph introduced earlier, Sunstein offers four broad
approaches: perfectionism, majoritarianism, minimalism and fundamentalism. He proceeds
to argue for why minimalism is superior.
First, Sunstein criticizes judicial perfectionism, which he says is based on the idea
that there is a perfect form and interpretation of the constitution which judges identify and
apply. An example of a judicial perfectionist is Sir Thomas Moore, who famously argued in
defense of family law that, since the law was given to man by “Christ, the most perfect of
all law givers, when he was personally present here on Earth” it could not be wrong.
Sunstein rejects judicial perfectionism for various reasons, and argues that it has long fallen
out of favor in contemporary American courts.
Second, Sunstein criticizes majoritarianism, the idea that the Supreme Court must
function along majoritarian principles, serving as another organ of democracy. Sunstein
argues that, contrary to functioning on majoritarian principles, we rather rely on the Court
as a bulwark against tyranny of the majority. Sunstein also argues on historical grounds that
majoritarianism is against the spirit of the Federalist Papers.
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The Federalist Papers, as interpreted by scholars like Furtwangler, aims to guard
Americans from exactly the sort of open majoritarianism that the Founders feared and
witnessed in Revolutionary France. Sunstein adds that majoritarianism has also long since
fallen out of favour within American courts. That leaves fundamentalism, a popular and
influential view that Sunstein directs a great deal of his energy to refuting.
According to Sunstein, fundamentalists believe that the Constitution must be
interpreted according to its original understanding as precisely what was meant at the time
of ratification. Radical fundamentalists advocate immediately implementing the
Constitution’s original meaning – for example, by banning contraceptives, banning gun
control and permitting individual states to establish official churches.
Sunstein grants that fundamentalism as an approach can be principled and neutral,
but argues that radicalism undermines precedent and creates opinions that are too sweeping.
Sunstein argues instead that the Court should seek to craft opinions on which a variety of
people with different ideologies could agree. This argument is a different justification for
judicial minimalism than the arguments I give in Chapter IV, but it is an interesting
defense. At the very least, it demonstrates that minimalism can be a substantive and
significant jurisprudence in its own right, with independent value-based arguments in
support.
However, like Peters, I think the account of minimalism in Radicals is a
mischaracterization. Both Sunstein and Peters fail to identify minimalism as a purely
procedural thesis. The root of the trouble is the lack of a formal definition for minimalism.
According to Sunstein it is impossible to be both a strict constructivist (since Sunstein calls
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that fundamentalism) and a minimalist. But this is, in fact, quite possible, as we
demonstrated with our phantom jurist Justice Jones earlier in this Chapter.
Justice Jones wants the court to go back to the original public meaning of the
Constitution, eventually. But he thinks that doing so immediately would cause unacceptable
damage to precedent and the rule of law. That means going back only very slowly by
reversing cases narrowly and carefully, gradually re-orienting the law toward the
constitution’s original public meaning.
While one might well disagree with Justice Jones’ his position certainly seem
possible. Yet Sunstein’s schema rules this position out categorically. The problem is that
Sunstein defines minimalism too narrowly, ruling out overlapping regions of the
philosophical landscape that might be inhabited.
The popularity and impact of Sunstein’s work has generated the lion’s share of
argument and response regarding minimalism. Jurists like Taylor, writing during the earlier
1990’s, often disagreed with Sunstein’s assessment of the importance of judicial
minimalism at the Supreme Court level, but they nevertheless recognized its significance.
We have now discussed the primary two authors defending judicial minimalism and
provided some analysis. Now, it is worth examining the actual impact of judicial
minimalism in legal practice.

1.5. Minimalism on the Bench
There are many actual judges and justices who are properly described – or, even,
self-describe – as minimalists. Chief Justice Roberts is a self-described minimalist and
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explicitly defended minimalism during his Senate Confirmation Hearings. He has been
loyal to it on the bench, with minimalist decisions in a variety of cases and a reluctance to
grant certiorari.
Earlier in this Chapter, the reluctance to grant certiorari was identified as an
objective indicator of judicial minimalism. It helps confirm that Chief Justice Roberts really
is a minimalist, he isn’t just playing one for political reasons, as critics like Garbus argue.
In this sense, conservative critics like Will characterize the Chief Justice correctly when
they set minimalism as his substantive position.
Before Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was a standard-bearer
for minimalism. On her retirement, Green wrote in Smythe’s Retired but Remembered that
“O’Connor was a moderating voice on the court and was very hesitant to expand the law in
either direction.” Criticism of O’Connor – for example, by Dorothy Roberts and by Krakoff
(considered at length in Chapter II) – often alleged that she hid her normative commitments
by a minimalist insistence on avoiding unitary theories.
Justice Kennedy is also often described as a judicial minimalist. In my own view,
after carefully reviewing his cases, I don’t quite agree. Perhaps that jurists are conflating
moderation (Justice Kennedy is a swing vote) with minimalism. The two are not at all
identical, though Sunstein’s popular account of minimalism, because it focuses on
shallowness, makes conflation easier.
It is true that Justice Kennedy and Justice O’Connor both have decided cases
pragmatically, often working toward consensus. But while this may be evidence of valuing
the goals of minimalism, it is not evidence that either is a minimalist. Looking at the body
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of their work more carefully, I find in her opinions in Webster and Casey and in a lengthier
analysis by Gelfand sufficient evidence to classify Justice O’Connor as a minimalist.
Justice Kennedy I rather think is not, although I leave that opinion open to revision.
Sunstein argues in One Case that Justices Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer are also
judicial minimalists. These claims are more controversial. Justice Ginsburg has a unitary
theory of gender equality in Virginia which would seem to violate Sunstein’s shallowness
requirement. Additionally, it seems like Virginia could have been rendered more narrowly,
violating my formal definition.
Still, Justice Ginsburg has often spoken like a minimalist. Her criticism of Roe
argues that the case is too broad and sweeping and, tellingly, that the decision prevented a
smoother operation of the democratic process which might have built a consensus on the
underlying moral and policy questions at play. In Some Thoughts on Autonomy, Justice
Ginsburg is even clearer, outlining how her verdict in Roe would have diverged. Sunstein
summarizes her conclusions by saying that a minimalist might simply have ruled that states
could not ban abortions in all cases. These rulings would have been narrower, but still
sufficient to resolve the case.
Further, Ginsburg’s commitment to a living constitution approach is not uniformly
or universally applied, and she is critical in Speaking of attempts by the Court to engage in
what she calls “grand philosophy”. Her calls for judicial “modesty” echo calls for judicial
restraint, although as we have shown restraint and minimalism are quite different. Sunstein
has even cited Justice Ginsburg’s well-known collegiality on the bench as evidence for her
minimalism, arguing that her preference for unified opinions is driven by a desire for
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overlapping consensus that reflects a desire for shallowness. In Speaking, Justice Ginsburg
calls for justices to craft “less bold” opinions if it is necessary to secure broader agreement.
Whether Justice Ginsburg’s opinions are minimalist or not is controversial, but
certainly she shares Sunstein’s desire that the role of democratic deliberation should be
maximized in resolving questions of policy. Justice Ginsburg’s arguments for moderation
and incrementalism are fundamentally motivated by the same goal as Sunstein’s judicial
minimalism: a view of the bench as just one branch of democratic deliberation.
Justice Souter, on the other hand, does not self-describe as a judicial minimalist.
Justice Souter never wrote about the law from the perspective of his own voice or his own
judicial philosophy. Sunstein might welcome that reticence as a form of shallowness, but I
don’t assume that. Sunstein cites shallow decisions in Consortium and Bank as evidence for
Souter’s minimalism, but I remain unconvinced.
Finding one way or in one “bloc” of justices, then joining the other bloc, is not
necessarily minimalist unless it is also narrow. It is hard to square Justice Souter’s unitary
theory of federalism and broad rulings to promote it with minimalism. In Idaho, Justice
Souter demanded clearer rules in a case so that lower courts might be given stronger and
clearer guidance. Part of the problem may be that Rosen’s popular portrait of Justice Souter
paints a picture of a minimalist. But as compelling as Rosen’s portrait is, I’m not sure the
evidence it presents is of sufficient rigor to prove this claim.
Sunstein in One Case cites Souter’s view of the Court as a moderating voice in the
national political discourse as evidence for judicial minimalism, but I am unconvinced.
There could be many reasons for holding this view of the Court, ranging from the
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jurisprudential to the strictly political. Again, moderation is not minimalism, and serving as
a swing vote isn’t the same as valuing incrementalism or judging narrowly.
Justice Breyer also doesn’t identify as a judicial minimalist and his own statements
of his jurisprudence, in Active Liberty and Judicial Review, don’t sound minimalist.
However, the point of active liberty is to maximize democratic deliberation (Breyer,
following Constant, calls this the “liberty of the ancients”) in the tradition of political
theorists like Cohen. For Sunstein, this view is therefore motivated by the substantive
purpose of judicial minimalism.
I’m not sure I agree with this assessment. Justice Breyer’s frequent use of balancing
tests and complex decisions indicate a reluctance to use simple unitary theories, but I don’t
think shallowness for its own sake indicates minimalism. Some of Justice Breyer’s
decisions are quite broad, especially when he writes on areas, like capital punishment,
where American law diverges from international and OECD standards.
I grant that Justice Breyer shares the minimalist’s concern for the unintended
consequences of his rulings, seen in his early text Liberty and his later Active Liberty. And I
think that Justice Breyer’s desire to avoid decisions with a strong “commitment to a theme”
speaks in the minimalist language. But his rulings have not always hewed to this line. A
balancing test is not a guarantee of narrow decision-making. Nevertheless, even if he isn’t a
minimalist, there is no denying that Justice Breyer is highly influenced by minimalism.
On the other hand, Justice Kagan genuinely seems to have minimalist leanings. It is
too early to do a proper retrospective analysis, but watching her confirmation hearings she
seemed to explicitly affirm minimalism. Additionally, as solicitor general Justice Kagan
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was known for aiming for narrow judgments, although it is certainly possible that her
expressed views as an advocate will diverge from her views as a justice.
Earlier in this Chapter I introduced a Cartesian plane that allows us to classify
jurists based on two axes. Following that model, here is how I would place the justices
evaluated in this section, along with the other justices currently on the Supreme Court and
the Court’s current nominee. To make this graph I have considered each justices’
jurisprudence over the course of their most prominent decisions, majority opinions,
concurrences, dissents and expository texts. As this graph makes clear, a majority of the
current Supreme Court, if not judicial minimalists, lean in that direction. Justices from left
to right rely on minimalism to guide the way they implement their theories of law.
Minimalism
KAGAN

O’CONNOR ROBERTS

GINSBURG
BREYER
Living Constitution

SOUTER
KENNEDY

SOTOMAYOR

Originalism

ALITO SCALIA
Radicalism
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Minimalists have sometimes claimed other justices and jurists either are, or were,
judicial minimalists. Those so claimed, as outlined critically by Smith, include William
Rehnquist, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Felix Frankfurter, Edmund Burke, Michael Oakeshott,
James Bradley Thayer, John Harlan II, Charles Fried, Henry Friendly, David Strauss,
Daniel Farber, Suzanna Sherry, and Adrian Vermeule. These claims range from the
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plausible to the anachronistic to the silly, and unfortunately I won’t have the space to go
through each of them here. Suffice it to say that if even a fraction of these figures were
actually judicial minimalists, consciously or not, then minimalism would be one of the most
influential theories in the history of jurisprudence.
A theory so important to the practice of judging deserves a rigorous and robust
philosophical analysis. In this Chapter I have started that process. I have given a formal
definition to judicial minimalism, explained why minimalism matters, contrasted
minimalism with other theories, summarized the literature and analyzed minimalism on the
Supreme Court. I now turn to objections to judicial minimalism, both straightforward
(Chapter II) and more challenging (Chapter III).
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Chapter II

Sixteen Objections

In this chapter, I will address sixteen straightforward objections to judicial
minimalism. First, I consider an objection based on general incoherence or a lack of
content. Second, I consider an objection that judicial minimalism is not a major factor in
contemporary jurisprudence. Third, I consider an objection based on the Right Answer
Thesis.
Fourth, I consider an objection based on a vision of a more active policy role for the
judiciary in general. Fifth, I consider an objection based on the idea that minimalism leaves
the judiciary poorly prepared to strike down unconstitutional actions. Sixth, I consider an
objection seeking to undermine claims that judicial minimalism is value neutral. Seventh, I
consider an objection from inflexibility.
Eighth, I consider an objection against the democratic deliberation component of
judicial minimalism. Ninth, I consider an objection from ambiguity. Tenth, I consider an
objection against judicial activism. Eleventh, I consider an objection from Court
responsibility. Twelfth, I consider an objection from order of reasoning. Thirteenth, I
consider an objection to a lack of explanatory power.
Fourteenth, I consider an objection based on the case Bush v. Gore. Fifteenth, I
consider an objection based on implied radicalism. Sixteenth, I consider a variety of
objections all resolved by careful definition. Each of these objections I consider and refute
in turn, ultimately showing that judicial minimalism is robust enough to fend off at least
these numerous initial challenges.
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2.1. Objection from Lack of Content
First, to the objection from a lack of content, called by Sunstein the objection from
general incoherence. Some critics of minimalism argue that it’s impossible to be a
minimalist, or that minimalism is without content. Political critics (e.g. Will) attack the
theory for being vacuous, or alternatively (e. g. Garbus) deny that anyone could be a
minimalist. Instead, these critics claim that minimalism is a pose to pass Senate
questioning. In argument form:
1. There is no objective test, even in principle, to determine if someone is a
judicial minimalist. [PR]
2. A theory which cannot be distinguished in principle by an objective test is
either vacuous or incoherent. [PR]
3. Therefore, judicial minimalism is either vacuous or incoherent. [1,2]
This argument is valid. However, this argument is unsound. Premiss (1) is false, as
shown by the formal definition given in Chapter I. In fact, several objective tests for
minimalism are identified in Chapter I; including an unwillingness to grant certiorari
unless a reversal is intended. If objective tests exist to identify minimalism, Premiss (1) is
false. Since one of the premisses is false, this argument is unsound, and this objection fails.

2.2. Objection from Relevance
Many critics argue that judicial minimalism is not an important theory on the bench.
This criticism doesn’t undermine the theory philosophically, but it suggests that it is less
relevant and consequently less valuable to explore. The most important of these critics is
Stuart Taylor Jr., who wrote two critical articles on the equal protection cases decided
during the late 1990’s.
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The first of these articles is Drawing the Line, where Taylor argues that Supreme
Court decisions on redistricting in the context of the Voting Rights Act were expansionist.
Notably, Taylor singles out for criticism Justice O’Connor, a noted minimalist of whom
Smythe once wrote “O’Connor was a moderating voice on the court and was very hesitant
to expand the law in either direction.”
Taylor argues that O’Connor’s decisions on race-based electoral redistricting cases
are “a jurisprudential mess – a confusing and indeterminate mélange of apparently
conflicting statutory and constitutional doctrines, which provides little useful guidance to
lower courts and amounts to a formula for endless litigation and political chaos.” In other
words, Justice O’Connor is not a minimalist, her views are simply incoherent.
Taking the argument further in Is Judicial Restraint Dead?, Taylor argues that a
pattern of activism emerges in the 1990’s equal protection cases:
“[It] it is becoming ever more clear that not a single member of the current
Court can be called a consistent practitioner of judicial restraint. Each of the
equal protection decisions – which were lauded, in turn, by liberal advocates of
gay rights and women’s rights, and by conservative advocates of ‘colorblind
Constitution’ jurisprudence – was an exercise in judicial activism. And each of
the nine justices joined at least one of them.”
These cases, Taylor argues, indicate that the justices on the bench aren’t ruling minimally
and they aren’t practicing judicial restraint. They are activists, on one side or the other. In
argument form, Taylor’s objection is as follows:
1. If no leading jurists hold a theory of jurisprudence, it is not relevant. [PR]
2. Show: No leading jurists hold minimalism as their theory of jurisprudence.
a. Some leading jurists claim to hold minimalism as their theory of
jurisprudence. [PR]
b. However, a careful analysis of their cases proves that they are, in
fact, not minimalists. [PR]
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c. Therefore, no leading jurists hold minimalism as their theory of
jurisprudence. [a,b]
3. Therefore, minimalism is not relevant. [1,2]
This argument is valid. It is a simple instantiation of modus ponens. However, this
argument is unsound. Premiss (2) is false. As given above, Premiss (2) has support in the
form of a three-step sub-argument. This sub-argument is invalid. Just because some jurists
who claim to hold minimalism are, actually, not minimalists it does not follow that there
are no minimalists. Maybe there are silent minimalists who hold the theory but don’t say
so.
Additionally, the ‘a’-‘b’-‘c’ sub-argument is unsound, because ‘b’ is false. It is clear
immediately that Taylor isn’t referring to judicial minimalism, he’s referring to judicial
restraint, and these two views are, in fact, very different. In other words, Taylor well argues
for a modified premiss:
b*.

However, a careful analysis of their cases proves that they are,
in fact, not jurists of judicial restraint. [PR]

However, this modified premiss is insufficient to support ‘c’. Consequently,
Taylor’s analysis supports ‘b*’, which is true, but if ‘b*’ is used the sub-argument is
invalid. Taylor’s analysis does not support b, which it must for the argument to be sound.
Therefore, ‘b’ is false, and the sub-argument is unsound.
Taylor could save himself by using ‘b*’ and adding a new premiss ‘d’:
a. Some leading jurists claim to hold minimalism as their theory of
jurisprudence. [PR]
b*. However, a careful analysis of their cases proves that they are, in
fact, not minimalists. [PR]
d. Judicial minimalism and judicial restraint are coextensive. [PR]
c. Therefore, no leading jurists hold minimalism as their theory of
jurisprudence. [a,b]
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However, unfortunately for Taylor, the new premiss ‘d’ is false. Minimalism and
restraint are not at all coextensive. Crucially, it is a requirement under the Chapter I
definition of minimalism that the minimalist always rules in the direction required by
justice. A jurist of restraint need not maintain this commitment. It is possible that the jurist
of restraint may rule instead intentionally unjustly (or may simply resign) if that would be
more restrained.
I base this distinction on an understanding of the substance of judicial restraint as
opposition to any ruling that minimizes the scope for discretion for the legislative and
executive branches. Judicial restraint opposes even rulings which minimize that discretion
but are just. For a jurist of this stripe, Taylor’s criticisms of the Court are well motivated,
and it may well be that none of the current justices actually believes in judicial restraint.
A judicial minimalist, however, sometimes makes rulings that explicitly rebuke and
overrule the legislative branch, even as he or she tries to narrow the scope of those rulings
as much as possible. A restraint jurist, like Bickel, would avoid making these rulings
entirely. This difference distinguishes these two views, and consequently Taylor is
attacking a straw-man in sub-premise (b).
In fact, the specific criticism Taylor makes echoes exactly what the judicial
minimalist should want. “A confusing and indeterminate mélange of apparently conflicting
statutory and constitutional doctrines, which provides little useful guidance to lower courts”
sounds rather like what a critic would call a series of narrowly tailored rulings catered to
individual fact patterns. Therefore, the sub-argument in support of Premise (2) is invalid,
and is at any rate certainly unsound. Premise (2) is in fact not true, as our evidence from
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Chapter I suggests. Therefore, the argument of the Objection from Relevance is unsound,
since it relies on a false premise (Premise (2)). Therefore, the Objection from Relevance
fails.

2.3. Objection from the Right Thesis
I move now to a third objection based on the Right Thesis (RT). The RT is an
ontological thesis credited to Ronald Dworkin, appearing first in his essay Taking Rights
Seriously, and later elaborated in his book Law’s Empire. The RT is the ontological claim
that a right answer exists to every legal question. If we accept the RT as an ontological
premise, then it seems at first to follow that jurisprudence is really quite simple: discover
the right answer and then apply it. Since the answer the judge is applying is ontologically
correct, the judge need not shy away from applying it maximally.
A thought experiment proposed by Dworkin helps to explain the intuition powering
this argument. Imagine that instead of jurisprudence we were considering the field of
rocketry. Suppose that NASA asked for the amount of fuel required to place a given object
into orbit. After calculating that amount using semi-classical mechanics, we arrive at the
figure of four-hundred thousand pounds of propellant.
A question has been asked and the right answer has been determined using the right
method. When we design the space launch protocol, how should we state the fuel
requirements? Should we say, as we know to be true, that four-hundred thousand pounds of
propellant is required? Or should we say, as a minimalist might, that some amount of fuel is
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required, and that the amount is more than a thousand and less than a hundred million
pounds.
If what we want to do is maximize our chance of correctness, we should opt to say
the latter. Since we will have then specified a wide range, there is a greater likelihood that
our statement is true, even if the mathematics turns out to be in error. But surely no
engineer prefers the latter answer. We have the right answer as best we can find it, now,
surely, we should simply give that answer.
Continuing the analogy, judges are not unlike rocket engineers. Like engineers, they
are experts asked by society to consider a specific aspect of human endeavor. Just as we
expect a rocket engineer to give a final answer on questions of rocketry, it seems reasonable
that we should expect a Supreme Court justice to give a final answer on questions of law. In
argument form:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

RT. [PR]
Therefore, judges should judge by searching for the right answer. [1]
Therefore, a good judge finds the right answer. [1,2]
Therefore, a good judge, having found the right answer, should render a
maximal decision based on what it is. [3]

This argument, more or less in this form, is common throughout the law-as-integrity
tradition. For example, in Law’s Empire, Dworkin’s model judge (Hercules) renders fairly,
quickly, simply and maximally, using the right answer to the questions that are posed
before him. It’s an attractive view, perhaps because it seems intuitively like the sort of view
we’d like to see from a judge at our own trial.
Unfortunately, as appealing as this view of jurisprudence seems, I think virtually
every step of the argument is wrong. First, I think the argument is invalid, in two places:
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the move from (1) to (2), and the move from (2) to (3). Second, I think the argument has
false premises. In particular, I think the Right Answer Thesis, though academically
interesting and intuitively satisfying, is provably false.
The move from (1) to (2) is invalid. Even if a right answer exists to a legal question,
there is no reason to assume that judges should go about their work by trying to find that
answer, nor is there any reason to assume that they ever even could find that answer even in
principle. As an example, in physics, the truly right answer to the question of how to launch
a satellite requires complex relativistic and even quantum adjustments. But that is not at all
what a good engineer does to actually launch a satellite. Instead, a good engineer solves the
problem using classical or semi-classical mechanics. The existence of a right answer that is
more complex does not mean that the best solution to a problem necessarily involves
searching for it – sometimes using a known wrong approximate answer is a better method.
Therefore, even if a right answer exists, it may make the most sense for the judge to
simply ignore that answer and make his decisions based on heuristics that consider other
factors. It may even make the most sense for the judge to embrace a known wrong answer.
In the game of Texas Hold’Em (a form of poker), the heuristic “play with an aggression
factor of three” is known to be non-optimal, and is even provably so. Nevertheless, we
often teach exactly that heuristic to amateur players, and it significantly improves their
play. Similarly, in chess, there is a known method of how to maximize checkmating odds
with a rook and bishop against a rook. But no one, not even the World Champion, would
bother learning it – they operate on a known wrong heuristic (make repeated threats)
because it yields good outcomes (in practice, it is challenging for the weaker side to hold).
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A Position Where a Grandmaster Avoids the Optimal Strategy

These examples and this argument demonstrates that the move from (1) to (2) in the
objection from the RT is not truth-preserving, and that, of course, makes the objection from
the RT logically invalid. But just to reinforce that point, I think we can give strong further
evidence that the move from (2) to (3) also fails to preserve truth, and the RT objection is
therefore doubly invalid.
The conclusion “good judges can find the right answer” does not at all follow from
the premise “judges should search for the right answer.” The search for a right answer
might, like so many philosophical questions, be the sort that rewards the searching, though
a final answer proves elusive. It may be that judges should search for the right answer
simply because the search illuminates the case.
In fact, it is not difficult to construct a counterexample that shows the invalidity of
moving from (2) to (3). Perhaps legal questions have a right answer in principle, but
calculating that answer requires data like a perfect knowledge of human psychology. This is
not implausible, for with a perfect knowledge of human psychology all sorts of judgments
might be open to us; but only with that knowledge.
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Of course, since we don’t have that data in practice, while in principle there is a
right answer, in practice there is no way to find it. This is a manifest counterexample to the
reasoning required to move from (2) to (3), since (2) is true (there is a right answer) but (3)
is false (a good judge never finds that answer). The only way to move from (2) to (3)
validly is to introduce a hidden premise:
(H) A good judge can find the right answer to legal questions put before him.
There is no reason to grant (H). It is not at all obvious that good judges can find
right answers. It may be that a right answer exists but that no mortal judge could see it, at
least given current technology, as in the example above. There is, for example, a right
answer to the question of how to perfectly play chess, but it does not follow that humans
can find that answer, since we lack the processing power.
If there are quantum effects in the brain, as Roger Penrose has argued: it may even
be that a right answer exists, but no human judge could ever, even in principle, find it. This
is not so dissimilar from the uncertainty principle in the De Broglie-Bohm interpretation of
quantum mechanics: there is a defined position and momentum, but no one could ever,
even in principle, identify it.
Additionally, even if we were to assume that the argument of the objection from a
right answer was valid, the objection is unsound because it has false premises. The RT is
not true; in fact, it’s provably false. The proof comes in a special type of fact-pattern found
in certain cases that I call paradoxical cases. Analyzing these counterexamples proves that
the RT is false.
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An ancient example of a paradoxical case comes from a paradox known as the
Paradox of the Court, also sometimes called the Counter-Dilemma of Euathlus. Although
there are other paradoxical cases, this case is both the oldest and (by far) the best analyzed
in the literature. Our best historical telling of the Paradox is from Attic Nights. I have
translated the key passage as follows:
“Among fallacious arguments there is one…which seems very much the most
invalid. This fallacy occurs when an argument can be reversed in the opposite
direction as it was originally presented, and is equally strong presented for both
sides. One example is a well-known argument that Protagoras, cleverest of
sophists, used against his pupil Euathlus.
“The origin of this example is a dispute between Protagoras and his pupil over
a fee…Euathlus was a wealthy young man that sought instruction in
oratory…[becoming] Protagoras’ student and [promising] to pay a large sum of
money…He agreed to pay half of the amount at once, before beginning his
instruction, and agreed to pay the remaining half on the day when he won his
first case before a jury.
“After Euathlus had studied with Protagoras for a short time… he still did not
take upon himself any cases. After a while it seemed that Euathlus was not
taking cases simply in order to avoid paying the rest of the fee...So,
Protagoras…[demanded] the remainder of his pay in court, and brought suit
against Euathlus.
“When Protagoras and Euathlus appeared before the jurors …Protagoras
[said]: ‘…In either event you will have to pay what I demand.... For if the case
goes against you, the payment will be due to me in accordance with the
verdict…But, if the decision instead should be decided in your favour, the
money will still be due to me as per the terms of our…contract.’
“…Euathlus replied: ‘…let me tell you in turn…that in either event I shall not
have to pay what you demand…for if the jurors decide in my favour, according
to their verdict nothing will be due to you, because I will have won the case.
But if they give judgment against me, by the terms of our original contract,
I shall owe you nothing, because I have not yet won a case.’
“The jurors, finding this dilemma insoluble and the argument both for and
against equally compelling…decided to leave the matter unresolved and instead
postpone the case to a very distant date.”
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In original words: the historical dispute is between two individuals, Protagoras and
Euathlus. Protagoras charged a fee to teach Euathlus rhetoric and law. Both agreed that
Euathlus would pay half this fee up front and the other half after he wins his first case.
Euathlus paid the first half and Protagoras taught. However, Euathlus showed no further
interest in law.
As time passed, Protagoras came up with an ingenious strategy: he sued Euathlus
for the balance. At trial, Protagoras moved for summary judgment. Protagoras argued that
there were only two outcomes: either the court could rule in his favour, in which case he
wins, or the court could rule in favor of Euathlus, in which case Euathlus would have won
his first case and would owe Protagoras the balance.
Euathlus, however, surprised Protagoras by also moving for summary judgment.
Euathlus agreed that there were only two outcomes: either the court could rule in his
favour, in which case he would not owe Protagoras, or the court could rule for Protagoras,
in which case he would not have won a case and would not owe Protagoras. In this case,
both plaintiff and defendant put forward arguments that seem to prove summary judgment
in their favour. Obviously, the two arguments are logically contradictory. Protagoras and
Euathlus cannot both be right, yet it seems that neither of them can be wrong.
Perplexed by this dilemma, and unable to find their way to a just conclusion, the
Athenian court adjourned the case for one hundred years. While this clever move is a fitting
narrative end, it is not just: Protagoras and Euathlus are due justice and an indefinite delay
without touching on the merits of the case unjustly deprives them of that legal right.
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There are various historical attempts to resolve this dilemma, from the Stoics to
Leibniz. Yet the most accurate answer seems also to be the simplest: there just is no right
answer in this case. Since the case turns on a logical paradox, no right answer could ever
exist. This clarifies a question of legal ontology: no right answer exists in this case;
therefore, a right answer cannot exist in all cases. In argument form:
1. RT. [PR]
2. Therefore, it is not the case that there is a case where no right answer exists
[1, Quantifier Negation]
3. Protagoras v. Eauthlus is a case where no right answer exists. [PR]
4. Therefore, there is a case where no right answer exists. [3]
Conclusion (2) and conclusion (4) are contradictory, therefore the argument is either
invalid or Premise (3) or Premise (1) is false. The argument is valid, therefore either
Premise (3) or Premise (1) is false. Premise (3) is true, for the reasons argued above.
Therefore, Premise (1) is false. Therefore, the RT is false. Therefore, Premise (1) of the
objection to judicial minimalism is false. Therefore, the RT objection is unsound.
Of course, judges sometimes believe that they have found a right answer, and the
proof that no right answer exists in every case is not a proof that no right answer exists in
any case. But similarly, the confidence of a judge that they have found the right answer is
not indisputable evidence that they have. After all, one can be wrongly confident – or
overconfident – of the truth of one’s position.
In fact, history shows us that the Court has at times ruled unanimously and with
great conviction only to see their decision overturned later on, sometimes unanimously and
sometimes rapidly. Loving v. Virginia is an example of a case with a resounding 9-0
decision that was unanimously overturned less than three decades later. Confidence is not
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the same as justified confidence, and even justified confidence is not the same as truth. If
the objection to judicial minimalism from the existence of a right answer is to succeed,
even if the argument were valid, there must be a right answer to every legal question. But
there isn’t, and therefore the objection fails.

2.4. Objection from Scope
This objection begins by noting that judicial minimalism strikes a very narrow role
for the judiciary. The Objection from Scope begins with the assumption that judges are
simply better at crafting policy than legislators. There are two main versions, I think, of this
objection. First, there is the straightforward argument that judges are just better
policymakers. Judges are free from politics and popular pressure, the argument goes, and
are better trained for understanding the nuances of public policy. This view is perhaps
summarized by an old Washington maxim often credited to President Nixon: “The Supreme
Court is where nine highly-educated experts defer to five-hundred and thirty-five fools.” In
argument form:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Judges are better policy-makers than legislators. [PR]
Policy should be made by the best policy-makers. [PR]
Therefore, judges should make policy over legislators. [1,2]
Judicial minimalism minimizes the scope for judges to make policy over
legislators. [PR]
5. Therefore, judicial minimalism is wrong. [3,4]

This argument seems valid. The move from (4) to (5) seems well-motivated but not
deductively forced. Nevertheless, the main problem is that this argument is unsound. Even
if you granted Premiss 1 (and I see no reason to do so), Premiss 2 is manifestly false.
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Policy, in the United States, should be made by those individuals empowered by the
Constitution to make policy, whether they are “good” policy-makers or not.
Nixon’s view may be amusing, but as a serious suggestion it is obviously
inadequate. Whether a judicial oligarchy is superior to a representative democracy is a
policy question beyond the scope of this essay. But it is abundantly clear from even a
cursory reading of the Constitution that no such oligarchy has ever been intended as the
mode of government for the United States.
If a citizen feels that a judicial oligarchy is superior as a form of government, then
they should engage in efforts to appropriately amend the Constitution. That would be a
change of government for the United States, and the new legislative-executive-judiciary
would be bound by new mandates and new objectives. Judicial minimalism would be a
different system in such a world, and my defense of it here might be irrelevant.
But this is not the world in which our jurisprudence operates. In our world, Premiss
2 is anti-Constitutional and false. And perhaps that is for the best, for defenders of this
objection might rapidly find that once the judiciary was making the kind of policy decisions
that are made in Congress the same special interests and political considerations would
begin to affect their judicial discourse. Singapore’s government has many fine features, but
even her polity is not free from lobbying or partisan conflict. In other words, Premiss 1 may
well also be false. Since this objection is based on an argument with false premisses, the
argument in support of the objection is unsound, and the objection is therefore
unpersuasive.
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On reflection, though, perhaps this is not the most charitable way of reading the
judicial scope objection. Perhaps the most charitable reading is not to hold that judges make
all decisions on policy better than the legislature, but rather just some decisions. Perhaps
with fundamental value judgments, or questions of war and peace we do want the decision
to come from the people’s representatives. But perhaps on other matters, especially on
technical issues where the public probably has no opinion, we ought to let judges decide.
This fill-in-the-gaps model seems in some ways to be immediately compelling.
Congressmen have all sorts of things to do with their time. Perhaps they should just sketch
out the broad outlines of public policy – and after that’s done, our judicial branch can fill in
the gaps and turn an idea about policy into a technical law. In some ways the Congress
already does this, with Members sending “bill requests” to a central nonpartisan legal office
which drafts the technical details. No one elects these central staffers, but no one objects to
their work or considers them anything but a necessity.
Why not take it a step further by giving judges a wider degree of latitude? Consider
an issue like intellectual property protection. Broadly speaking, we want people to be
creative and we want rights to be protected. But what about the technical details of whether
a specific patent infringes on a particular type of business idea? Realistically, Members of
Congress don’t have views on this subject. If they take a position at all they will probably
do so motivated by non-policy factors like special interests and political capital. Perhaps,
therefore, the subject ought to best be left to judges and other experts, as, indeed, some like
Garbus think it already is.
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This view leads naturally to the conclusion that appointing members of the judiciary
is vitally important for policy-making, and that the criteria of a good justice is not solely (or
even primarily) based on their legal qualifications. Since justices are engaged in policymaking, it becomes quite important that they are the “right people” with the “correct”
political orientation.
So, for example, calls abounded from liberals for Justice Ginsburg to step down in
2015 so that President Obama could nominate another justice. Not because Justice
Ginsburg has lost her keenness as a scholar or because she wishes to pursue other
opportunities in private life, but because otherwise a Republican president will nominate
her successor, and therefore her successor might have the wrong set of views.
An op-ed by eminent liberal legal scholar Erwin Chemerinsky well captures this
view. Chemerinsky thinks Ginsburg is a fine justice and could probably serve admirably for
many more years. Unfortunately, he also thinks that there’s a good chance President
Obama’s successor will be a Republican. For Chemerinsky, there are the right judges and
the wrong judges. Since President Obama’s successor, if he or she should be a Republican,
will likely replace Justice Ginsburg with a justice with the wrong views, Chemerinsky
urges Justice Ginsburg to retire now, while there is still time for President Obama to replace
her with a justice with the correct views. Otherwise we will have the wrong person filling
in the gaps, and the wrong sort of policies will become law. In argument form, this more
refined version of the Objection of Scope is as follows:
1. Judges are better technical policy-tuners than legislators. [PR]
2. Small points of policy should be left to the best technical policy-tuners. [PR]
3. Therefore, judges should fill in small points of policy. [1,2]
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4. Judicial minimalism minimizes the scope for judges to fill in small points of
policy. [PR]
5. Therefore, judicial minimalism is wrong. [3,4]
This argument is valid, or, at least, provides good evidence for its conclusion and
may be stipulated to be valid a fortiori as above. It is designed to be a mirror construction
of the first argument given above, so the logical structure has been correspondingly
preserved. However, the argument is unsound. Again, Premiss 2 is unsupported and, though
intuitive, runs afoul of Constitutional guidelines.
It may be possible that judges must, in some very specific cases, actually render
policy decisions. But, quite clearly, Article III of the Constitution permits policy-making
only as rarely as possible. Otherwise, for better or for worse, judges are constitutionally
restrained by our legal framework. There is a philosophical justification for this limitation.
Judges are appointed and they serve, at the federal level, life terms. While the people have
some influence on their appointment by electing those who appoint them, they have little
democratic recourse if a federal judge should become unrepresentative. It makes sense then,
in a democracy, to limit the scope of powers for these unelected judges as much as possible.
Sometimes history has shown us that judges are ahead of the curve. In Brown v.
Board, the Court was ahead of the times. Judicial minimalists will stand out, sometimes, for
being cautious about a case like Brown. But that is a sacrifice that has to be made in order
to maintain fidelity to Article III. Partly this has to do with the special value of
predictability in the practice of law, an argument developed further in Chapter IV. And it is
certainly the case that a minimalist about jurisprudence needn’t be a minimalist elsewhere.
There is a correlation between minimalism and conservatism but that correlation is not
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inherently causal. Therefore, for better or for worse, Premiss 2 is false and this argument is
unsound. Since the argument underlying the Objection from Scope is unsound, the
objection fails.
It is worth adding as a note that if any judge feels that a particular law is so
egregious and flagrantly unjust that, despite being constitutionally permissible, he or she is
absolutely unable to uphold it in good conscience, then he or she must simply resign. Then,
if the judge wants to change the law, the path is clear: win election to Congress, persuade
Congress of the need for change and pass a new law. Objections to minimalism on the
grounds that the world would be a better place if judges ruled maximally disregard the
document which empowers judges to rule at all. The Objection from Scope is
fundamentally unpersuasive, at least as long as we confine our analysis to the American
Constitutional framework.

2.5. Objection from Inaction
Another objection is that judicial minimalism fails to equip Supreme Court justices
with the necessary legal framework to strike down oppressive government action. I call this
the Objection from Inaction. Berwick makes this point elegantly. Berwick argues that the
purpose of the Supreme Court is to act as a bulwark against unconstitutional and tyrannical
laws passed by Congress. Minimalism is too vacuous to permit the Court to exercise this
function and is therefore unacceptable.
Where judicial minimalists sees a judicial branch that needs to mindfully pay
deference to the elected legislature, Berwick sees a strong independent institution whose
function is to aggressively guard the rights of individuals. Berwick views the fundamental
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function of the Court as a guardian against tyranny of the majority, and grounds the purpose
of the Court in the body of work by the Framers expressing concern over the effects of
unchecked majoritarianism. Since minimalists eschew broad rulings and do not rule, as
Berwick sees it, from deep principles, minimalism causes judges to abandon their crucial
constitutional role. Justices, he argues, can only serve their purpose by actively adopting the
philosophy of the Constitution and then aggressively ruling to protect constitutional rights.
As an example of the failures of judicial minimalism, Berwick cites Kelo. In Kelo,
the City of New London condemned a tract of private land so that it could be transferred to
a private developer. Kelo broke new ground, for never before had the Court upheld the use
of eminent domain for a transfer from private owner to private owner. The simple fact that
a different private owner would use property in a more economically productive way had
never before justified a coercive eminent domain taking.
In Kelo, the Court spoke in judicial minimalist language, discussing their
unwillingness to strike down a democratically-determined development plan and
expressing concern over the burden to smaller municipalities of requiring extensive
documentary evidence of immediate benefit. The economic development proposal involved
in Kelo never materialized, but, Berwick claims, minimalists still ground their holding in
Kelo on the idea of maintaining the dignity and authority of the Court.
Yet, in this respect, Kelo was surely an abject failure. Opinion polls taken
immediately after Kelo found that over eighty percent of Americans opposed the ruling.
Since Kelo, ninety percent of states have specifically passed statues to guarantee that
similar uses of eminent domain are illegal within their jurisdiction. Berwick argues that if
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the Court had been less opposed to deep reasoning, and had focused more on the proper
meaning of the public use requirement, public outrage over Kelo, which has harmed the
reputation and authority of the Court, would have been avoided.
Can Sunstein rescue himself from this counterexample by saying that Kelo is not a
case where judicial minimalism is appropriate? No, Berwick argues, for the obvious
philosophical response is that Sunstein is determining which cases to apply minimalism in
an ad hoc manner. If there is no principled rule for how to apply minimalism, then
minimalism can’t plausibly be said to be a theory of jurisprudence, either procedurally or
substantively.
Judges, Berwick argues, are supposed to confine themselves to rulings justified by
the Constitution. Whatever their interpretative theory, they are bound by the rule of law to
implement the intentions of the Framers and Amenders as they review statutory doctrine.
By abstracting away from the necessity of forming an interpretative theory, Berwick
argues, judicial minimalism calls for replacing philosophical analysis with judicial fiat.
Berwick’s account of Sunstein’s answer is that Sunstein simply wishes to use
judicial minimalism when he likes, at the discretion of the judge. This will leave the law to
be determined by the way individual judges feel with no regard to the intentions of the
Framers or the letter of the law. Minimalism is thus not only not humble in its outcome but
rather highly arrogant, for it elevates the personal opinion of the judge over all other
factors.
Berwick argues that with the power of judicial review comes a duty for judges to be
bound by the Constitution and to transparently explain the principles of their reasoning as
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they arbitrate cases. Only then can litigants accurately predict the nature and future
judgments of the Court. With this core hollowed out by judicial minimalism, the Court
abdicates this solemn responsibility.
According to Berwick, a Court which aims, out of judicial minimalism, to avoid
adopting a principled and consistent approach to all cases and all constitutional questions
inevitably shirks her responsibilities and treats defendants unequally. Therefore, insofar as
judicial minimalism is a theory of shallowness in jurisprudence, it is wrong, for only a deep
theoretically grounded theory can give the Court the ballast she needs to function. In
argument form, Berwick’s criticism is as follows:
1. The job of the Supreme Court is to strike down tyrannical laws. [PR]
2. Judicial minimalism, if adopted, makes a Court less likely to strike down
tyrannical laws. [PR]
3. Therefore, judicial minimalism makes a Court less likely to do its job. [1,2]
4. A philosophy which makes the Court less likely to do its job is wrong. [PR]
5. Therefore, judicial minimalism is wrong. [3,4]
This argument is valid. It has the form:
1. Cx ⊃ Sx [PR]
2. Mx → (Cx & ¬Sx) [PR]
3. Mx → ¬ (Cx ⊃ Sx) [1,2]
4. ∀x((Ix → ¬ (C ⊃ S)) ⊃ Wx) [PR]
5. ∴ Mx ⊃ Wx [3,4]
Where ‘C’ is ‘ α is the Supreme Court’, ‘S’ is ‘α strikes down tyrannical laws’, ‘M’ is ‘α
adopts judicial minimalism’, ‘I’ is ‘α is a philosophy’, ‘W’ is ‘α is wrong’ and ‘φ→Ψ’ is an
operator with the meaning ‘φ reduces the likelihood of Ψ’. This argument is valid.
Nevertheless, the argument is unsound. Specifically, premiss 1 is false as presented: it is
not the sole job of the Supreme Court to strike down tyrannical laws.
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It is fundamentally the function of the legislature to abolish tyrannical laws. It is the
function of the Supreme Court to make sure that all of the laws, tyrannical or otherwise,
accord with the Constitution. This is the limited and specific power assumed by the Court
in Marbury and the limit to the authority of its mandate. Perhaps, though, it is possible to
modify Berwick’s argument to accommodate this correction.
To do so, we must replace “The job of the Supreme Court is to strike down tyrannical
laws” with “One of the jobs of the Supreme Court is to strike down tyrannical laws”. Or, to be
precise, perhaps with: “One of the jobs of the Supreme Court is to strike down tyrannical
laws, at least those tyrannical laws which conflict with the Constitution”. Surely, no one could
disagree with the truth of that premise. The new argument would then be:
1. One of the jobs of the Supreme Court is to strike down tyrannical laws, at
least those tyrannical laws which conflict with the Constitution. [PR]
2. Judicial minimalism, if adopted, makes a Court less likely to strike down
tyrannical laws. [PR]
3. Therefore, judicial minimalism makes a Court less likely to do its job. [1,2]
4. A philosophy which makes the Court less likely to do its job is wrong. [PR]
5. Therefore, judicial minimalism is wrong. [3,4]
Unfortunately, while premiss 1 is now certainly true, this new argument is rather
manifestly invalid. In particular, the move from premisses (1) and (2) to sub-Conclusion (3)
now doesn’t follow at all. It follows only that judicial minimalism makes the Court less
likely to do one of its jobs, specifically the striking down of tyrannical laws. That, I can
plainly grant – but that is no dispositive guarantee of the conclusion. We can modify
Berwick’s argument further to restore validity by simply substituting “one of its jobs”
through:
1. One of the jobs of the Supreme Court is to strike down tyrannical laws, at
least those tyrannical laws which conflict with the Constitution. [PR]
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2. Judicial minimalism, if adopted, makes a Court less likely to strike down the
tyrannical laws that conflict with the Constitution. [PR]
3. Therefore, judicial minimalism makes a Court less likely to do one of its
jobs. [1,2]
4. A philosophy which makes the Court less likely to do one of its jobs is
wrong. [PR]
5. Therefore, judicial minimalism is wrong. [3,4]
Validity has now been restored and premiss 1 is true. Unfortunately, premiss (4) is
now questionable. It is not at all clear that a philosophy which makes the Court perform one
of its functions worse is a bad philosophy. For example, the philosophy of the Court
double-checking all case-numbers against the record makes it harder to perform the job of
“swiftly delivering justice” (double-checking case-numbers takes time). But it improves the
Court’s performance on the job of “don’t make legal blunders”. Since the latter job is more
crucial, we are willing to sacrifice performance on the former for performance on the latter.
It is not coincidental that Berwick’s argument has trouble once we get down to the
nitty-gritty of symbolizing and analyzing it. Berwick’s primary intuition is that judicial
minimalism, by requiring shallowness, leaves a theory remaining which is not robust
enough to strike down legislative errors. But as our definition of Chapter I makes clear,
minimalism doesn’t require shallowness.
Berwick assumes that minimalism cannot maintained a principled imposition of
foundational legal principles because he assumes that minimalism cannot embrace legal
principles at all. But as minimalism is defined in Chapter I the Court not only can but in
fact must rule according to deep and transparent legal principles. Minimalism instructs the
Court in how to apply those principles and how, over time, to change the status quo of law.
But the principles are a required part of the ruling.
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Considering Berwick’s example of Kelo directly, even if the Court’s holding was
minimalist, Berwick’s objection isn’t to the scope of the ruling but to the content. It is
completely cogent to say that Kelo, though minimalist, was wrongly decided, because the
Court used the wrong theory of justice. But the problem then is not minimalism, it’s the
erroneous theory of justice the Court employed in reaching the majority opinion. So this
objection fails either because it targets the wrong thing – attacking minimalism when it
should be attacking other theories of justice – or because it wrongly assumes an informal
definition of minimalism that requires shallowness.

2.6. Objection from Value Bias
A sixth objection to minimalism deals with value-neutrality. The idea of using
value-neutral rules to construct public policy comes from the influential evidence-based
policy approach. The aim is to improve policy by making changes that do not assume a
particular normative perspective and are consequently value-neutral. Not all definitions of
minimalism claim that minimalism is value-neutral. However, the definition of minimalism
given in Chapter I is presented as ideologically neutral and so may be vulnerable to this
objection. A persuasive and extensive form of this criticism is given by Smith, who writes
in Reckless Caution that minimalism is “merely a placeholder invoked to sanction a grabbag of desiderata.”
Smith argues that the fact that jurists from different (inconsistent) ideological
perspectives can separately endorse judicial minimalism indicates that the theory is
incoherent. Minimalism, Smith argues, is either internally contradictory or vacuous. Smith
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is not alleging bad faith; criticizing Rosen’s attacks against originalists in McJustice,
Prakash’s attacks on Sunstein for advocating selective restraint, and Cooper’s criticism in
Calabresi of minimalism as smuggling in a liberal agenda. All of these objections are ad
hominem attacks on particular theorists, according to Smith, and, therefore, are
philosophically uninteresting. The problem is not bad faith, she argues – its bad ideas.
Smith argues that judicial minimalism actually requires inconsistency, a changing theory
that morphs as it encounters new scenarios. This is because minimalism, according to
Smith, fails to refer to a single method of judicial decision-making.
Smith follows Sunstein in the usual definition of minimalism as narrow and
shallow. In putting forward minimalism as a theory, Smith also credits the Burkean values
of stability and rule of law, nodding to an argument I make in Chapter IV. In her
reconstruction, Smith leans more on A Constitution of Many Minds than Sunstein’s earlier
One Case at a Time, although she dutifully presents One Case as a foundational text.
Smith emphasizes that minimalism is anti-theoretical. I choose the charitable
interpretation to this criticism, for it is true that minimalism fails to advance a complete
theory of values and policy. Minimalism avoids many of the major questions of
constitutional law and the biggest controversies, which is not surprising, since, according to
the definition given in Chapter I, minimalism is a theory of procedure.
Smith concludes by categorizing minimalism as a theory of deference, to existing
laws, previous courts and democratic self-government. She summarizes minimalism with a
quote from Chief Justice Roberts: “If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case,
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in my view it is necessary not to decide more.” This quote certainly accords with the
definition formulated in Chapter I.
Smith notes that Sunstein’s minimalism is self-reflective: at times, Sunstein is a
minimalist about minimalism. In this sense, she characterizes Sunstein as grounding his
minimalism in pragmatism. Consequently, in some cases (perhaps like Brown) Sunstein
would call for more radical rulings. Sunstein identifies, in Beyond Judicial Minimalism, a
category of minimalists that he calls Rationalist Minimalists, who adopt this minimalist
approach to minimalism. Rationalist Minimalists contrast with Burkean Minimalists, who
are minimalists in all cases. From this discussion, Smith rightly extracts that minimalists do
not value restraint for its own sake. Smith notes that consequently minimalists can make
unrestrained rulings. Echoing Berwick, Smith argues that the two most criticized recent
Supreme Court rulings – Kelo and Bush – aspired toward minimalism in their reasoning.
Smith thinks the minimalism of Kelo and Bush are mostly to blame for
minimalism’s poor reputation. In particular, in Kelo, the reluctance, as Berwick argues, to
enforce private property protections compounded by the Court’s unwillingness, on
minimalist grounds, to create a limiting rule led to a terrible ruling. By refusing to specify
when the Kelo standard forbids takings, the Court left open the possibility of permitting all
takings.
Sunstein at times suggests that value-neutrality is a major selling point of judicial
minimalism. His idea is that minimalism is a strong theory because it allows for
overlapping consensus. Smith has a range of arguments aimed at refuting this claim, which
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seem strong to me, although perhaps there is room in Sunstein’s theoretical framework for
a response. In argument form, this objection is:
1. Value-neutrality is a claimed virtue of minimalism.
a. Value-neutrality is a virtue for theories of jurisprudence. [PR]
b. Minimalism is value-neutral, some claim. [PR]
c. Therefore, some claim that value-neutrality is one virtue of
minimalism. [1,2]
2. Minimalism is not actually value-neutral. [PR]
3. Therefore, minimalism does not have one of the virtues some claim it has.
[1,2]
It seems like the easiest response for me to this objection is simply to grant for the
sake of argument that it is sound and point out that the conclusion follows anyway and is
not damaging. It seems clear to me that the virtue (or vice) of value-neutrality is rooted in
the notion that minimalism is shallow. The definition of minimalism given in Chapter I
eschews this requirement, stating that only narrowness matters. Since minimalism as I have
defined it is not necessarily shallow, it is correspondingly not necessarily value-neutral.
Jones, the hypothetical jurist from Ch. I, is not value-neutral in his approach to
jurisprudence, for he sets the original public meaning of the Constitution as being
supremely valuable. However, minimalism as defined in Ch. I includes Jones. Therefore,
not all minimalists adopt a value-neutral approach. Since I do not maintain that minimalism
is fundamentally value-neutral, I simply accept Smith’s conclusion. I do not think this is
problematic as I think Marbury v. Madison creates a fundamentally value-laden obligation
for the Court in judicial review. Smith’s objection, then, follows by definition, but is not
damaging.

2.7. Objection from Inflexibility
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Some defenders argue that flexibility is a virtue of minimalism. Justice
Frankfurter’s comment in his Youngstown dissent that the Court must “avoid putting fetters
upon the future by needless pronouncements today” exemplifies this view. Flexibility about
future decisions relates to epistemic humility, an important asset that motivates one of the
arguments in Chapter IV in support of judicial minimalism.
Smith and others present several arguments against flexibility, arguing variously
that:


The role of the Court is to set the boundaries of future jurisprudence;



Flexibility is a vice;



The Court can at any rate change its decisions at a later date; and,



Flexibility implies a low value on the ability to predict legal outcomes that
conflicts with a core argument in support of judicial minimalism.

These arguments are interesting, but ultimately irrelevant.
Arguments from flexibility are relevant to minimalists as Sunstein defines
minimalism. However, as I define minimalism in Chapter I, minimalism can be both
principled and deep, as in the example of Justice Jones. Consequently, I do not have much
space to promote flexibility as a virtue. Therefore, arguments against flexibility are
somewhat irrelevant to minimalism as defined in Chapter I. Again, this concession is not
particularly damaging, as minimalism has other arguments for it beyond flexibility.

2.8. Objection from Deliberation
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Similarly, the criticism levied by Smith against the argument from democracy is far
more relevant to Sunstein than it is to me. Sunstein makes the promotion of democratic
deliberation central to judicial minimalism –calling it the “substance” of judicial
minimalism. Justice Ginsburg’s criticism of Roe echoes this point: by taking away the
people’s ability to determine policy on complex moral and political issues, an overly
aggressive court causes long-term harm to the democracy within which it is situated.
An even more aggressive approach to this argument is to argue that even when the
action of a democratic branch like the legislative or executive is actually constitutional,
increased democratic legitimacy means that the Court should only strike it down when, as
Peters writes, it is “plainly and obviously” unconstitutional. This branch of judicial
minimalism Smith finds totally unacceptable. In argument form:
1. An argument for judicial minimalism is that it promotes democratic
deliberation. (PR)
2. A theory which avoids striking down bad laws to promote democratic
deliberation is unacceptable. (PR)
3. Therefore, judicial minimalism is unacceptable. (1,2)
This argument is invalid. Just because judicial minimalism aims to promote a
certain feature (democratic deliberation, in this case) it doesn’t follow that this is the sole
function or purpose of the theory. Premiss 1 is also false, since the promotion of democratic
deliberation is not actually an argument I credit in support of judicial minimalism. That
said, I rather agree with the spirit of this criticism, and it is worth noting that on my
definition Peters’ view isn’t even a form of judicial minimalism. Judicial minimalism, as
defined in Chapter I, requires judges to render verdicts that accord with their broader theory
of jurisprudence. Peters’ definition does not, so it is not minimalism.
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Smith criticizes Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Akron, arguing that Justice O’Connor
holds that – regardless of the rightness or wrongness of the matter – the Court ought to
leave decisions on sensitive and controversial subjects up to the legislature. Smith sharply
criticizes the political arguments used by Justice O’Connor and Sunstein in maintaining this
position, arguing against adopting a view simply to check the possible ambitions of
ideological opponents. I find Smith’s objection sound, but irrelevant to minimalism when
defined without a requirement of shallowness.

2.9. Objection from Ambiguity
Another argument Smith advances concludes that minimalism fails to provide
coherent guidance for judges. The argument is that a purely procedural instruction, like the
command to minimize legal impact, fails to pick out a distinctive or unique method of
adjudicating cases. Therefore, judicial minimalism fails to offer real guidance to judges on
how to judge.
Smith more or less deploys a procedural definition of minimalism, accepting that
the purpose of minimalism is to instruct judges in not what to do but in how to do it (or
how not to do it, as the case may more likely be). However, she argues that simply
providing procedural guidance is insufficient, because the degree qua degree is neither
good nor bad. Consider, for example, the desirability of consuming a certain amount of a
substance. Whether the substance should be consumed – and in what amount – depends on
what it is. If we identify the substance as milk, we have some sense for the degree it should
be consumed. If we identify it as alcohol, we have a different sense. Without that
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identification, though, a theory of degrees is unhelpful. Therefore, if it is to be useful,
minimalism ultimately must address underlying questions of justice. Smith takes Justice
Alito’s Senate confirmation hearings as an example. Justice Alito talks of limiting his
focus, and of avoiding questions when possible. Justice Alito, though, carefully avoids
identifying his actual jurisprudence. His testimony just tells us that he will not do much, not
that what he will do is in any way correct.
Smith identifies judicial minimalism as a form of legal policy prescription. It
therefore should tell us how judges should rule. Since it is merely a theory of degree, it fails
to do so, and this is a critical flaw. This also, of course, informs us of how judicial
minimalism might respond to Smith’s critique: by denying, as per the definition in Chapter
I, that judicial minimalism is a complete policy prescription at all. In argument form:
1.
2.
3.
4.

A legal theory should tell judges how to judge. (PR)
Judicial minimalism is a legal theory. (PR)
Judicial minimalism doesn’t tell judges how to judge. (PR)
Therefore, judicial minimalism is a bad legal theory. (1,2,3)

Depending on the meaning of ‘legal theory’ this argument is either invalid due to
equivocation between premisses (1) and (2), or unsound because either premiss (1) or
premiss (2) is false. If by ‘legal theory’ we mean just a theory about the law, then premiss
(1) is false and the argument is unsound — a theory of ambiguity doesn’t tell judges how to
judge but is about the law. If by ‘legal theory’ we mean a complete philosophy of
jurisprudence then premiss (2) is false and the argument is unsound — judicial minimalism
isn’t a complete philosophy of jurisprudence. If by ‘legal theory’ we mean one thing in
premiss (1) and one thing in premiss (2) then the argument is invalid because it equivocates
on the words ‘legal theory’ in premisses (1) and (2).
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At times Smith expands this objection, arguing that in a system where the law is
fundamentally just, it makes sense to conserve that system through incremental change. But
in a profoundly unjust legal system, sweeping decisions might be morally mandatory. This
is a completely reasonable objection, but more or less equivalent to the “tough cases”
objection I present in Chapter III. I therefore put it aside for now, with an eye toward
subsequent reëxamination.

2.10. Objection from Legislating
Another objection that can be extracted from Smith is that judicial minimalism
assumes that judges create law – it assumes that they ought to legislate from the bench. If
you think instead that judges ought not to be in the business of creating law, then it follows
that judicial minimalism is wrong for requiring that they do. This rather simple argument
can be reconstructed along the lines Smith aims as follows:
1. Judges should not create law, they should decipher and apply it. (PR)
2. A judge deciphering and applying law doesn’t change the status quo of law.
(PR)
3. Therefore, judicial minimalism is irrelevant if a judge is doing what she is
supposed to do. (1,2)
This argument is valid. If it is true that judges should not merely decipher law, and
if it is also true that deciphering law doesn’t change the status quo of law, then it follows
that a good judge will never change the status quo of law at all. Therefore, since a good
judge isn’t changing the status quo at all, a theory which tells the judge how rapidly or
slowly to change the status quo will be obviously irrelevant.

Page | 83

However, while this argument is valid, it seems unfortunately to be unsound. The
judicial minimalist ought simply to reject the second premise. By “creating new law” for
the purpose of the formal definition given in Chapter I, what we mean is altering the way
that law is applied, including any change to what the law does. Nearly any application will
have this effect, and therefore nearly any work at all that a judge does will create new law.
To illustrate, imagine a statute as passed has three possible meanings: 5, 5+X or
5+X+Ψ. In the past, the law has been applied as if it just means 5. Analyzing the history, I
determine that the law should properly be interpreted instead as 5+X. Following my theory
of justice, I issue a ruling interpreting it so. I have now expanded the scope of the law and
changed the status quo. By applying the law I’m changing the law.
That doesn’t mean I’m legislating from the bench. Rather, it means that when the
original statute was passed, the legislature intended to cause 5+X legal effect. The Courts
wrongly included only 5 in the effect of the law, and by my proper reinterpretation, I’ve
restored the statute to causing the 5+X change in the law that was originally intended. I’ve
properly interpreted the law, but I’ve still changed the status quo, because the former status
quo was incorrect.
The thought experiment above illustrates a counterexample where, even without
legislating from the bench, I have created law, in the sense intended by the definition of
judicial minimalism provided in Chapter I. Therefore, by counterexample, Premiss (2) is
false. Therefore, Objection 2.10 is unsound – it relies on a false premiss (2) and this makes
the entire objection unsound.
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2.11. Objection from Responsibility
In footnotes, Smith argues that minimalists, in effect, abdicate the proper
responsibilities of the Court by privileging the epistemic humility argument so strongly.
Memorably, she criticizes the minimalist for approaching the Court as if it were a kind of
fire department or emergency room – to be called in, only at moments of crisis – rather than
a regular interpreter empowered by the Constitution. In argument form:
1. The proper function of the Court is to serve as a regular interpreter of law.
(PR)
2. It is a logical consequence of judicial minimalism that the Court should not
serve as a regular interpreter of law (PR)
3. Therefore, judicial minimalism is wrong. (1,2)
This argument is valid. The argument is simply of the form: ‘P, Q ⊃ ¬P, ∴ ¬Q’, a
valid form of reasoning in propositional logic. However, the argument is unsound, because
the first premiss is false. That this should be the refutation is unsurprising, for obviously
judicial minimalists openly oppose an active judicial interpreter. As to Smith’s intuition on
judging, my own intuitions are less clear. The rules of baseball, for example, speak to and
of the umpires, but umpires still ought to interfere as little as possible in the flow of the
game.

2.12. Objection from Reasoning
Smith also argues that methodologically minimalism is secondary. Smith writes that
we cannot reach conclusions about process – about how we go to where we’re going – until
we reach conclusions about where we ought to go. But this conclusion seems unwarranted.
To return to an example from Chapter I, the doctrine of separation of powers presented in
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the Constitution and discussed in the Federalist Papers is an important idea regardless of
any further philosophical conclusions.
True, the background Lockean philosophy of the Framers was essential in coming
to their separation of powers conclusions. But as democracies around the world have
adopted the concept, they have ranged from the liberal (Japan) to the illiberal (Singapore).
Japan and Singapore have different political goals, but they both find the process of
separation of powers valuable. We can support a procedure, as we do with judicial
minimalism, without committing to supporting any particular end-goal, although, of course,
we still need to analyze whether the procedure is valuable given what we value

2.13. Objection from Explanatory Power
Another objection raised by Smith is that minimalism fails to provide adequate
explanatory power. In other words, it fails to provide sufficient guidance to judges and
therefore fails as a theory of jurisprudence. Smith assumes that minimalism aims to provide
a complete theory of jurisprudence. She contrasts minimalism with gradualism, the more
modest theory of procedure that focuses solely on making small changes. In argument
form:
1.
2.
3.

A good theory of jurisprudence tells judges how to judge. [PR]
Minimalism does not tell judges how to judge. [PR]
Therefore, minimalism is not a good theory of jurisprudence. [1]

This argument is sound, but the conclusion is irrelevant. The conclusion sounds
important, but actually should be rephrased as “3*. Therefore, minimalism alone is not a
good theory of jurisprudence.” This Objection proves only that minimalism, if offered
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without any additional theoretical components, fails to be a good theory of jurisprudence.
But minimalism, as defined in Chapter I, explicitly requires an additional theoretical
component.
Minimalism, properly defined, does not pretend to be a complete theory of
jurisprudence. Therefore, criticizing the theory for incompleteness is no criticism at all.
Smith is right to point out that we need to pair minimalism with a theory that tells us how to
get where we need to go. But the combined theory may well be an excellent theory of
jurisprudence. The existence of that possibility implies that this objection fails.

2.14. Objection from Bush v. Gore
Some of the strongest objections to judicial minimalism come from specific cases
where minimalism seems to point in the wrong direction. Some of these cases are
considered at length in Chapter III. One case often cited in criticizing minimalism in this
vein is Bush v. Gore. Bush seems to be narrow, but its very narrowness is particularly
galling, for Justice Kennedy’s begins the majority opinion by declaring that Bush has no
relevance or application for the purposes of stare decisis. This opinion seems ad hoc and
unprincipled, yet is certainly very narrow. It seems then that minimalism promotes an
unacceptable legal opinion. In argument form, this objection is as follows:
1. Bush v. Gore was unacceptably decided. [PR]
2. Therefore, any theory which states that the ruling in Bush v. Gore was
correct is unacceptable. [1]
3. Judicial minimalism declares that the ruling in Bush v. Gore was correct.
[PR]
4. Therefore, judicial minimalism is unacceptable. [2]
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I stipulate that this argument is valid. A diligent opponent could raise some
concerns about the move from Premiss (1) to Sub-Conclusion (2), but I will waive those
objections. Instead, I will simply argue that this argument is unsound. The argument relies
on a false premiss, Premiss (3). Judicial minimalism does not, in fact, declare that the ruling
in Bush v. Gore was correct.
The ruling in Bush v. Gore was undeniably narrow. But judicial minimalism, as
defined in Chapter I, requires that decisions are based on a repeatable articulated principle
of law in order to be legitimate. Since Bush v. Gore fails to be based on a repeatable
principle (as Justice Kennedy declares at the start of the opinion) it is incorrect according to
judicial minimalism. Therefore, this argument is unsound. Therefore, the Objection from
Bush v. Gore does not refute minimalism.

2.15. Objection from Distance
Smith also objects to minimalism (or gradualism, as she calls minimalism under the
Chapter I definition) on the grounds that it only makes sense as a legal theory if the end
goals desired are far away. If the end goals are close, Smith argues, we ought to just jump
forward and achieve them. Only if the goals are a long way off and consequently disruptive
to the current status quo then there a justification for moving gradually. However,
minimalists are motivated to be minimalists precisely because of their conservatism and
therefore anti-radicalism. Minimalism only makes sense, therefore, if its proponents aim to
achieve an end that they oppose. Therefore, minimalism is self-defeating. Therefore,
minimalism is wrong. In argument form:
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1. The end goal of legal rulings is either close at hand or radical. [PR]
2. If the end goal of legal rulings is close, then it can be easily realized. [PR]
3. Therefore, if the end goal of legal rulings is close, minimalism is wrong.
[1,2]
4. Therefore, if minimalism is true, then the end goal of legal rulings is radical.
[1,3].
5. If the end goal of legal rulings is radical, then legal conservatism is false.
[PR]
6. Minimalism implies conservatism. [PR]
7. Therefore, if minimalism is true, then the end goal of legal rulings is not
radical. [5,6]
8. Therefore, the truth of minimalism implies a logical contradiction. [4,7].
9. Therefore, minimalism is false. [8]
This objection is very clever but unsound and invalid. The reasoning from
Premisses (1) and (2) to sub-conclusion (3) is invalid. Just because a goal is close at hand it
does not follow that incrementalism in achieving that goal is wrong. I am nearly an
International Master of chess. But it does not follow from this that I quit my job and spend
six months becoming one. There is no inherent need to abandon gradualism simply because
a goal is near. In jurisprudence, the value of the predictable rule of law remains, even if the
optimal solution is soon to be reached.
Second, Premiss (5) is false. It does not follow that just because the end goal of
jurisprudence is radical that legal conservatism is false. Slow, gradual change can be
acceptable to a conservatism, even if those changes lead to a radical conclusion. Third, I
think Premiss (6) is false, or at least is false without a precise definition of conservatism.
Conservatism, certainly not political conservatism, need not be implied by minimalism.
Therefore, this objection is unsound and invalid. Consequently, it does not refute
minimalism.
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2.16. Objections Resolved by Definition
Smith and others have made several other arguments which range in terms of the
length and complexity. Rather than tackle these more minor arguments one-at-a-time, in
this final catch-all I simply refute each in turn. The unifying theme here is that each
objection is refuted by a tighter, more formal definition of judicial minimalism – the
definition provided in Chapter I.

The Argument from Minimization
Still another interesting objection from Smith concerns the problem of
minimization. Smith rightly notes that minimizing does not solely identify a single method
of arbitration: we could be minimizing the size of change, the pace of change, the impact of
rulings, the philosophical basis of rulings or something else altogether. Without clarifying
what is to be minimized, judicial minimalism provides ambiguous or even incoherent
practical guidance.
Again, I actually agree with Smith here, which is why I began by providing a formal
definition in Chapter I. Smith rights keys into the ambiguity that is found in a great deal of
minimalist apologetics, but concerns about this ambiguity are immediately resolved when
one hews to a well-defined formal definition. Having provided that, we can dispose of this
objection as no longer applicable.

The Argument from Conflicting Advice
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Smith also objects that minimalism offers conflicting advice to substantive
questions of jurisprudence. There are two ways this criticism might be taken. If Smith
means that two minimalists can come down on opposite sides of a legal question, that is
certainly possible, but it does not strike me as a failing. Minimalism is a procedural thesis –
paired with different normative theories of jurisprudence it will, of course, yield different
answers.
Smith, on the other hand, might mean that minimalism claims to offer substantive
solutions to questions of jurisprudence but actually fails to do so. My solution to this is
clear – don’t offer any substantive solutions to questions of jurisprudence. Instead,
following the formal definition provided in Chapter I, simply provide a procedural thesis
and leave the normative jurisprudence to other theories.

The Argument from Public Opinion
Smith contrasts a theme of emphasis on current public opinion (through the desire
for narrow and shallow rulings) with emphasis on past opinion (through the argument of
epistemic humility). Here I disagree with both arguments. Aiming to craft opinions that
many groups of people can agree with is not the substance of minimalism as we’ve defined
it in Chapter I, and epistemic humility needn’t privilege the past. Claiming that judges
ought to have low certainty just as plausibly privileges the future by leaving future judges
the widest scope of opportunity to clarify and reëxamine prior rulings.

The Arguments from Tension
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Smith asks what a minimalist should do when considered a possible radical ruling
which would win more support across-the-board than a narrower ruling. But with a clear
definition of minimalism, the answer is obvious: rule narrowly. Ruling narrowly is the
substance of the theory for its own sake, not because doing so necessarily wins more broad
support for an opinion (nor should opinions necessarily be judged on their popular support).
Smith also argues that the desire for stability in law (a major argument given in Chapter IV)
conflicts with the desire for flexibility and shallowness. In aiming not to prematurely
foreclose a public conversation on a matter of policy, aren’t the justices weakening the
predictability and therefore the value of stability in law? Here, we also answer simply:
shallowness is not a goal of minimalism, as indicated by the definition provided in Chapter
I. It is true that new areas of law are often uncertain, but since the minimalist incorporates
them slowly, market players will at least know that the area is both uncertain and likely to
be codified only slowly. That should provide them clear enough legal guidance to preserve
the value of stable law. Smith also points out a tension between the desire for stability in
law and the desire to defer to democratic sovereignty and opinion. She makes a strong
point, for popular opinion changes volatilely over time and tying opinion immediately to
law would seem to weaken law’s stability. This tying, however, requires that judicial
minimalism be shallow and accommodating of public opinion, which, on the definition of
Chapter I, it isn’t. So this objection also fails.

The Argument from Inconsistency
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Smith argues that adopting judicial minimalism as a philosophy leads to being
forced to rule in two different directions simultaneously. The view is therefore internally
inconsistent and consequentially inconsistent. For example, attempting to rule broadly
means considering all perspectives on a legal issue. Smith asks if that includes the
perspective of neo-Nazi’s and terrorists, or if there is a specific threshold that must be
passed – and if so, what it is. But since the Chapter I minimalist isn’t ruling broadly, this
objection fails.

The Argument from Value-Neutrality
Smith raises an additional objection to judicial minimalism: is it fair to say that
deference to democratic sovereignty is value-neutral? It is procedural, of course. But isn’t
supporting democratic deliberation itself a value judgment? If so, minimalism is torn
between a commitment to promote democratic deliberation and a desire to be value-neutral,
with each end pushing in different directions. But since the Chapter I minimalist isn’t
claiming value-neutrality, this objection also fails.

The Argument from Modesty
The idea of a modest jurisprudence has also come in for its share of criticism.
Alexander notes that the decision to defer to existing precedent might be considered
precedent, but so too might overturning a prior precedent and replacing it with a new
precedent that leaves more room for discretion to future judges. Which is the more modest?
Without a standard for modesty, judicial minimalism cannot credibly argue that it achieves
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this goal and therefore one of the arguments for minimalism is undermined. But modesty
isn’t the nature of minimalism, narrowness is, so this objection fails.

The Argument from Precedent
More fundamentally, Smith asks if deference to precedent is truly the judicial
minimalist position. By minimizing the influence of the current judge of a case it extends
the influence of previous judges who established the precedent. Certain authorities are
minimized while others are maximized. Without a clear barometer of minimal influence the
theory is too vague to clarify any further. But the formal definition in Chapter I makes the
theory precise – certainly, precise enough to evaluate.

The Argument from Breadth
Smith further criticizes the idea that judicial minimalism is properly narrow.
Narrowness, Smith argues, can be defined along many different dimensions, including the
basis of a ruling or the ruling’s impact, or the ruling’s popular support or even the ruling’s
divergence from social expectations. These different standards of narrowness can cut
against one another; for example, a ruling with a narrow basis might well have a major
impact on the law. How should we assess what is narrow and what isn’t? But the formal
definition in Chapter I resolves this problem, so this objection fails.

2.17. Summary
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In this chapter I subjected judicial minimalism to a gauntlet of objections. I held
back the objections built on specific cases for the next chapter; here my goal was to simply
throw every conceivable analytic or philosophical objection at minimalism. My hope was
that this kitchen sink approach would, in this spirit of the adversarial legal tradition, reveal
a fatal flaw in the theory or, at least, leave us with more confidence of minimalism’s
philosophical worth.
There are over twenty objections presented in this chapter, counting sub-objections
and modifications of premisses. As each objection is dealt with in turn, a few
commonalities emerge. First, many of these objections assume definitions of minimalism
that turn out, on reflection, to be flawed. Clarifying the meaning of minimalism with
analytic rigor removes a great many of these concerns, a theme I return to in the next
chapter.
Second, minimalism does a representative job resisting the array of challenges we
have put before it. In each case, a cogent objection does not fully rule out specifics of the
theory, or context to the way minimalism applies evades a repugnant conclusion. This
should suggest that the theory has at least a prima facie plausibleness. Combined with legal
impact, that certainly seems enough to demand deeper analysis.
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Chapter III

Tough Cases

In this Chapter, I consider the toughest cases and the arguments they suggest against
judicial minimalism. I begin with an in-depth case study of one case: Brown v. Board. I
begin by analyzing the legal and historical background of the case, before employing the
case in an objection to judicial minimalism. I consider the objection and rephrase it for
validity before ultimately providing an answer by carefully examining the specifics of the
case.
Next, I consider an intriguing series of cases from American Indian case law first
put forward as an objection to minimalism by Sarah Krakoff. I consider these cases so as
not to limit my Brown response to special circumstances. Ultimately, I distinguish the
problematic reasoning in these cases from minimalism and close the Chapter with the
theory of judicial minimalism still standing.

3.1. Brown v. Board
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka is a landmark Supreme Court case. In a
unanimous decision, the Court in Brown reversed Plessy v. Ferguson, striking down racebased segregation in school districts throughout the United States. As a result of Brown,
racial segregation was ruled a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Brown began a national process of racial integration and was the most
important legal victory of the Civil Rights Era. Brown defined subsequent civil rights
jurisprudence, as the Court decided multiple follow up cases to enforce and clarify the
holding.
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3.1.1. Background
As in many civil rights cases, the core constitutional issue in Brown is an
application of the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically what is called the Equal Protection
Clause. The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted on July 9, 1868. The amendment was
proposed to resolve legal issues concerning former slaves following the Civil War. It limits
the actions not just of federal government officials, but of state and local officials as well.
The text of the Fourteenth Amendment reads:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the
United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers
of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of
the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion,
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military,
under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof. But Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of each House,
remove such disability.
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Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither
the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations
and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
The Fourteenth Amendment was passed during the Reconstruction Era. Former
slaves had been freed by the Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment,
passed in 1865. It was not a given, though, that these newly freed persons should have the
right to vote, and there was initially great opposition in the South toward extending the
franchise to African-Americans.
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to guarantee citizenship regardless of
race or prior slavery. Although the bill passed the Congress with a strong majority,
President Andrew Johnson vetoed it, arguing that Congress had more pressing priorities.
Johnson’s veto was overturned three weeks later, but the tussle over the Act worried
Republicans who began to question whether Congress had the required constitutional
authority.
In response, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction first proposed an amendment
that said that any state which barred citizens from voting based on race would be prohibited
from counting their barred citizens in the census for purposes of congressional
representation. This amendment passed the house, but was blocked in the Senate by Radical
Republicans led by Charles Sumner in an alliance with Southern Democrats.
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The focus then turned to Representative John Bingham’s proposal for an
amendment guaranteeing the life, liberty and property of all citizens, but this measure failed
to pass the House. In April 1866, a complex third proposal was put before the Congress,
passing through both the House and the Senate with strong majorities on June 18th. Radical
Republicans accepted the bill, although they still sought further protections for former
slaves.
The new Fourteenth Amendment was sent to the states, where the battle for
ratification was bitter. Connecticut, New Hampshire, Tennessee, New Jersey, Oregon and
Vermont ratified the Amendment in 1866. The most important of these states was
Tennessee, which had sided with the Confederacy during the Civil War and was the only
former Confederate state to ratify the Amendment. New York, Ohio, Illinois, West
Virginia, Michigan, Minnesota, Kansas, Maine, Nevada, Indiana, Missouri, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island and Wisconsin ratified the Fourteenth Amendment when their legislatures
returned to session in the first two months of 1867. That still left the Amendment eight
short.
To move the process along, Congress passed a law on March 2nd, 1867 requiring
that in order to be eligible for representation in Congress each former Confederate state was
required to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. That law brought on board North Carolina,
Louisiana and South Carolina, which had previously rejected the Amendment. Joining them
by July were Massachusetts, Nebraska, Iowa, Arkansas and Florida. On July 20, William
H. Seward, Secretary of State for President Johnson, certified that the Fourteenth
Amendment had become part of the Constitution. The Amendment was subsequently
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ratified by every state that existed during Reconstruction, starting with Alabama in 1868
and ending with Kentucky, which finally ratified the Amendment in 1976.
Traditional scholarship, e. g. Kilpatrick, breaks the Fourteenth Amendment down
into four clauses called the Citizenship Clause, the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the
Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. The Citizenship Clause deals with the
first portion of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which reads:
§1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. […]
This clause formally defines citizenship in the United States and protects the civil
rights of citizens from being abrogated by any state. Denial of civil rights by private
persons was determined by the 1883 Civil Rights Cases to be outside §1. This section was
effective, though, in preventing the Civil Rights Act from being declared unconstitutional
by a Supreme Court, then or now.
The initial intention of the Citizenship Clause was to guard the Civil Rights Act, but
the law of unintended consequences works in profound ways. This section of the
Fourteenth Amendment is the most litigated section of the Amendment. As the Fourteenth
Amendment is itself the most litigated part of the Constitution, the Citizenship Clause is the
single most litigated clause in the Constitution.
The Citizenship Clause overturned Dred Scott, which held that African-Americans
could not be American citizens. Debates still continue on the intention of Congress
regarding how the Citizenship Clause was intended to apply to American Indians and to
undocumented immigrants. As a practical matter, the subject of the applicability to
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American Indians was resolved with the passage of the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924,
extending American citizenship to all American Indians. Additionally, while Congress has
sometimes debated the specifics of birthright citizenship, this section has generally been
held to grant citizenship to all native-born Americans.
The primary precedent here is United States v. Wong Kim Ark, where the Court held
that the Citizenship Clause granted citizenship to the child of Chinese citizens residing in
the United States at the time of the child’s birth. Subsequent cases have applied this
precedent, although technical details can still create complexity, e. g. regarding the children
of diplomats. The Citizenship Clause strictly limits the powers of Congress to deny
citizenship to any American. If a person is granted citizenship by an act of Congress,
Congress may later repeal that act. Otherwise, short of voluntary surrender, American
citizens maintain their citizenship, even if they acquire other citizenships, since Afrovim
and Vance.
The Privileges or Immunities Clause concerns the second portion of §1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which reads:
§1. […] No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States […]
This section is designed to protect the privileges and immunities of citizenship in the
United States from interference by the states. The Clause derives from the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, which protects the privileges of state citizenship from
interference by other states.
In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court defined two types of citizenship –
state and national – and ruled that the Privileges or Immunities Clause safeguards only
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national citizenship, limiting the Clause to rights created by the federal government or the
Constitution. Initially, these rights mostly involved protection while abroad and rights of
democratic participation. The Privileges or Immunities Clause hasn’t received much
attention, but it has long been favoured by libertarian jurist Roger Pilon. Pilon’s
interpretation was boosted somewhat by Justice Thomas’ citation in his concurring opinion
in McDonald, though it remains a heterodox approach.
The Due Process Clause concerns the very next section of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which reads:
§1. […] nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law […]
This Clause repeats the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which limits actions
by the federal government. The Due Process Clause has been interpreted to provide
procedural due process (e.g., a fair trial, right to counsel) and substantive due process
(protections for individual persons against state efforts to deprive life, liberty or property).
The Due Process Clause is further critical in that it has been held to “incorporate” the
protections of the Bill of Rights to apply to state acts as well.
The Court has gone through phases on the use of substantive due process. In the
“Lochner Era”, named after Lochner, the Court struck down a range of labor protections
including maximum hours (Lochner) and minimum wage (Adkins), although it upheld some
restrictions on hours (Holden, Muller) and disputes (Wilson). This hodgepodge approach
was settled by Parrish, which set the subsequent standard.
The Due Process Clause is also the foundation for many of the “penumbra” rights
found not in the direct text of the Constitution but in the broader implications of its
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reasoning. This includes the right to privacy as outlined in Griswold and expanded in Roe,
then reaffirmed in Casey and expanded again Lawrence. More recently is the right for
same-sex partners to marry found in Obergefell.
Procedural due process applies when the State actively makes an effort to deprive a
person of their property or liberty. At a minimum, procedural due process requires that a
person is given due notice, an oral hearing and the right to come before a neutral arbiter.
Termination of public sector staff or a determination of ineligibility on welfare are
examples of decisions which trigger these guarantees. In judging, procedural due process
requires all judges to recuse themselves if a conflict of interest exists. A good example is
Caperton, where the Supreme Court ruled that a West Virginia Supreme Court justice had
to recuse himself from a case involving one of his largest campaign donors. Nevertheless,
the doctrine of incorporation is the most lasting legacy of the Due Process Clause. In
Barron the Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights restricted only the federal
government. However, by working through substantive due process, nearly all of the rights
protected by the Bill of Rights have since been applied to the states.
However, it is the Equal Protection Clause which is at the center of Brown. The
Equal Protection Clause requires each state to provide equal protections to all persons
within their jurisdiction. The Equal Protection Clause took effect in 1868. The Clause refers
to the final sentence of §1:
§1. […] No State shall […] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
The primary motivation for this clause was to lock in equality language included in the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, which sought to ensure that all citizens would have equal legal
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rights. Originally, the Equal Protection Clause applied only to state and local governments.
However, the landmark case Bolling v. Sharpe held that the equal protection requirements
of the Equal Protection Clause applied to the federal government as well because it was
required by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
As to legislative intent, in 1871 Congressman John Bingham, the clause’s primary
author, said that the clause meant no state could deny to any citizen “the equal protection of
the Constitution” nor could it deny to anyone “any right secured…either by the laws and
treaties of the United States or of [any] State.” Early tests of the Equal Protection Clause
involved laws banning interracial marriage. In 1872, the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that
a ban on mixed-race marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause in Burns v. State.
Nearly a century later the Supreme Court agreed in the landmark case of Loving v. Virginia.
The question of separate but equal schooling didn’t come up in the Reconstruction
Era because no states during that era required separate schools for children of color. While,
as Bickel notes, some states, including New York, empowered local school districts to
establish segregated schools, many other states (Iowa, Massachusetts) flatly banned
segregated schools as early as 1855.
The first landmark equal protection decision by the Supreme Court was probably
Strauder, decided in 1880. In Strauder, an African-American man was convicted of murder
by an all-white jury. West Virginia law at the time excluded African-Americans from jury
duty. In Strauder, the Supreme Court ruled that bar unconstitutional, on the grounds that it
denied equal protection to African-Americans.
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The reach of the Equal Protection Clause was restricted somewhat in the Civil
Rights Cases. Here the Court found that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutionally
required that all persons should enjoy full enjoyment and use of “inns, public conveyances
on land or water, theatres, and other places of public amusement.” The Court’s holding
declared that the Fourteenth Amendment applied solely to state and not to private actions.
Restrictions on the enjoyment of private property and enterprise, the Court held, was a
private wrong and should be dealt with privately, by shifting business to other enterprises
or by expressing displeasure to management.
These early cases set the stage for Plessy. In Plessy the Court upheld a Louisiana
law that required segregation based on race on railroads. The Court argued in its majority
opinion that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to protect equality in civil rights
alone. Therefore, social arrangements, like choice of railway car, were not restricted, even
if the railroads were public entities.
The Equal Protection Clause was written to restrain the action of state governments.
The right of due process guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment applies to the federal
government, and since Bolling the Fifth Amendment has sometimes been used to generate
Equal Protection-like restrictions on the actions of the federal government. Bolling held that
Due Process and Equal Protection overlap, but are not coextensive.
Contemporary jurisprudence has developed since Bolling to provide different
standards of scrutiny (the intensity with which a law should be assessed) and special
circumstances which elevate scrutiny. In the modern understanding of tiered scrutiny that
developed after Skinner v. Oklahoma, Equal Protection rights have been held to be
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fundamental and therefore trigger the highest level of judicial scrutiny. Higher levels of
scrutiny are also triggered if discrimination seems to be on the basis of what is called a
“suspect class”, meaning a class that has previously faced discrimination. These standards
of scrutiny are higher, since Parrish, than the sort of scrutiny used to evaluate restrictions
on economic freedom.
In modern jurisprudence the level of scrutiny applied to government action against a
suspect class is strict scrutiny. To satisfy the standard of strict scrutiny, the state must
demonstrate that a discriminatory law or regulation is necessary to promote a compelling
state interest and must further demonstrate that there is no less restrictive method to
accomplish that interest.
Demonstrating that less restrictive regulation is impossible is extraordinarily
difficult, so the decision to use strict scrutiny usually means a law will be found
unconstitutional. There is no complete list of conditions for a class to qualify as suspect, but
the Supreme Court currently recognizes race, national original, religion, and immigration
status as suspect classes.
The complex specifics of immigration status are set out in Graham. In Perry v.
Schwarzenegger the District Court for the Northern District of California entertained the
notion that sexual orientation might be a suspect class, but never ruled on the subject since
they were able to strike down the proposed proposition a fortiori through analysis by the
scrutiny standard of rational basis review.
There are also quasi-suspect classes, where a special category of intermediate
scrutiny is applied. These classes include gender and legitimacy of birth. In Windsor the
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Second Circuit found sexual orientation to be a quasi-suspect class. Discrimination when
not aimed against suspect classes is tested through the standard of rational basis review,
which looks simply for a reasonable state interest.
“Tiered scrutiny” is the name for this system differing tests.” It has some critics:
Justice Thurgood Marshall argued, in effect, for a smooth gradient of infinitely many tiers,
with each case evaluated more or less sui generis. On the other end of the extreme, Justice
Stevens argued for using the same system of scrutiny for every case, since there is only one
Equal Protection Clause.
Since the standard of scrutiny usually determines the outcome of a case, in practice,
it is natural that differing jurisprudential schools differ on which standard of scrutiny to use.
For example, Justice Alito argues that the original corporate intent of the Framers and
Amenders should determine the decision over whether or not a right is fundamental and
therefore subject to strict scrutiny.
It is worth noting that the Court has never forbidden policies that lead to disparate
impact based on race or other classes just because they lead to disparate impact. The harm
must be intentional. An illustration of this principle is the 1977 case Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Corporation. In Arlington, a property developer called Metropolitan
Housing Corporation sued the Chicago suburb of Arlington Heights.
Metropolitan Housing wanted to build affordable housing on a plot of land, but the
planning commission of Arlington Heights refused to rezone the land. Arguing that this
rezoning refusal disparately harmed African-Americans and Hispanics, Metropolitan
Housing sued. The Court did not dispute the disparate racial impact, nor was there found
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evidence of offsets for this impact. However, the Court also did not find any evidence that
the Arlington Heights planning commission had intended to cause disparate impact. In
other words, the impact was simply an accident. Writing for the majority, Justice Powell
noted that proof of intent to discriminate was required to demonstrate that a policy violates
the Equal Protection Clause. The Equal Protection Clause protects equal access to
opportunity, which is why the Clause requires intentionality in discrimination. If a
legislative body is intentionally limiting opportunity, then the Court must strike that policy
down. If the legislature is causing harm unintentionally, then the legislature itself can
provide a remedy by revising policy.
A few examples illustrate the way the Court has chosen to apply the Equal
Protection Clause. In McClesky, the Court found that death penalty sentences in Georgia
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause even though empirical evidence showed racial
biases, because there was insufficient evidence of intent on the part of the state government.
In Baker, the Court ruled that some ways of dividing representation violated Equal
Protection. The Court in Baker was expanding on Nixon v. Herndon, which first found that
the Equal Protection Clause protects voting rights. The modern “one person, one vote”
standard developed two years later in Reynolds. Some, like Justice Harlan, have argued that
Nixon is in error. The argument here is based either on the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment or because extending Equal Protection in this way seems to make the Fifteenth
and Nineteenth Amendments redundant. However, the Court has always rejected this
reasoning, including in Reynolds.
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Possibly the most controversial case in recent memory, Bush v. Gore, also turned on
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. The majority found that the
Florida Recount violated the Equal Protection Clause after the 2000 presidential election.
However, the Equal Protection Clause says nothing about remedy, and the remedy in Bush
was the primary controversy.
In Reed v. Reed, the Court extended the Equal Protection Clause to protect against
gender discrimination. The scrutiny level applied was rational basis review, later raised to
intermediate scrutiny in Craig. The court still relies on rational basis review for other
potential suspect classes, including the developmentally disabled (Cleburne) and sexual
orientation (Lawrence).
The Court’s decision in striking down parts of the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) in Windsor is not a violation of that jurisprudence, because DOMA is federal
legislation. The Equal Protection Clause applies only to states. Similarly, the use of
affirmative action by private actors is not in violation the Equal Protection Clause because
most of the cases arising have come from private businesses or private universities. The
Equal Protection Clause does not apply to these entities, and their admission or promotion
policies are their own to decide within the confines of state and federal law.
The key cases involving affirmative action have been cases regarding public
universities. In Bakke, the Court held that racial admission quotas unconstitutionally violate
the Equal Protection Clause by harming rejected students. On the other hand, the Court held
that public universities might use race as one of many factors in their admissions process.
In Grutter and Gratz, the Court reaffirmed Bakke while simultaneously upholding an
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admissions policy at the Michigan Law School that used race as one of many factors. The
Court struck down a points-based admissions policy at the College of the University of
Michigan. In all of these cases, the standard of the Court has been strict scrutiny. The Court
permitted Michigan’s policy in Grutter because it fulfilled a compelling state interest
(diversity) and because Michigan tailored the policy as narrowly as possible to achieve that
aim. This is that rare case where strict scrutiny is used and the Court upholds the statute.
Justice Thomas argued that the Court did not actually use strict scrutiny, as follows:
1.
2.
∴3.
4.
∴5.

Michigan’s policy in Grutter was not minimally invasive (PR);
If the Court used strict scrutiny, then the Court will strike down all
policies that are not minimally invasive (PR);
If the Court used strict scrutiny, the Court struck down Michigan’s
policy in Grutter (2, 1, universal instantiation)
The Court did not strike down Grutter (PR);
The Court did not use strict scrutiny. [3,4, modus tollens]

Regardless of the soundness of this argument, the discussion helps elucidate the principles
behind strict scrutiny.
In Yick Wo, the Supreme Court held that the protections of the Equal Protection
Clause prohibited discrimination on the grounds of race, color and national origin. In
Plyler, the Court extended standing for Equal Protection claims to also include
undocumented persons. Plyler expanded and reaffirmed Wong Wing, which first held
decisively that the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to “any and every
human being within the jurisdiction of the republic.”
Since Santa Clara, these protections also apply to corporations, based on dicta by
then-Chief Justice Waite. The number of claims involving corporations now vastly
outstrips the number of claims regarding individuals. Although a range of measures were
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struck down in cases like Strauder and Yick Wo, the Court in Plessy determined that racial
segregation was permissible as long as facilities were “separate but equal.” This
determination was the subject of the legal dispute underlying Brown.
Plessy wasn’t the only case to restrict the Equal Protection Clause in how it
protected African-Americans. In Berea College, the Court held that a state could force
private institutions to segregate college classes. Still, the Equal Protection Clause expanded
overtime, with Hernandez in 1954 broadening the list of protected racial classes to include
Mexican-Americans.
As powerful as the Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause are,
they protect only against actions by government, not against actions by private persons.
Shelley v. Kraemer makes this caveat plain: only the actions of States are regulated by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The definition of a government action or agent were first clarified
in 1880 in Ex Parte Virginia. Included are federal and state agents or other private persons
acting under federal or state authority.
Beginning with a series of cases in the Civil Rights Era, the notion of state actor has
expanded to include private entities intimately involved with state policy, such as
contractors. It is necessary that the state provides enough coercive force for the actions by
the private actor to have been fairly said to have been determined by the State in order for
expanded protections to apply.
The remaining sections of the Fourteenth Amendment are important, although not
relevant to Brown. §2 made it public policy that all persons are counted for determining
Congressional representation, replacing Article I, §2, Clause 3 of the Constitution which
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counted slaves as three-fifths of a person. Because it specified protection of the voting
rights of men, §2 was condemned by suffragists like Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B.
Anthony. §2 has been used in various Civil Rights cases since its adoption. The most
modern case is Hunter v. Underwood, where the Supreme Court held that a state law
barring African-American non-felon criminals was passed with a discriminatory purpose
and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause working through the right to vote
provisions of §2.
§3 specifically prohibited a variety of office holders in the Confederacy from
holding office in the United States. A Congressional vote in 1898 removed this limitation.
The only notable instance of the use of §3 came in 1919, when Victor Berger of the
Socialist Party of America was not seated in the House of Representatives on the grounds
that he had been convicted under the Federal Espionage Act.
§4 was designed to insure that all debt issued by the United States was valid and all
debt issued by the Confederacy was not. The Court held in Perry that §4 prevented
Congress from voiding a United States bond. 2011 and 2013 brought renewed interest to §4
because it would seem, under the doctrine in Perry, to make a Congressional debt ceiling
unconstitutional if it is used to void a bond. Some jurists, including Rosen, consequently
argued that §4 allowed the President to unilaterally raise the debt ceiling, while others,
including Chemerinsky, argued that it not. An intermediate view, put forward by Balkin, is
that the President could take broad unilateral action to pay all creditors, including
abrogating Congressional requirements on spending, but could not unilaterally raise the
debt ceiling. All very interesting – but not directly related to Brown.
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§5 is known as the Enforcement Clause. It empowers Congress to pass laws to
enforce the other sections of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court set out an initially
narrow interpretation of §5 in the Civil Rights Cases, holding that §5 authorized Congress
simply to pass legislation to protect the liberties protected by Fourteenth Amendment. But
§5 was later used, in Katzenbach, to uphold sections of the Voting Rights Act, although it
was then limited, in Flores, to barring only legislation that interprets the Fourteenth
Amendment. This limited provision is interesting, but not irrelevant to Brown, where the
problem was segregation legislation that had already been passed.

3.1.2. History & Politics
The Civil War was not the end of racial conflict in the United States. Throughout
large portions of the America, racial segregation came to replace slavery as the institution
for discriminating against African-Americans. Segregation was an improvement, but
caused deep harm to millions of Americans. Despite this, in Plessy, the Court upheld
segregation – at least as long as facilities were equal.
The plaintiffs in Brown argued that racial segregation never actually provided equal
facilities. Rather, in every case, African-Americans were subject to worse accommodations,
goods and services. The case came in the backdrop of a changing scientific view on racism,
as expressed in the work of Myrdal. Much of this psychological work showed long-lasting
psychological harm to racial segregation, even if facilities were nominally equal.
International opinion was sharply negative about policies of segregation. The
United Nations released a comprehensive report authored by over a hundred scholars
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criticizing segregation in the United States and international opinion throughout the world
saw the system of racial segregation as a major problem in American democracy. Jurists
disagree at the extent to which this perception impacted – or should have impacted – the
Court in Brown.

3.1.3. Fact Pattern
In 1951, thirteen residents of Topeka, Kansas filed a class action lawsuit against the
Board of Education of the City of Topeka on behalf of their twenty children. The petition
filed called for the Board to abandon racial segregation. Topeka ran segregated elementary
schools under Kansas law which permitted districts to run segregated schools in certain
populations.
Brown was a test case, and the plaintiffs were recruited. The Topeka branch of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored Persons (NAACP) wanted the Court
to rule segregation unconstitutional and recruited plaintiffs with that in mind. The named
plaintiff, Oliver Brown, worked as a shop welder. His daughter Linda took the bus each
morning to Monroe Elementary, a school for African-Americans, even though Sumner
Elementary was just seven blocks away.
Under the guidance of Charles Scott, legal counsel for the Topeka NAACP, Brown
and the other plaintiffs tried to enroll their children in the nearest public school. Each was
refused enrollment and directed to the nearest segregated school. The thirteen original were
Oliver Brown, Darlene Brown, Lena Carper, Sadie Emmanuel, Marguerite Emerson,
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Shirley Fleming, Zelma Henderson, Shirley Hodison, Maude Lawton, Alma Lewis, Iona
Richardson and Lucinda Todd.
The trial court ruled in favour of the Board of Education. In their holding, they cited
Plessy. Finding the school facilities of equal funding and professional qualifications, the
court held that Monroe and Sumner were examples of separate but equal institutions,
explicitly permitted under Plessy. For the sake of argument, I grant the accuracy of these
facts.
A lower court is bound by precedent and Plessy seems clear. Consequently, a
judicial minimalist – or really any judge – seems obliged to rule as the lower court did in
Brown. Plessy was the law of the land, and if a judge felt that it was so unconscionable that
he could not uphold it, the proper recourse would be resignation. After the trial court ruled
in Brown, the plaintiffs appealed. A three-judge panel heard the case at the appellate level.
The panel found that segregation actually did, by its very nature, have a negative impact on
African-Americans. However, again following Plessy, the appellate court ruled in favour of
the Board. The finding of harm was an important finding of fact which would go on to
shape the case, but the appellate court was bound, like the trial court, by Plessy.
While Brown was making its way through the system, several other cases were
pending as well. In Gebhart, a trial court judge in Delaware found in favour of the AfricanAmerican plaintiffs and was upheld at the State Supreme Court level. The court was able to
distinguish Gebhart from Plessy because the school facilities in Gebhart were manifestly
unequal, violating the separate but equal requirement.
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Three other cases with similar fact patterns were also working their way through the
system. These cases – Briggs, Davis and Bolling – were jointly sponsored by the NAACP
around the country. What distinguished Brown was that in Brown no one disputed that
Monroe Elementary was of equal quality to Sumner Elementary. It was thus the best test
case; the fact pattern most purely suited to testing whether facilities which were separate
but equal – facilities which met the test put forward in Plessy – were actually constitutional.
Thurgood Marshall, later Justice Thurgood Marshall after his appointment to the
Supreme Court in 1967, argued Brown for the plaintiff. Assistant Attorney General Paul
Wilson argued for the State. A range of amicus curiae briefs were filed in Brown. Much
attention has been given in historical treatments to an amicus brief filed by the Justice
Department.
Attorney General James McGranery argued in the Department’s brief that the policy
of segregation damaged the image and therefore the interests of the United States abroad.
McGranery included a letter from celebrated diplomat Dean Acheson, then serving as
Secretary of State, who lamented that the “United States is under constant attack in the
foreign press…and in…the United Nations because of …discrimination…”

3.1.4. Decision
The Supreme Court heard Brown in the Spring of 1953 but could not reach a
decision. They asked to rehear the arguments in the case in the Fall, with special interest in
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Private records of the deliberations
of the Court during this time suggest that there was a majority in favour of the plaintiffs in
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the Spring, but the majority sought a more politically legitimate unanimous decision and
asked for a rehearing in an effort to try to narrow the judgment to something every justice
could support. The Court was concerned that a dissent in Brown, even in an 8-1 decision,
could provide ammunition politically to supporters of segregation and could disrupt
political unity on racial policy.
More specifically, Justices Black, Burton, Douglas and Minton seemed immediately
predisposed to overturning Plessy. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson agreed in principle that
Plessy should be overturned, but expressed concerns about judicial restraint and about the
difficulty in enforcing any decision overturning Plessy in Southern communities. Justice
Clark was more ambivalent, arguing that the resolution of segregation as an issue ought
properly to be left to the individual States. This was in part because of broader concerns
about federalism, but also out of concerns regarding stare decisis: overturning Plessy would
be a major break in past law, and since States had based their laws on Plessy it might be too
much. Justice Reed, arguing from a perspective of state’s rights, was initially opposed to
overturning Plessy at all. Justice Reed seems to have felt, from the conference notes, that
segregation actually benefited African-Americans by creating less of an urgent requirement
for cultural assimilation. Chief Justice Vinson was the most enigmatic, noting primarily
that Congress had not issued any legislation mandating desegregation.
After the first conference, four justices were in favour of overturning Plessy, two
justices were leaning toward overturning Plessy but were concerned about overreach, one
justice was in the middle on the grounds of judicial restraint, one justice was leaning
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against overturning Plessy on federalism grounds, and one justice was against overturning
Plessy on the merits.
Chief Justice Vinson passed away in September of 1953, and President Eisenhower
appointed Chief Justice Earl Warren by means of a recess appointment. President
Eisenhower had moderate views on the question of segregation, but Chief Justice Warren
was strongly in support of integration. The Chief Justice avoided commenting on the case
or lobbying the Court until the Senate confirmed his appointment.
After his confirmation, Chief Justice Warren convened a meeting of the Supreme
Court to discuss Brown. Chief Justice Warren argued that only a genuine belief in the
inferiority of African-Americans justified any form of segregation, and, absent that belief,
the Court must overturn Plessy. Further, the Chief Justice argued that the Court must do so
unanimously or face massive Southern resistance.
Chief Justice Warren’s arguments persuaded Justices Frankfurter and Clark, who
decided to join an emerging unanimous opinion rather than craft concurring opinions.
Joining Justices Black, Burton, Douglas and Minton, that gave the Chief Justice seven
votes. Justice Jackson, an ardent proponent of judicial restraint, took longer to convince but
eventually was persuaded after several revisions.
Eventually, lengthy arguments persuaded Justice Reed to drop his dissent, giving
Chief Justice Warren all nine votes. Several redrafts of the opinion were circulated before
consensus was reached, but the Chief Justice kept re-writing until there was unity. The
unanimity of the Court came as a surprise to observers, who had expected some break given
the controversial issues. The Chief Justice read his unanimous opinion to an audience that
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included Dean Acheson and the current attorney general Herbert Brownwell. Justice
Jackson fought through a recent heart attack to be present when the opinion was read. Also
present, of course, were the parents and legal coördinators from Topeka who had
shepherded the case along.
The Court broke new ground by denying a conditional. The Court had already held
in Plessy that segregated facilities had to be actually equal. In prior jurisprudence they had
enforced that point, striking down separate but unequal facilities. In Brown, for the first
time, the Court held that even if segregated facilities were of equal quality, segregation was
itself unconstitutional.
Citing research by Clark, the Court held that segregation itself caused psychological
and social harm. Therefore, separate schools themselves were disadvantaging and
unconstitutional, regardless of whether or not they were equal. It was the very act of
separation, the Court held, which caused harm, therefore it was the segregation itself which
was unconstitutional.
The Court summarized its views on the subject thusly:
“…segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even
though the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’ factors may be equal,
deprive[s] the children of the minority group of equal education
opportunities…Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has
a detrimental effect on the colored children. The impact is greater when it has
the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating the races is usually
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group…Segregation with
the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [harm] the educational and
mental development of negro children…We conclude that, in the field of
public education, the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the
plaintiffs…are…deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”
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3.1.5. Impact
The effect of the ruling in Brown was immediate and wide-ranging. Junior high
schools in Topeka were already integrated, as was Topeka High School – Kansas state law
permitted segregation only below high school. By the time Brown reached the Supreme
Court, public opinion in Topeka had begun to move against segregation. According to the
TOPEKA DAILY CAPITAL, starting in 1953, the Board of Education began to end segregation.
By 1956, according to the CAPITAL article Racial Bar Down, all elementary schools had
been integrated. Adams writes that there was little outrage in the community in Topeka, and
that the verdict in Brown was widely accepted. Several of the physical locations associated
with Brown have since become registered historic places.
The broader social implications of Brown were more complex. Senator Byrd from
Virginia organized what is now called the Massive Resistance movement, which tried to
close schools rather than integrate them. Efforts to fight desegregation had a profound
effect on social, political and public life throughout the South – the consequences
sometimes occurring years, or even decades, after Brown.
In Texas, according to Howell, the Attorney General organized a series of legal
obstacles to try to delay desegregation. In 1957, the Governor of Arkansas used the
National Guard to try to block entry to Little Rock Central High. President Eisenhower
responded by deploying the federal armed forces, as described by Hampton. The fight in
Florida was also divisive, pitting the legislature against Governor Collins, who, though
opposed to Brown, would accept only legal methods for trying to overturn it.
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Mississippi was one of the latest adopters of the decision in Brown. Klarman writes
that, afraid of vigilante violence, no plaintiff brought forward a desegregation case for nine
years. When Medgar Evers sued to desegregate schools in Jackson in 1964 he was
murdered by a racist extremist. The murderer, De La Beckwith, faced two hung juries. He
was finally convicted in 1994.
In 1963 the Governor of Alabama personally blocked a school door to prevent the
enrollment of two black students. The Governor moved aside after the intervention of
General Henry Graham of the Alabama National Guard. Resistance was subtler in North
Carolina, where Chafe notes that the City of Greensboro delayed implementation of
desegregation by nearly fifteen years, despite announcing that the City would follow Brown
in 1954. Northern cities rarely had de jure segregation policies, so there was little for
Brown to overturn. However, Brown indirectly inspired much of the activism which led to
popular movements to reduce overcrowding in existing schools, as described by Weiner.
Some of these legal obstacles may have followed from ambiguity in Griffin, where
the Court seemed to permit adoption of desegregation at a slower pace. Griffin concerned
the school district of Prince Edward County, in Virginia, which refused a court order to
desegregate in 1959 by defunding all public schools for five years. Various legal obstacles
and strategies delayed full integration in Virginia for years.
Much of the intellectual opposition to Brown derived from theories of scientific
racism, but these theories faded in popularity and were, in any event, never as motivating a
force of popular opposition as simple racism. Sarat argues that Brown marked a major
repudiation by intellectual elites of the scientific racism of Plessy. Attempts to revive
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theories of scientific racism played a role in the (limited) intellectual backlash to Brown, as
described by Schaffer.

3.1.6. Legal Reception
Brown has been widely praised by legal scholars, both in its immediate aftermath
and as the decades have passed. There has also been some criticism. Perhaps the most
notable criticism came from William Rehnquist, later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
In 1952, as a law clerk working for Justice Robert H. Jackson, Rehnquist wrote a memo
arguing that Plessy was correct and should have been reaffirmed.
This may well not have reflected the Chief Justice’s views. In 1971, during his
confirmation, Rehnquist backed away from his opposition – noting that the memorandum
was prepared for Justice Jackson, who originally intended to dissent in Brown. As Chief
Justice, Rehnquist made no effort to overturn or undermine Brown, and, in fact, as Rosen
notes in Rehnquist the Great?. frequently relied upon it as precedent in his jurisprudence.
Some contemporary jurists criticized Chief Justice Warren’s reasoning in Brown. Of
these, Judge Learned Hand is perhaps the best regarded. In a lecture at Harvard Law
School, Judge Hand did not disagree with the policy promoted by the Court, but rather felt
that the Court exceeded statutory authority in deciding Brown, acting, in effect, as a third
legislative chamber rather than as a neutral arbiter of legal disputes. Herbert Weschler,
founder of the Model Penal Code, criticized Brown on similar grounds a year later at the
same lecture series.
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Later Originalists have expanded this criticism against Brown. Berger argued in
1977 that Brown could not have been intended by the original understanding of the 14th
Amendment, since the Civil Rights Act of 1875, passed by the same Congress, expressly
chose not to ban segregated schools. Judge McConnell of the Tenth Circuit disagreed,
arguing that desegregation of schools was part of the legislative intent. Klarman and
McConnell argue back and forth on this point, and the debate continues in the literature.
Other jurists have praised Brown, including conservative scholars like Robert Bork.
Bork, writing in 1990, noted that segregation virtually never actually led to equality. That
experience forced the Court to strike down segregation in Brown, or simply abandon the
project of promoting equality. Bork argued that both striking down segregation or
upholding segregation would have violated the original understanding of the Constitution.
Since violating the original intention was inevitable, the Court had to make a choice, and
obviously chose correctly, normatively and in terms of the spirit of the fourteenth
amendment, which focuses on equality before the law. Today, government officials are
nearly unanimous in their praise for Brown. On the fiftieth anniversary of Brown, President
George W. Bush hailed the case as a decision that “changed America for the better, and
forever.”
In 1978, the American Civil Liberties Union sought to instigate new litigation on
school integration. Linda Brown Smith, now with her own children attending school in
Topeka, was concerned that Topeka’s policy of open enrollment would lead to de facto
segregation. The Topeka District Court reopened Brown but found for the District. In 1989,
a panel on the Tenth Circuit found 2-1 that segregation remained problematic. In 1993, the
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Supreme Court denied certiorari, returning the case to District Court while upholding the
Tenth Circuit ruling. In 1994, the Topeka School District released a plan to redraw
attendance plans. Sufficient progress was made by 1998 that the District was granted
unified status.

3.2. The Argument from Brown
The Argument from Brown is a tough case argument. It is a three step argument
premised around the idea that judicial minimalism returns the wrong judgment in this
landmark case. In argument form, rephrasing the argument presented by Sunstein and
others, the Argument is simply:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The Court made the correct decision in Brown. [PR]
Minimalist judges would have made a different decision in Brown. [PR]
∴, minimalist judges make the wrong decision in Brown. [1,2 MT]
A good theory of jurisprudence reaches the correct decision in Brown. [PR]
∴, judicial minimalism is not a good theory of jurisprudence. [3. 4 MT]

In terms of validity, the argument claims two reasoning steps: in establishing subconclusion (3) and in establishing conclusion (5). The argument in support of subconclusion (3) is invalid as written. This argument loosely has the form:
1. D ⊃ C
2. M ⊃ ¬D
3. Therefore, M ⊃ ¬C
Here ‘D’ is ‘The Court’s Decision’; ‘C’ is The Correct Decision’; and ‘M’ is ‘Judicial
Minimalism’. This argument is valid only if it is the case that only the decision of the Court
in Brown is correct. This additional premise (replacing 1 with 1* as ‘D ⇔ C’) makes the
argument valid, by simplification of 1* and then modus tollens, and then recombination.
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Is this new premise, that only the decision of the Court in Brown is correct, true?
We consider that later, as that question pertains to soundness, not to validity. Rephrasing
the argument, we now have:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The Court made the only correct decision in Brown. [PR] *
Minimalist judges would have made a different decision in Brown. [PR]
∴, minimalist judges make the wrong decision in Brown. [1,2 MT]
A good theory of jurisprudence reaches the correct decision in Brown.
[PR]
5. ∴, judicial minimalism is not a good theory of jurisprudence. [3. 4 MT]

Now, the chain of reasoning leading from premisses (1) and (2) to sub-conclusion (3)
follows, since any decision different than the decision of the Court is a wrong decision.
Additionally, the argument from (3) and (4) to conclusion (5) is valid. If minimalist judges
would rule incorrectly in Brown, and if good theories of jurisprudence lead to the correct
ruling in Brown, then judicial minimalism must not be a good theory.
The Argument from Brown, therefore, is valid. And that’s intuitive, for this
argument (in one form or another) is one of the most common arguments against judicial
minimalism in the literature. Is the Argument sound? Are the three premises, (1), (2) and
(4) each true? I actually think, controversial though this may seem, that there is a decent
argument against all three premises. The strongest of these counter-arguments seems, to
me, directed at premiss (2). This may seem unsatisfying, as it might seem like I’m just
arguing around the specific example of Brown. But perhaps a careful reading of the
reasoning will reveal broader truths about the way minimalists approach tough cases.

3.3. In Re: Brown
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Premiss 1* asserts that the Court made the only correct decision in Brown. I do not
dispute that the Court reached a correct decision in Brown, although others, like Black, do.
But it is more ambitious to claim that the Court reached the only correct decision. There
were many possible decision which led to the integration of public schools in Kansas, many
with different reasoning leading to the same holding. Consider, for example, the following:
1. Separate but equal facilities empower state and local governments to
discriminate between different citizens on the basis of a biological factor.
2. The Constitution’s Bill of Rights as incorporated substantively by the
Fourteenth Amendment bar state and local governments from
discriminating between citizens on the basis of biological factors.
3. Therefore, the Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas exceed its
constitutional authority when it segregated schools in Topeka.
4. Therefore, the Court finds for the plaintiff and rules the schools
desegregated.
This is a different argument than the Court’s in Brown – the reasoning differs in
fundamental ways. But the holding is the same. Is this new decision wrong? It doesn’t
immediately appear so. After all, the holding remains just – there will be no segregation if
the Court reaches this outcome. Of course, one can modify the Argument from Brown to
avert this counterargument:
1. The Court reached the only correct holding in Brown. [PR]**
2. Minimalist judges would have reached a different holding than the Court in
Brown. [PR]*
3. Therefore, minimalist judges would have reached the wrong holding in
Brown. [1,2 modus tollens]*
4. A good theory of jurisprudence reaches the correct holding in cases like
Brown. [PR]*
5. Therefore, judicial minimalism is not a good theory of jurisprudence. [3. 4
modus tollens]
As stated in this improved third form, I now concede both the validity of the
argument and the truth of the first premiss. That leaves the second premiss and the premiss
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in line four as open to disputation. Ultimately, I think the premiss in line four is true,
although I think it is a reasonable to argue that. Briefly, then, let’s consider that
counterargument before concentrating on the second premiss.
Do all good theories of jurisprudence reach the correct holding in cases like Brown?
One argument is that they don’t, simply because theories of jurisprudence are rather like
ball players. They may excel in one set of circumstances, but in another they are deficient.
In this way, minimalism is properly said to fail when it comes to Brown, but excels, or so
the argument goes, in other kinds of cases. Therefore, Premiss (4) is false.
While this approach is certainly possible, I find it unpersuasive. Brown is one of the
most important Court cases in American history. It is not simply an ordinary case. The
Court should get a case like Brown right, and I think it very much is fair to criticize any
legal theory which fails to do so. Even if there is no perfect theory of jurisprudence, surely
we can do better than a theory which gets Brown wrong. So, I’m afraid I cannot avail
myself of this defence, and I concede the truth of Premiss (4).
It all then comes down to Premiss (2). All of the arguments against minimalism
from Brown are premised upon the idea that minimalists would reach a different conclusion
in Brown. But would they? I think not. I think, despite the conventional analysis, that the
Court’s ruling in Brown was actually perfectly satisfactory from a minimalist perspective.
And I don’t mean that in the way Sunstein suggests, where certain classes of case are
dubbed inappropriate for minimalism – I consider that defence too ad hoc. I mean that the
holding in Brown was actually a minimalist holding.
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The Court in Brown held that “separate but equal” facilities where inevitably
inherently unequal. This, the Court found, was more than an empirical correlation. It was
not simply that, as it turns out, attempted separate but equal facilities were not ever actually
separate but equal. It was stronger: as argued at length in the majority opinion, the facilities
being separate made them unequal.
Yet, if this (empirical) premiss about the nature of segregation is true, then the
conclusion of Brown follows plainly even for a minimalist. The Equal Protection Clause
transparently bars unequal treatment on the basis of race, and Substantive Incorporation is
granted by even the most ardent originalists. If separate facilities are by their very natural
caused to be unequal, then, of course, they are forbidden.
Any ruling the Court reaches in Brown must therefore strike down the practise of
segregation in Topeka, assuming Justice Marshall’s premiss about segregation is true.
There is no principled way to limit this striking down to Kansas alone, for, since separate
schools cause unequal schools, all separate schools are by necessity barred by the Equal
Protection Clause and Substantive Incorporation in all states, everywhere.
Therefore, granting the premiss of the majority opinion in Brown, the only just
conclusion is to rule pretty much precisely as the majority ruled in Brown. Brown is
therefore not at all an example of a case where a minimalist would rule incorrectly – rather,
the minimalist must rule as the Court held. Therefore, Premiss (2) is false, the Objection
from Brown is unsound and therefore minimalism is not refuted.
It is certainly true that some minimalists do, in fact, dispute the correctness of the
majority opinion in Brown. But their opinion must, by necessity, involve disputing the truth
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of Justice Marshall’s empirical premiss. Disputing an empirical premiss is always a
perfectly acceptable way of formulating an argument, but the disagreement here is not over
minimalism or radicalism, but rather over fundamental conclusions in sociology.
Therefore, Brown turns out not to be a problem at all for judicial minimalists. Our
intuition is that Brown was decided correctly, and minimalists would decide Brown the
same way, on the same empirical assumptions. One of the most notorious counterexamples
to minimalism simply evaporates on careful analysis of the case material.
Perhaps the critic of minimalism can respond by arguing that my refutation of the
objection from Brown is too ad hoc. Sure, this analysis might work for Brown, but what
about for the general class of problematic case that Brown was meant to evoke? That’s a
good try, but I don’t think we can permit a counterexample based on a specific case to
respond, on refutation of that specific case, by abstracting from the example. The objection
is the example!
If critics of minimalism want to formulate a new objection, then, they need a new
set of problem cases. There are many options and many ways to go in coming up with that
new set of cases, but, interestingly, I think the best example comes from the work of Sarah
Krakoff and a line of cases in the relatively obscure branch of jurisprudence called various
tribal law or American Indian jurisprudence.

3.4. Arguments from American Indian Case Law
With Brown behind us, we move now to an unusual branch of law which provides
another set of tough cases. I am grateful in this section to the work of Sarah Krakoff, whose
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reconstructions I follow closely in this unusually arcane branch of law. I will largely grant
and accept the ideological or philosophical conclusions Krakoff draws as well except where
otherwise noted, for the purpose of handling her argument a fortiori.
Krakoff begins by agreeing with Sunstein in One Case that the Court is dominated
by judicial minimalists, identifying a “minimalist core” of Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
Souter, Kennedy and O’Connor. This mapping differs from the mapping presented in
Chapter I, but this is unsurprising, as Sunstein’s informal definition of minimalism differs.
Krakoff complains that these minimalist justices have consistently voted against
tribal plaintiffs, at times unanimously. She cites as an example Nevada v. Hicks, where the
Court held that tribal courts lack jurisdiction over tort claims against state officials even if
their actions exclusively occurred on tribal land. Trying to explain this ruling, Krakoff first
considers whether or not judicial minimalism itself pushes against tribal arguments. She
notes that justices who have been proponents of tribal rights, citing Tsosie’s profile of
Justice Thurgood Marshall, were known for rendering verdicts that are broad in their
impact on the status quo of law and deep in their unitary principles of reasoning.
Correctly, Krakoff concludes that this relationship is contingent rather than
necessary, and that it is possible to be a judicial minimalist while still ruling correctly. The
center-point of Krakoff’s objection, then, is that decisions written or joined by minimalists,
like Atkinson, narrow and shallow though they may be, reflect underlying normative
theories about the proper relationship between the United States and American Indian
nations. While these theoretical assumptions may be true (although Krakoff thinks they
aren’t), their latent nature undermines the proper spirit of democratic deliberation.
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Krakoff isn’t saying that minimalists ought to render verdicts like Justice Marshall’s
McClanahan, which granted broad tax-exempt status to tribal members living and working
on reservations, since that’s obviously inconsistent with minimalism. She is arguing instead
that a normative assumption (for example, that tribal sovereignty is outdated) powers recent
verdicts, but the language of minimalism evades democratic deliberation on that
assumption.
In this way, Krakoff echoes Dorothy Robert’s criticism of Justice O’Connor’s
jurisprudence on women’s rights and other issues. The problem isn’t that Justice O’Connor
decided, one way or the other, in her cases, nor is it that she held particular normative views
(although Robert’s would certainly disagree with those views). It’s that Justice O’Connor
has smuggled in her normative theories, and harmed democratic deliberation in the process.
This last point I hold critical in forming a formal reconstruction of a first objection.

3.4.1. The Smuggling Objection
The smuggling objection is premised on the idea that the main argument for
judicial minimalism is that minimalism, by limiting the footprint of the judiciary, preserves
and promotes democratic deliberation. In other words, by ruling as narrowly as possible,
the judicial minimalist allows the democratically-elected legislative and executive branches
the maximum scope in resolving policy questions.
1. In Nevada the Court ruled on the basis of a value premiss about tribes that
diminished their sovereignty with respect to the federal government. (PR)
2. The Court did not make this value premiss explicit. (PR)
3. Judicial minimalism has as a logical consequence that the Court should not
issue rulings on the basis of a hidden value premiss. (PR)
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4. Therefore, judicial minimalism has as a logical consequence that the ruling in
Nevada is wrong. (1,2)
This argument is valid. The argument has something like the form ‘¬Sx ⊃ Px, Px =
¬Ex, Mx ⊃ ¬¬Ex ⊃ Ex, ∴ Mx ⊃ ¬Px ⊃ ¬¬Sx ⊃ Sx’ where S is a predicate about tribal
sovereignty, P is a predicate about premisses and E is a predicate about explicitness of
premisses. This is a valid chain of reasoning and consequently this argument is valid. In
order for the argument to additionally be sound, (1), (2) and (3) must all be true.
The argument for (1) and (2) is based on case analysis. The argument for (3) is
based on the idea that judicial minimalism is about maximizing democratic deliberation.
Krakoff derives this point from Sunstein, who promotes minimalism as a theory that
promotes an ever-evolving domain of overlapping consensus. Of course, I give no
argument for minimalism based on democracy in this dissertation.
The simplest response to this objection however is simply to concede the point. So
what, we might say, apparently some obscure case like Nevada was wrongly decided. How
is that an objection to minimalism? Perhaps the Court, minimalist though it was, simply
decided the case incorrectly. But Krakoff has a response – if the Court was properly
minimalist, and it reasonably decided in a minimalist way, how could it have been wrong
unless minimalism was also wrong? In argument form:
1. Judicial minimalism has a logical consequence the holding in Nevada. (PR)
2. The decision in Nevada was wrong. (PR)
3. Therefore, judicial minimalism is wrong. (1,2)
This argument is obviously valid. The argument is a simple use of modus tollens.
Additionally, we have already stipulated to the second premiss for the sake of argument.
What about the first premiss? Fortunately, for minimalism, this premiss seems to me clearly
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false. Minimalism does not logically imply the holding in Nevada, and this is true even if
the holding in Nevada is, in fact, minimalism.
What explains this seeming contradiction? The simple fact that minimalism is not a
complete theory of jurisprudence. It is not minimalism alone that implies Nevada, it is
minimalism plus some other theory – a background theory of justice. That background
theory is the problem here, not the minimalism. A different theory, still combined with
minimalism, would reach the correct answer. Therefore, premiss 1 is false and this
objection is unsound.
This is not the only time this exact form of defence works in response to Krakoff.
For example, Krakoff argues that Atkinson provides a good example for her objections to
minimalism. According to Krakoff, Atkinson has fundamentally re-shaped American Indian
law, even though it was decided narrowly and shallowly. Since Krakoff separately argues
that this wrong, the same form of objection as above would follow; but minimalism has
open the same form of reply.

3.4.2. The Incremental Departure Objection
The Court has departed recently from legal precedent, Krakoff argues, echoing
Getches. A consultation of the trends in American Indian law, as presented by Frickey or
Newton, shows a recent sharp departure. And it is a minimalist Court that has enabled this,
willingly or unwillingly. The Court has departed from the precedent established by John
Marshall in dealing with cases regarding American Indians.
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The heart of this precedent is what is called the “Marshall trilogy” and consists of
Johnson, Cherokee and Worcester. In Johnson, the Court established that only the Federal
Government has the right to sell American Indian lands. In Cherokee, the Court held that
Indian tribes are neither American states nor foreign countries, but rather semi-sovereign
entities. Finally, in Worcester, the Court found that tribal sovereignty is not subordinate to
the sovereign authority of states.
Two cases toward the end of the nineteenth century cemented this precedent. Crow
Dog affirmed that Indian tribes held exclusive jurisdiction committed between tribe
members on reservation boundaries. Talton found that tribal courts were exempted from
Fifth Amendment requirements over grand juries because tribal authority predates and is
separate from the protections of the Constitution.
Despite these rulings, the Supreme Court proved reluctant to strike down
government actions designed at confiscating tribal lands. In Lone Wolf, the Court permitted
Congress to unilaterally break treaties with tribes. The Court held that Congress had
“plenary power” over Indian nations, meaning that their decisions were final. This holding
has generated great controversy amongst jurists, a controversy Getches well describes in
Beyond Indian Law.
Some Courts have tried to roll back Lone Wolf, which seems to have simply made
precedent out of a Congressional practice without much legal argument, as Pommersheim
argues. In Hodel, Justice Stevens sought to clarify that the federal government has
exclusive authority to deal with tribes, but is not a final decider. In Tribal Bus the Court
held that decisions regarding tribes were subject to judicial review. Even cases which have
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upheld the plenary power doctrine have stressed that it is not absolute – Alcea is a good
example.
The Court held in McBratney that states, not tribes, have jurisdiction over criminal
acts committed on tribal land – at least, after Ray, regarding acts committed against other
non-Indians. Worse for American Indians were holdings in Maricopa and Utah that
allowed states to tax tribes, along with Wagoner and Thomas which taxed non-Indians
using reservation resources.
Legislatively, the worst period for tribes came during what is now called the
termination period, after the Second World War, when the Federal Government terminated
her relationship with 109 American Indian tribes. 1954 Statutes 250 and 714 are examples
of this policy, which is chronicled carefully by Wilkinson. But this policy was ended by the
Department of Interior after just over a decade.
Reaffirming her prior holdings on contract enforceability, the Court found in
Williams, that Arizona state courts did not have jurisdiction over a debt owed by a member
of the Navajo Indian Nation to a non-Indian. Instead the case would have to be heard under
tribal authority. As Laurence describes, Williams came to symbolize the Court’s renewed
commitment to the Marshall trilogy and the pattern of jurisprudence the trilogy established.
If anything, American law moved more in the direction of tribal sovereignty during
and after the 1970’s. The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, along
with the Indian Child Welfare Act moved forward tribal welfare policy, and the Indian
Tribal Justice Act (103-176) provided funding for the development of tribal judicial
systems. The Court seemed to be of the same mind, following Williams with McClanahan,
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which prevented Arizona from taxing a member of the Navajo Nation and Martinez, which
maintained a kind of sovereign immunity for Indian tribes.
Even during this period, though, some cases stuck out. Oliphant held that criminal
jurisdiction for tribes ran counter to their fundamentally dependent status. Oliphant ran
against the jurisprudence of McClanahan and Martinez by limiting tribal sovereignty.
Oliphant has correspondingly been heavily criticized, on policy (Maxfield) and
jurisprudence (Barsh).
The Supreme Court continued to tack to and fro throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In
1976, Bryan held that Minnesota could not apply property taxes on reservation homes. That
same year, Moe held that Montana could tax on-reservation purchases by non-Indians.
Colville expanded that precedent, upholding a Washington effort to tax cigarette purchases
by non-tribe members. Bryan follows the Williams, but Colville seemed more to follow
Oliphant, which left court-watchers scratching their heads. Crucially, Colville seems to
Krakoff and to others rooted in a fundamentally value-laden picture of the proper place for
tribes in the federal system, although the Court doesn’t articulate anything directly.
In 1989, the Court considered whether states could impose excise taxes on nonIndian companies extracting natural resources on tribal lands. In Cotton, they found that
they could, rapidly muscling out tribal taxation. This holding departed from Merrion, which
held that tribes could tax non-Indian companies within their borders – a power the Court
had held just four years earlier, in Kerr-McGee, didn’t even require approval by the
Secretary of the Interior.
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In National Farmers and then in Iowa Mutual the Court adopted a rule of requiring
plaintiffs to exhaust their options in tribal court before bringing a case to federal authorities.
In doing so, the Court extended tribal jurisdiction to non-Indians. But in Montana the Court
moved in a different direction.
The fact-pattern of Montana concerned the Crow Tribe, who was trying to ban nonIndian hunting and fishing within their reservation boundaries. The Court held that the land
in question wasn’t tribal lands because of the structure of the acquisition of Montana
territory (which, of course, had little to do with the Crow Tribe). Therefore, the Court
struck down Crow Tribe’s efforts. This ruling overturned Solem, which held that all land
within a reservation was Indian land regardless of legal title. Following in the same spirit as
Montana came Brendale, where the Court ruled that the Yakima Tribe could not enforce
tribal zoning codes on lands legally leased from the tribe.
Jurisprudence over diminishment – whether reservations had been diminished by
settlement under now-abandoned older land policies – has been similarly jumbled. Cases in
1962 (Seymour) and 1973 (Mattz) found that rerservations had not been diminished.
However, in 1975, the Court held just the opposite in Decoteau. Two years later, that ruling
was reaffirmed and expanded in Rosebud. Laurence in The Unseemly Nature of Reservation
Diminishment provides a sharp critique of this line of holdings.
Solem was an attempt to unify these differing cases. The Court essentially
constructed a complex balancing test based on a variety of technical factors which it used to
distinguish the fact patterns in these differing cases. The holding in Solem favoured the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, but the reasoning legitimized the limitations on sovereignty

Page | 137

first articulated in Decoteau. Because the demographics and specifics of the statute
favoured the Cheyenne in Solem’s fact pattern (most of the Tribe’s members and the seat of
tribal government were based in open areas), the case worked out for the Cheyenne. But, as
Grijalva argues, the pattern of reasoning opened the door for worse outcomes for other
tribes in different contextual circumstances.
Today, the legislative and executive branches remain committed to the concept of
self-determination. But the judicial record is much less clear. Courts still apply past
decisions inconsistently, drawing on cases which seem to make different arguments from
different value perspectives. As Getches writes, this places the Supreme Court in the unique
position of having a great deal of direct policy influence over the self-determination status
of tribes going forward. Getches urges the Court to return to its early case history and the
Marshall trilogy – other scholars argue that the Court should just pragmatically begin to
decide cases on an understanding of limited but extant Indian sovereignty.
How to convert this close analysis into a formal argument? My best reconstruction
is something along the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

The Court’s recent jurisprudence has made Tribal law less just. (PR)
The Court’s recent jurisprudence is minimalist. (PR)
Therefore, minimalism has made Tribal law less just. (1,2)
Therefore, minimalism has led to an unjust conclusion. (3)
A jurisprudence that leads to an unjust outcome is itself unjust. (PR)
Therefore, minimalism is unjust. (4,5)
Therefore, minimalism is wrong. (6)

This argument is transparently valid and structured similarly to other tough cases
arguments we have just analyzed. But, just like in the Smuggling Objection, there is no
reason to grant the truth of premiss 5. Minimalism is not a complete theory of
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jurisprudence. Therefore, showing that minimalism leads to bad case law is insufficient to
show that the theory is unjust. It may be that the minimalism part is perfectly just, but the
background ideological commitments are nevertheless to blame. Since premiss 5 is not true,
this objection is unsound.

3.4.3. The Principled Objection
In American Indian law, there is broad consensus between the foundationalists and
the pragmatists that a radical change is necessary and broad consensus about the direction
this change needs to move. But absent the deep theoretical commitments of either
foundationalism or pragmatism, judicial minimalists are left adrift – and consequently
susceptible to long-standing background norms of termination, integration and domination.
How does this manifest on the current Supreme Court bench? Krakoff counts
Justice Souter as a judicial minimalist and so begins her analysis with his arrival on the
Supreme Court in 1990. The minimalist footprint deeps, Krakoff argues, when Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer are appointed in 1993 and 1994 by the Clinton Administration.
According to Krakoff, it was rapidly evident that these new judicial minimalists felt unable,
because of their judicial minimalism, to challenge the poor case-log of jurisprudence on
American Indian issues.
Krakoff starts her analysis with Strate, a personal injury lawsuit which occurred on
a public highway located inside the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation in North Dakota. By
framing the case as a discussion over whether these specific defendants (A-1 Contractors),
who are not tribe members, are liable for their work maintaining a highway granted federal
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right of way, Justice Ginsburg paves the way for a finding against the tribe. After all, why
should a tribe have the right to sue non-tribal members in tribal court over work they are
doing at the specific direction of the federal government?
Looking at the case from a different, although still minimalist perspective could
easily have led to a different conclusion. Suppose that instead of asking why a tribe has the
right to sue non-tribal members doing federal work, we had asked if a tribal member has a
right to sue in their own selected tribal court over an injury that happened on their own
tribal lands. Now the answer seems intuitively to be that the tribal court does have
jurisdiction.
For example, Justice Ginsburg characterizes right-of-way as equivalent to a fee
charged to non-Indians. She argues that the right-of-way was of infinite duration, with the
only right preserved by individual tribal landowners being the right to construct crossings.
Since the Tribe has no gatekeeping rights, it cannot exclude non-members. In reaching this
conclusion, Justice Ginsburg draws on Bourland – although in Bourland that conclusion
was expressed solely as dicta.
Since the loss of tribal sovereignty by the original grant of right-of-way was
permanent, the test from Montana applies and the Tribe’s jurisdiction is only over nonIndians. In this way, Justice Ginsburg’s holding in Strate differs strongly from the holding
in cases like Cabazon, where the State was found to have no jurisdiction over tribal gaming
activity by tribal members and non-members alike.
Krakoff argues that Justice Ginsburg’s analysis under Montana used in Strate are
artificially built – aimed, from the beginning, with an outcome in mind. She ignores facts –
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like the fact that the non-Indian defendant was only present on tribal land to conduct tribal
business – that would undermine her analysis. This isn’t necessarily intentional, but it is
biased and that bias is shrouded and therefore preserved by Justice Ginsburg’s minimalism.
Krakoff finds evidence of a facile approach to precedent – and of question begging
– in Justice Ginsburg’s argument. Justice Ginsburg cites a number of cases to justify her
use of the Montana exceptions, but these cases generally deal with regulatory sovereignty,
and did not interpret Montana to cover activity on non-tribal fee land. This interpretation of
Montana is not at all value-neutral, for reading the list of cases covered to exhaustively
include previously decided fact patterns – as in Williams and Colville – unnecessarily limits
the scope of the holding. This is one of those cases, in short, where interpreting Montana as
not doing something is itself a broad change to law.
In this way, Justice Ginsburg interprets a delineated list of circumstances that
trigger an exception as an exhaustive list, even though Krakoff argues that was never the
intent. In some ways, then, this is the same kind of error as interpreting the Constitution by
saying that the only rights protected are those enumerated specifically in the Bill of Rights,
rather than recognizing that these are just some of the rights safeguarded.
In particular, Krakoff argues that Justice Ginsburg’s interpretation of the case
history argues that either a subject is so intrinsic to tribal sovereignty that the tribe has sole
jurisdiction or the tribe has no jurisdiction at all. This all-or-nothing interpretation of
Montana permits no level of intermediate interest to involve tribal jurisdiction and is
therefore severely limiting from a tribal perspective.
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Justice Ginsburg also cites several cases which permit taxation of non-Indian
property within a reservation, like Montana Catholic Missions which permitted the taxation
of cattle back at turn of the Twentieth Century. But these old cases would only be helpful if
the question in Strate was whether the state had concurrent jurisdiction regarding the
lawsuit, not whether or not the tribe had any jurisdiction at all.
Justice Ginsburg therefore construes Montana and other parts of the case-history in
a way that strongly suggests that Indian nations have sole interest and jurisdiction over their
own members. Insofar as a great deal of the business of jurisdiction and tribal law concerns
non-Indian economic activity within the borders of a reservation, this interpretation,
Krakoff argues, is severely limiting.
Therefore, in her opinion in Strate, Justice Ginsburg achieves a shallow and narrow
opinion but only by refusing to consider the broader implications of her ruling. By focusing
solely on past precedent, Justice Ginsburg ruled in a way that wound up being deeply
damaging to tribal rights. Krakoff argues that this ruling follows from judicial minimalism.
Yankton is a similar case. The unanimous holding in Yankton was written by Justice
O’Connor, a judicial minimalist stalwart as noted in Smythe. The dispute arose over
regulation of a proposed landfill on non-Indian fee land. The Tribe argued that the landfill
fell within existing reservation boundaries. South Dakota argued that an 1894 allotment
statute had reduced the tribal borders.
Yankton follows on Hagen, decided with a Court similar to the present. In Hagen, the
Court found that the language of the allotment acts showed Congress’ intent to diminish
reservation holdings, even though the Tribe had not consented as the statute required. Hagen,
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decided with the minimalist justices O’Connor and Ginsburg in the majority, is a tortured
attempt to render coherence into a ludicrous interpretation, Krakoff contends.
Since Solem, the Court has accepted that the events surrounding the passage of
legislation are taken into account when determining a diminishment of tribal borders, although
they are less of a factor than other considerations. But never had the Court gone to the lengths
of linguistic gymnastics it employed in Hagen, where the words “sell and dispose of” open
negotiations but the words “restore to the public domain” diminish a reservation unilaterally.
According to Krakoff, efforts to distinguish between “evidence of intent to diminish”
by consultation of statutory language “give[s] succor to those who condemn the whole
enterprise of statutory interpretation as a sophisticated form of neurosis.” In the spirit of Schlag
and Campos, Krakoff argues that the Court’s interpretations can be put down entirely to their
background legal principles and rules, for the technical distinctions of language are ridiculously
arbitrary.
For example, the Court has held that the words “sell and dispose of” do not indicate an
intent to diminish, whereas the words “restore to the public domain” do, but the appearance of
the words “public domain” are not themselves sufficient to show intent to diminish, unless the
word “restore” is somewhere nearby. Unsurprisingly, not all of the justices signed on to this
interpretation.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Souter, simply follows the logic of Solem,
reasoning that the questions raised by modern diminishment cases were really never anticipated
by the architects of allotment. American Indian law, following Bourland, requires that the
Court can only diminish boundaries if it finds “clear and unequivocal evidence of congressional
intent”. Since this is lacking in Hagen (for the circumstances were not anticipated, and
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Congress has since suggested it does not wish to diminish American Indian territories), the
majority opinion is inaccurate. It might well appear that the dissenting justices are more
restrained in their approach, although the majority cites minimalism as a motivating factor in
their holding.
Yankton is another example case. Yankton concerned the Surplus Lands Act, which, it
was argued, divested the Yankton Sioux Tribe of any lands they had which had been removed
from allotment. Justice O’Connor argued that the Act contained clear language diminishing the
reservation and offering a sum in compensation. Justice O’Connor cited Article XVIII of the
1894 Agreement with the Tribe, which read in part:

“Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to abrogate the treaty of April
19th, 1858, between the Yankton tribe of Sioux Indians and the United States.
And after the signing of this agreement, and its ratification by Congress, all
provisions of the said treaty of April 19th, 1858, shall be in full force and
effect, the same as though this agreement had not been made, and the said
Yankton Indians shall continue to receive their annuities under the said treaty
of April 19th, 1858.”
However, a clause called the “savings clause” in the 1894 Act seems to contradict the
idea that the Tribe relinquished any treaty guarantees. Since her borders were secured by treaty,
the Tribe argued that statutes were insufficient to diminish boundaries. At worst, the allotment
statute was ambiguous, and ambiguous legislation ought not to be interpreted in a manner
unfavorable to tribal interests.
The seeming contradiction with the savings clause didn’t sway Justice O’Connor.
Justice O’Connor found that the clause did not create ambiguity in the statute, by simply
following the jurisprudence of recent cases. Justice O’Connor noted that both Solem and Hagen
presented the Court with the task of determining congressional intent on issues that Congress
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could never have contemplated. In the interest of minimalism, therefore, Justice O’Connor aims
to follow Solem, arguing that language and history ought to determine application.
Justice O’Connor upholds the interpretative doctrine that diminishment ought to be
found only when evidence for it is overwhelmingly clear. But these principles seem empty.
Yankton presents a fact pattern with two conflicting clauses of a statute. Surely, if anything is
ambiguous, a straight contradiction of clauses is ambiguous. Therefore, on the Court’s stated
interpretive doctrine, the Court should have found in favor of the Tribe. It didn’t, and the culprit
is an overemphasis on minimalism taken to apply even when legislation is logically
inconsistent.
Good jurisprudence, Krakoff argues, would keep to the spirit of Justice Marshall’s
opinion in Solem. By departing from that spirit, while still applying some of the technical
language, the Court in Yankton appeals to a case-by-case minimalism which ultimately has led
to a significant change in policy not required by statute. In trying to follow minimalism, the
Court is imposing policy prescriptions – the worst form of judicial activism.
The proof is in the evidence. Justice Blackmun – not a minimalist – properly dissented
from Hagen and from diminishment. By the time of Yankton, Justice Blackmun had left the
Court. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, both minimalists, joined the majority. Like in Strate,
minimalist options preserving tribal land are possible, but background assumptions smuggled in
to the Court’s opinions undermine tribal sovereignty, using minimalism as a cover.
Two additional cases are Leech Lake and Venetie. The rulings in Leech Lake and
Venetie were both quite broad, so they are hardly examples of failings of judicial minimalism,
However, Krakoff argues that they do provide evidence that minimalists, far from determining
the decisions of a divided Court, as argued in Chapter I, are actually shaped in their decision-
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making and their jurisprudence by the more vocal views of maximalists like Justice Thomas.
Krakoff argues that this ceding of authority comes when judicial minimalists, out of a desire to
render decisions shallowly, try to avoid commitments over content altogether.
In Leech Lake, the Court found that tribes were not exempt from property taxes
imposed on lands purchased by the Tribe. In his opinion, Justice Thomas relied heavily on the
controversial Allotment Era case Goudy v. Meath. Goudy differed from other Indian law cases
in that it did not require a clear congressional statement to abrogate Indian rights. To the
contrary, Goudy held that a clear congressional statement of non-taxability would be required
for taxes to be imposed. Applying this standard, Justice Thomas held that Congress didn’t need
to state that land was taxable in order for Congressional intent to be clear or to be applied.
From the perspective of Indian law, Krakoff argues that the biggest risk of Leech Lake
is that it holds that land is only non-taxable if Congress has expressly stated that it is, implying
that the fundamental consideration of sovereignty is exclusively the province of Congress, not
the Tribe. Krakoff notes that Justice Thomas doesn’t even use the term “inherent sovereignty”,
implying that Tribal immunity from state taxation has always come only from Congressional
action, not from separate sovereignty.
Leech Lake sharply contrasts with the Court’s approach in McClanahan, which stressed
a background of tribal sovereignty. Leech Lake is broad, implying that any land regained by
tribes is always subject to taxation unless Congress says otherwise. But, notably, Leech Lake is
shallow. Leech Lake does not present a broader theory of Indian law and doesn’t even discuss
change theory and history in precedent.
Tricked by the shallowness of Leech Lake, the Court’s minimalists were able to join the
majority without thinking they were putting forward a new theory of tribal sovereignty. But
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they were: by rejecting the Tribe’s argument that sovereignty is an inherent (although
unexercised) tribal right, the Court affirmed that sovereignty was granted by Congressional fiat
(and could, consequently, be taken away). This supplants the vision of John Marshall: Indian
sovereignty pre-dates and exists outside the Constitution. Since Leech Lake avoids stating this
implicitly, it seems minimalist, and attracted minimalist support. But it wasn’t really, it was just
seemingly shallow. Minimalism failed to actually avoid overturning the status quo. For
Krakoff, this is a failure of the theory. In my eyes, it’s a confusion over the content of
minimalism; it is the focus on shallowness which is confusing the Court, rather than a strict
adherence to narrowness under which Leech Lake, granting the premises of Krakoff’s
argument, would have been rejected.
Another example of a broad but shallow ruling is Venetie. In Venetie, the Court held
that the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act eliminated several tribal lands previously held to
be sovereign. The Native Village of Venetie sued for the authority to tax a contractor building a
public school on Tribal land. Sovereignty was at the center of the case – the difference between
private land held by Indians and separate taxable sovereign territory.
In determining the sovereignty of the land owned by the Native Village of Venetie, the
Court considered first whether the land had been set aside for Indian use and second whether
the Federal Government continued to assert Federal supervision of the land. Venetie argued
that since the Tribe had repurchased the land as part of an agreement in the Settlement Act,
unbroken sovereignty was maintained. The land, in other words, was basically the same as a
reservation. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Tribe, but the Court found that the legal land
transfers from trust to private corporations vacated sovereignty.
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The Court also found that the State, not the Federal Government, maintained
supervision of Venetie’s land. The Tribe argued that since the Settlement Act granted them
unique claims to federal benefits and special exemptions from federal tax burdens, their special
status was federally supervised. The Court disagreed, maintaining that these special provisions
were just special provisions, not indicative of some special character of the land.
To put the analysis above into argument form:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Minimalism implies Strate and Yankton. (PR)
Strate and Yankton are unjust. (PR)
Therefore, minimalism implies injustice. (1,2)
Minimalism permits Leech Lake and Venetie. (PR)
Leech Lake and Venetie are unjust. (PR)
Therefore, minimalism permits injustice. (4,5)
The best maximalism neither implies injustice nor permits injustice. (PR)
Therefore, the best maximalism is superior to the best minimalism. (6,7)
Therefore, maximalism is superior to minimalism. (8)

This argument is quite complex. The validity seems suspect to me, particularly the
move from (8) to (9). Even if the best maximalism is better than the best minimalism,
perhaps the median maximalism is actually worse, and therefore we should avoid
maximalism. For that matter, premiss (7) seems controversial. We all know a maximalist or
too we personally think of as an excellent jurist, but are we truly able to conclude that the
best maximalism never implies or permits injustice? Nevertheless, I think the best way to
argue against the soundness of this objection is to dispute premises (1) and (4).
My response to Brown relied heavily on the idea that in order for a minimalist to
sign on to an opinion, the opinion has to be just. This condition, based on my definition in
Chapter I, distinguishes minimalism from restraint and explains why minimalists actually
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find on the side of the majority in Brown. But there is another criterion for minimalism –
the decisions of a minimalist must be, at least in some way, principled.
By principled I mean simply that the reasoning utilized in the majority opinion must
be general and applicable to other cases. This requirement is necessary because otherwise
the minimal ruling in every case would start with a Bush v. Gore disclaimer: the argument
in this case cannot be used as precedent in any future case. No system of law functions
properly without guidance for future cases and a steady, predictable rule of law. Since the
United States is a common-law system, that guidance comes from precedent. Without
principled precedent, the system collapses. Therefore, some enumerable principle must be
present in every case, otherwise it is not a minimalist decision – rather simply a wrong or
ad hoc decision.
Krakoff’s argument relies on Strate, Yankton, Leech Lake and Venetie being
minimalist. But this does not follow. The problem isn’t that these cases are unjust –
minimalism alone is no guarantee of that reply because it does not identify what is just. The
problem is that these cases are unprincipled. For the minimalist, the big trouble with the
Court’s decisions is simply that these cases are unacceptably unprincipled.
Strate, Yankton, Leech Lake and Venetie are not principled, and therefore they are
not minimalist. Since these cases are not minimalist, tough case arguments that argue from
modus tollens or by counterexample are unsound. This objection, therefore, fails. You
cannot show that minimalism has a problem because it implies an incorrect decision if
minimalism does not actually imply that decision.
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3.5. Conclusion
I began this Chapter by considering the case of Brown. First, I catalogued the case,
discussing the history, context and legal questions considered. Next, I use this case to
power an objection against judicial minimalism. After clarifying that objection, I refuted it
by arguing that judicial minimalists actually would have ruled with the majority. Then, I
considered a set of cases from American Indian law. I similarly used these cases to power a
few different objections to minimalism. After analyzing these objections, I refuted the first
two by disputing the validity of the objections on the basis of the Chapter I definition of
minimalism. I then refuted the final objection by challenging soundness since minimalists
would not have ruled the way the Court ruled in several key cases because the Court’s
decisions were unprincipled.
As with all objections by counterexample, it certainly remains possible that some
counterexample or tough case lurks out there which, when properly analyzed, will show
fundamental and irresolvable problems with minimalism. It is hard, ever, to fully rule
something like that out. But we have combed the literature for the famous landmarks and
the obscure arcana without finding a counterexample and without identifying a sound
objection to minimalism. Therefore, I turn now, in Chapter IV, to independent arguments
for judicial minimalism as a procedural theory of jurisprudence.
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Chapter IV

For Judicial Minimalism

My purpose in this Chapter is to argue for minimalism. I have provided a formal
working definition of minimalism in Chapter I, considered straightforward objections in
Chapter II and tackled tough objections in Chapter III. Having considered several initial
objections, I now argue why minimalism is correct. I will advance two independent
arguments. I begin with an inductive argument from epistemic principles. I think this
argument is sound, and provides good evidence in support of minimalism. I follow this
argument with a separate argument using the framework of law and economics. My first
argument is philosophical; my second is empirical.

4.1. Argument from Epistemic Humility
While some sources gesture toward an epistemological argument, I have never seen
the argument presented with full rigor. I take the name “epistemic humility” from Sunstein
and from Smith’s critical account, although my reconstruction is more formal than either
approach. This argument differs from a simple wisdom-of-crowds argument in the style of
Surowiecki, although there are similarities.
The Argument from Epistemic Humility begins with an epistemic premiss:
(1) We have a low level of epistemic confidence about the right answer to legal
questions. [PR]
I think there are at least four reasons to accept this premiss. First:
(a) Jurisprudence is not the sort of subject that, by virtue of the nature
of the study, yields the student a high degree of epistemic certainty.
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The idea is that there are some branches of inquiry – e.g., logic, mathematics, and the
physical sciences – where we assign a high confidence to our conclusions. I am highly
confident that the Pythagorean Theorem is correct – if not absolutely certain, then nearly
so. In fact, I am as certain of the Pythagorean Theorem as I am of almost anything, except
perhaps Descartes’ cogito or other background metaphysical assertions.
I am not nearly as confident, but highly confident, of the Second Law of
Thermodynamics. I am not completely certain, but I am very certain, of the Second Law. I
am more certain that the Second Law holds in general than I am that my father is a human
being, since the (implausible) scenario of my father’s replacement by body-snatchers is
more probable than the failure of conservation of energy.
That I am willing to be so confident in the conclusions of mathematics or
thermodynamics suggests that I hold these subjects in high epistemic regard. This is an old
argument; Carnap argued for the near-certainty of the ‘analytic disciplines’ many years ago.
My case is easier since I do not need, for this argument, a hard analytic-synthetic
distinction. I simply need to recognize that subjects besides mathematics and the physical
sciences – including the social sciences and economics – seem to yield a lower epistemic
confidence in their conclusions. This is not necessarily a criticism of those subjects or their
methods of inquiry, but rather of the nature of the subject itself.
For example, political science contains a well-known theory called the Iron Law of
Oligarchy. First proposed by Michels in 1911, the Iron Law claims that all forms of
political organization ultimately collapse into oligarchies. Notably, this includes all forms
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of democratic political government. No matter how democratic or egalitarian a movement
begins, it inevitably becomes an oligarchy.
The idea of the Iron Law is that no large and complex organization can function as a
direct democracy. Therefore, power within an organization accrues to a limited set of
individuals within the group, selected in one way or another. Michels provides a number of
examples to support the Iron Law including political parties, civic organizations and trade
unions.
In each case, a small group of executives within the organization succeeds in
centralizing information and political power, growing to dominate the power structure of
the organization. Since most ordinary members are uninterested in the internecine conflicts
at the upper administrative level, these positions have little accountability or membership
governance. Efforts within an organization to hold leadership accountable inevitably fail,
according to Michels, because the powerful build political machines that reward loyalty and
shape the narrative of the organization. In this way, even the highest-minded and egalitarian
organizations fail to escape from oligarchic rule.
One particularly striking observation of Michels is that socialist political parties –
ostensibly organized around grassroots activism and mass participation – seem dominated
by elite personalities that are often hereditary, a feature stereotypically associated with
conservative movements. Rather than criticizing specific parties, Michels argued that it was
the nature of organizations itself that causes this outcome.
In other words, as organizations become larger and more powerful, the number of
day-to-day decisions they make becomes too vast for ordinary members to decide. These
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decisions have to be concentrated in the hands of a smaller class of persons. As this class
becomes smaller (relative to the membership), more centralized and more powerful, its
structural incentives change. Rather than being primarily motivated by a desire to put into
action the will of the majority of members, each level of removal from the day-to-day
membership causes successively higher levels of the organization’s bureaucracy to shift
focus toward preserving and expanding their own personal bureaucratic empires within the
organization. Specialization within the bureaucracy concentrates knowledge further,
enhancing this effect.
As leadership becomes increasingly entrenched, it increasingly controls the levers
of promotion and dismissal within the organization. The primary goal of leadership moves
from the amassing of power to the preservation of power to the preservation of the power
structure itself. An echo chamber develops and leadership becomes self-reinforcing,
perpetuating the same oligarchy over generations of administrations.
This system selects, converts and promotes leadership devoted to the system. As
more and more of the institutional channels of the organization are captured by this
oligarchy, information becomes sanitized to reinforce the current power structure. Negative
information is suppressed; positive information is promoted until eventually the
organisation is completely captured by the ruling oligarchy.
Therefore, true democracy, in the sense of rule without an oligarchic elite, is both
theoretically and practically impossible, according to Michels. Michels thought this made
democratic organization undesirable or at least dishonest, but subsequent scholars have
noted that this does not necessarily follow. It may be that actual egalitarian rule is
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impossible, but by encouraging buy-in democratic organizations better legitimize the
oligarchy in power.
Confederate power structures hinder the Iron Law. Unions organized around strong
and autonomous local chapters, as described by Lipset, weaken the power of centralized
leadership and serve as a check on coördinated empire building. If local chapters have
economic incentives understood by rank-and-file members of the chapter, they are strongly
motivated to preserve their autonomy, and this makes it harder to centralize power.
Factions, too, can serve as a check on power. Warring bureaucratic factions or
internal divisions amongst ministries of state can help redirect resources and focus, making
empire-building more difficult. This is not dissimilar to the intentions of the Founding
Fathers as expressed in the Federalist Papers: rather than fighting against the fundamental
human drive for power, a dynamic system can balance competing interest to avoid tyranny.
In this way, some union case examples and perhaps the general governmental
example of the United States serve as counterexamples to the Iron Law. Indeed, many take
these counterexamples as largely dispositive, indicating that the Iron Law is not so much a
law in the sense of natural science but rather a more general (if powerful) tendency of large
bureaucratic organizations.
For these reasons, I suspect the Iron Law is false, although highly interesting. But
how certain am I of that conclusion? How high is my epistemic confidence, one way or the
other? The answers are: “not very” and “very low.” I am not particularly convinced I’m
right on the Iron Law or that my counterexamples are dispositive, and I would not be
especially shocked to learn of a more robust research result which refuted my views.
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My argument (a) therefore is a claim about epistemology and the scientific method.
I assert, without defense (as it would be beyond the scope of this dissertation) that
mathematical proof and empirical observation provide greater certainty of conclusions than
the scholarly method used in the study of law. Therefore, (a) is true. Therefore, (1) is true.
However, even if (a) were false, a second argument shows that (1) is true:
(b) For any given legal question, there may not be a right answer at all.
This point has already been made in this dissertation (see Chapter II). To quickly
reiterate, some cases involve certain fact-patters that I call paradoxical cases. In these
paradoxical cases, there is no right answer to the legal question of how to resolve the
dispute. The example given in Chapter II is of an example known as the Paradox of the
Court, where a payment dispute leads to a lawsuit.
The Athenian Court quickly discovers that both parties in the lawsuit have what
appear to be airtight arguments in support of motions for summary judgment. Both motions
can’t be just – their arguments are mutually inconsistent – but it seems that both arguments
are sound. The Court wonders what to do, and the most straightforward answer seems to be
that they can do nothing: the question of how to fairly adjudicate this case has no right
answer.
Various attempts at answering this question have been tried throughout the years
and throughout the literature, but they all seem flawed in one way or another. Therefore,
there are some legal questions which don’t have right answers. Therefore, if one is
confronted by a legal question, the question may not have any answer at all. Therefore, we
have very low epistemic confidence in legal conclusions – which is, of course, premiss (1).
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Attempts to reply to arguments based on the Paradox of the Court often turn on a
type of special pleading excusal – that case is so old and so obscure, surely it is insufficient
to establish a broader argument. But I reject this counterargument. First, the use of single
cases to generalize broader conclusions is common in legal philosophy – in Law’s Empire,
for example, Dworkin generalizes broadly from Riggs v. Palmer, a quite obscure case.
Second, even if it were uncommon, philosophical rigor is sufficiently satisfied if a logical
conclusion follows, even if there is only one example. There is no ‘that’s a weird case’
objection in logic, nor should there be. If a claim is universal, a single counterexample
proves it false. Third, and perhaps most simply, there actually are a wide range of
paradoxical cases.
Another example of a paradoxical case identified by Suber is State v. Jones. My
description of this case follows Suber – State is an example of a legal paradox occurring
even in quite modern law. In State, Jones was a physician alleged to have performed thenillegal abortions on six women. In the case of one woman, Jacquelin Harris, the only
evidence of the abortion was her testimony. The trial judge informed the jury of the
following rules:
(a) a women who voluntarily procured an abortion was an accomplice
(b) if Jones is guilty, then Harris must be guilty as an accomplice,
(c) sole testimony of accomplices against principals can not justify a conviction.
These jury instructions were agreed by both sides to be accurate statements of then-current
Ohio law.
Jones moved to find Harris, by her own testimony, an accomplice as a matter of law
determined by summary judgment. Had the motion carried, Harris’ testimony would have
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been legally insufficient to convict him. He could then have moved for a motion to dismiss
the charges and be acquitted as a matter of law. However, Jones’ motion failed, and the
original instructions outlined above were instead given to the jury.
Jones’ motion aims to have Harris declared an accomplice as a matter of law. But if
she is his accomplice, then he must be the guilty principal. His guilt is required in order for
the motion which proves his innocence to be upheld. Should the motion have been granted
and should he have been declared innocent because he is guilty? Or should the motion be
denied, opening the possibility that he will be found guilty on the basis of testimony that is
only admissible if he is innocent?
The State assumes that Jones will be found either guilty or not guilty. If guilty, then
the State wins. If not guilty, then Harris is not his accomplice and her testimony against is
admissible, and so sufficient to convict him and so the State wins. So either way, the State
wins. Jones also assumes that he will be found guilty or not guilty. If not guilty, then he
wins; if guilty, then Harris is his accomplice and her testimony against him is legally
insufficient, and so he wins. So either way, Jones wins.
This paradox is deeper than a simple dispute over the applicability of the motion.
On both the State and Jones’ arguments, it is ultimately irrelevant whether Harris actually is
Jones accomplice. In attempting to sidestep the paradox, the trial judge told the jury to find
Harris to be Jones' accomplice if they found Jones guilty. Therefore, the jury’s verdict is
inevitably self-annulling. If they find Jones guilty, then they must find that Harris was his
accomplice, and so they must find her evidence against Jones insufficient, and so they must
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acquit Jones. But if they acquit Jones, then they must find Harris' evidence legally
sufficient, and so they must convict Jones.
The trial judge clearly understood that his instructions to the jury were paradoxical,
but simply forwarded the instructions anyway. The jury found Jones guilty. Since that
verdict implied he was innocent, Jones appealed, contesting the trial judge’s instructions to
the jury. The Appellate Court rejected his appeal and the trial verdict stood. The Appellate
Court referenced the State’s argument in rejecting the appeal.
Jones shares some characteristics with the Liar Paradox and other self-contradictory
statements, and, of course, with Protagoras. In both cases a logical paradox occurs in the
fact pattern and therefore, naturally, no right answer exists, even ontologically. Since no
right answer exists even ontologically, the Court should approach the situation with grave
epistemic caution – premiss (1). Therefore, argument (b) is true, and premiss (1) is true. But
even if argument (b) were false, another argument shows that premiss (1) is true:
(c) Even if there is a right answer, there may be wide and sensible
disagreement on what it is.
Those who, like me, dispute that the Right Thesis is true do not maintain that no
cases ever have right answers. Some cases do – sometimes the fact pattern or the legal
precedent makes the answer abundantly clear. Many other cases are the sort where there is
great disagreement and yet we might think, for one reason or another, that we have the right
answer. In these cases, argument (b) does not serve to support premiss (1).
But even if a right answer exists ontologically, it may be unknown to us – or, worse,
it may even be unknowable. The sort of cases that reach the Supreme Court are, for
structural reasons, rather often of this type. It is rare for the Supreme Court to have original
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jurisdiction over a legal dispute – the vast majority of Court cases arise from appellate
jurisdiction, as the Supreme Court reviews a decision by a Circuit Court of Appeals.
The classic example of review over appellate jurisdiction arises in the case of a
circuit split – and circuit splits account for a disproportionate number of Supreme Court
cases. Cummins defines a circuit split as any situation when two or more different Circuit
Courts provide mutually inconsistent rulings on the same legal matter. Since neither Court
has jurisdiction over the other, only the Supreme Court can arbitrate the dispute.
It is not a sufficient condition for a circuit split to arise when a cases reaches the
Supreme Court – there are some circuit splits which are not reviewed. But it is a very strong
reason – Lacovara notes that circuit splits are the single most likely reason for a case to be
reviewed by the Supreme Court., as do Perry and Stephenson. This makes sense – the Court
must arbitrate the split in order for appellate jurisprudence to be non-contradictory.
Meadon notes that Federal Circuit Courts have been in existence since 1789. Circuit
Courts do not work together to solve legal issues jointly, and so virtually as long as there
have been Circuit Courts there have been cases which different Circuit Courts resolved
cases differently. Cases decided in the jurisdiction of one Circuit Court do not provide
binding precedent on any other Circuit Court, meaning that differences can persist through
time.
Since decisions of a Circuit Court are binding on all District Courts within the
jurisdiction of that Circuit Court, this precedent can lead to a snowball effect of layers of
decisions all based on different precedents between the two Circuits. Left alone, a core
circuit split would lead to the development of different legal systems between the two
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circuits, and a broadening sphere of cases undecidable by the Supreme Court without
resolving the split.
It is possible for circuit splits to be even (Court 1 finds Χ, Court 2 finds not-Χ), or
for there to be a majority (Courts 1 and 2 find X, Court 3 finds not-X) and even, rarely, for
a triple or quadruple split (Court 1 finds X, Court 2 finds Ψ, and Court 3 finds Ω – X, Ψ
and Ω are mutually inconsistent). As Summers and Newman note, if there is a majority in
the split the Circuit Courts in the majority win at the Supreme Court in around ninety
percent of cases.
Additionally, unresolved circuit splits can have a tendency to lead to forum
shopping by litigants, as different court systems will render different verdicts. Judge Moore
is known for this argument, and for the consequent argument that circuit splits must be
resolved by the Supreme Court as soon as possible, in the interest of legal consistency,
predictability and economic efficiency.
There are even arguments demanding resolution of circuit splits on the basis of
fundamental rights, rather than efficiency. This ranges from Griffith’s claims of
fundamental unfairness to the argument to Morrison’s argument that lengthy circuit splits
lead to due process violations if they make criminal law incomprehensible to a reasonable
man. Other similar arguments, like Logan’s, are based on the Fourth Amendment.
Jurists focused on agency law and agency enforcement raise their own set of
objections. For example, Boodoo argues that enforcing laws as a federal agency where a
circuit split exists is nearly impossible, since the requirement to create a national standard

Page | 161

in the interest of fairness runs against the differing legal requirements in different circuit
jurisdictions.
For all these reasons, the Supreme Court often steps in to resolve circuit splits. One
of the major functions of the Supreme Court is to ensure that laws are applied and
interpreted uniformly across the United States – a function reaffirmed explicitly by Justice
Douglas, writing a dissent on the decision not to grant certiorari in Wright. The Supreme
Court offers the only judicial path to resolving a circuit split.
It is true that some jurists defend a kind of competitive market system and therefore
do not demand splits be resolved. Frost has this view, as does Wallace. Others don’t think
resolving splits is as crucial an issue: Warsby falls into this group. But the Supreme Court
does not agree, and sometimes directly indicates, as in Moskal, that they are accepting a
case for the primary purpose of resolving a split.
In theory, all appellate courts are equal. However, certain Circuit courts hear a large
number of cases in one particular branch of the law and have, for this reason, developed
extensive experience in these cases. The Court Appeals for the District of Columbia, for
example, hears a large number of administrative law cases, while the Ninth Circuit Court
hears a large number of intellectual property cases.
The Supreme Court is understandably more inclined to uphold the Court acting
within her primary area of expertise in the case of a circuit split. And this is sensible, for a
Court with greater experience probably tends toward sounder opinions. Circuit splits are, of
course, nearly impossible with specialized courts like the Court of Admiralty or the Court
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of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which, as described by Markman, exclusively hears
patent cases.
If a specialized court is the only court in the system hearing certain kinds of cases,
then a split becomes impossible, since that court can hardly split with itself (that would just
be to revise precedent). Even jurists like Wood, who consider removing the monopoly these
specialized courts have in the appellate process, concede that the impossibility of splits on
specialized courts is an advantage. Hansford is even more positive.
There are several active circuit splits. For example, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits
disagree on whether prisoners have a reasonable expectation of privacy for correspondence
with their attorney when they know, because of prison rules, that their correspondence is
being read. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits disagree on whether police may seize an
individual without a warrant solely on the officer’s suspicion that they committed a
misdemeanor.
The upshot of all of this analysis is that Supreme Court cases are hard. By the time a
case reaches the Supreme Court it is no surprise that there can be a wide range of views on
it. These differing opinions may be thoroughly informed and each side may be perfectly
reasonable. Therefore, even if we believe we have discovered the best answer, we should
bear in mind that we might be wrong, and keep our epistemic confidence low.
Moreover, the answer to legal questions might be more than controversial and hard.
There’s also the fact that when we come to an answer we may very well get it wrong. This
justification for premiss (1) is as follows:
(d) We often get legal decisions wrong. Even consensus in the form of
a unanimous opinion doesn’t guarantee that we get the right answer
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– consider Pace or Loving, which were reversed shortly after being
decided unanimously.
It’s one thing to say that it hard to come to answers to legal questions when they are
presented to us. It’s another, far stronger, thing to point out that even when we do reach
answers they are (sadly) often wrong. And not just wrong, but very wrong. The history of
the Court is sadly full of determined answers in cases where the opinions are reversed,
shortly afterward, sometime unanimously.
A discipline where, by the nature of the subject we should have low epistemic
confidence, where there is widespread and thoughtful disagreement on conclusions, where
we tend to get conclusions wrong – in some cases drastically – and where there may well
be no true right answer sounds like a discipline where we should assign a very low
epistemic confidence. Therefore, premiss (1) is true.
To premiss (1) we add the premise that when uncertainty exists, the judiciary should
defer to democratically-elected policymakers. This is a somewhat controversial
constitutional premise. But, I think it is a conclusion not out of line with the view of the
Court in the American political tradition. As Madison noted in the Federalist Papers,
democratically-elected policymakers have the automatic legitimacy of their popular
election.
If the answer to a subject is unclear, or the moral implications divisive, at least if the
legislature decides we can say that the result was reached via the consent of those affected.
That intuition powers this second premise. If this premise is rejected, as some jurists
certainly do, I don’t think this argument works as a defense of judicial minimalism – I think
I’d need another argument.
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This portion of the argument echoes Sunstein in One Case at a Time, in that a high
value is placed on the value of deliberative democracy and the role of the Court in allowing
that deliberation to flourish. The difference is that where Sunstein grounds that value as the
sole substantive reason for minimalism, I use the value of deference to the elective branch
as simply a premise in a broader argument.
It is clear though that minimalists are fundamentally ‘small footprint’, sharing this
trait with Bickel and others and arranged against more activist approaches from both the
left (Dworkin comes to mind) and the right (Justice Thomas comes to mind). In this way,
judicial restraint and judicial minimalism are similar, although for reasons discussed in
Chapter 1 they remain separate and distinct legal theories. To restate then, premiss (2) is:
(2) When uncertainty exists, courts should defer to elected policymakers. [PR]
If I am granted these two premisses, I think I can make a very strong argument in
defense of judicial minimalism. If the law is fundamentally viewed as murky, with
decisions very unclear and error highly possible, and if we fundamentally orient our
jurisprudence toward the idea that uncertainty ought to be shifted (to the maximal extent
possible) onto democratically elected policymakers, then our natural conclusion should be
that judges should do as little as they can get away with.
Judges must actually make rulings, of course. They must arbitrate disputes and,
where necessary, they must clarify precedent and the application of laws. They must do this
in accordance with their fundamental jurisprudence and their definition and theory of
justice. But they should try to do this while leaving the maximal scope possible for elected
policymakers.
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Since the view that judges should make the narrowest possible fair ruling is the
definition provided of judicial minimalism in Chapter 1, this line of reasoning leads us
inexorably toward our simple conclusion:
(3) Judicial minimalism is correct. [1,2]
Two notes about this argument. First, as judicial minimalism is defined in Chapter
1, a minimalist will still need a general jurisprudential philosophy in order to get a complete
theory. Minimalism is the method of achieving the end goal of jurisprudence, but it does
not specify the end goal. To make a celestial analogy: minimalism is the (very slow) rocket
ship, a philosophy of jurisprudence points the ship at the right planet.
Second, it is often assumed, for example by Wexler, that in order to argue for
judicial minimalism you need to adopt a “Maimonides premise” – the idea that justice
requires permitting a thousand legal uncertainties to avoid one judicial error. The intuition
behind this thought certainly helps lead one to accept my second premise, but I do not need
a Maimonides premise for my argument.
I note also that even if judicial minimalism were defined as Sunstein defines it the
Maimonides premise would not be necessary. It is perhaps unsurprising that claims that a
Maimonides premise are required are generally found in criticism of judicial minimalism,
although even that seems suspect, since the Maimonides premise seems more broadly a
core part of common-law jurisprudence.
In the preceding paragraphs we have put forward an argument for judicial
minimalism that is philosophical and based on epistemic uncertainty. The argument seems
valid to me, and I think both premises are true, meaning that the argument is sound. This
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argument provides inductive evidence to support judicial minimalism, and while it uses the
value of deliberative democracy as a premise, it does not equate the theory with that value.

4.2. Argument from Rule of Law
The first argument presented in this chapter moves from first principles and the
concept of epistemic uncertainty to the conclusion that courts should adopt a minimal
footprint while fulfilling their required work – in other words, that they should adopt
judicial minimalism. An alternative argument from the law and economics tradition is
possible based on the high economic and humanitarian value of stare decisis and the rule of
law.
Sunstein, as we have seen, grounds the value of judicial minimalism in the
promotion of democratic deliberation. Especially in political theories like Cohen’s, this
seems highly persuasive. But it seems to me like there is an alternative grounding based on
a much simpler ethical theory: utilitarianism. The argument here is simple: judicial
minimalism increases utility – more specifically, aggregate utility for society.
Unfortunately, proving this by directly measuring utility is obviously unworkable.
Even if we could agree on the definition of utility, and even if we could find some long
elusive way of measuring utility directly in brain states, we would still need some way of
contrasting the alternative possible worlds where we chose different legal models and this
seems to me totally implausible.

4.2.1. The Human Development Index (HDI)
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Thus, we will have to settle for indirect arguments. There are a broad series of
measures of global happiness, with varying degrees of support from the academic literature.
One of the oldest is the Human Development Index (HDI) maintained by the United
Nations. I will choose to use this index for my argument, although I think virtually any
other happiness index would suffice to make the same case.
The HDI is a composite metric that includes life expectancy, educational attainment
and income per capita. The HDI was developed by economists Mahbub ul Haq and
Amartya Sen, and was first published by the United Nations Development Programme. I
will use the HDI rather than the IHDI, an adjusted variant of the HDI which also accounts
for income inequality. This is because I think the HDI is less controversial, less valueladen, has a more robust data-set; also because the HDI is older and because, given how
tightly the HDI and IHDI correlate, I’m not sure it really much matters for my argument.
The HDI began in 1990, when economist Mahbub ul Haq sought to shift the indexes
used to assess development away from raw measures of national income, like GDP-percapita or GNP-per-capita and more toward measures of general outcome satisfaction. To
improve the index outcomes, Mr Haq formed a group of development economists.
Supervised by Amartya Sen, the group worked to create a simple composite index of
human well-being. The result was a single score that ostensibly objectively measures
human development.
Technically, the HDI measures the Life Expectancy Index (LEI), the Education
Index (EI) and the Income Index (II), themselves composite factors following simple
formulae. LEI is given by (LE-20)/(85-20), where LE is the life expectancy at birth of a
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country. The EI is given by (MYSI+EYSI)/2, where MYSI and EYSI are themselves
composite indexes. The HDI is therefore a composite of a composite of a composite. To
calculate MYSI, the mean years of schooling index, simply divide the mean years of
schooling by fifteen. To calculate EYSI, the expected years of schooling index, divide the
expected years of schooling by eighteen. II, the Income Index, is given by a compound
quotient.

The numerator begins with β, set to Gross National Income adjusted for

purchasing power parity divided by the number of citizens residing within a country. GNI
is itself composed of GDP, with the addition of incomes made by citizens living abroad and
the subtraction of GDP created by foreign citizens. Subtracting 4.61 from the natural log of
β thus give the full numerator. The denominator of II is simply set to 6.62. II is equal to 1
when β – effectively, the income earned by the average citizen – is equal to precisely
$75,000. II is equal to 0 when β is equal to just $100.
The HDI itself is simply the geometric mean of all three of the previous normalized
indices: the cube root of the product of the LEI, the EI and the II. The HDI aims to include
all countries, or at least all United Nations Member States, but some are missing, primarily
due to lack of data. The most significant of these is India. New states (South Sudan),
totalitarian states (North Korea), weak states (Somalia, Pakistan) and very small states
(Monaco, San Marino) are the most likely to be missing.
HDI has risen steadily over time, as human development has improved across the
world. In the thirty years from 1975 to 2005, the HDI of the OECD rich countries grew
from approximately 0.82 to about 0.92, a gain of approximately 12%. HDI in Latin
America and the Caribbean grew from 0.67 to 0.79, a gain of approximately 18%. Gains in
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East Asia were extraordinary, growing from a base of 0.55 to 0.76, good for 38%
cumulative growth. Remarkably, South Asia grew even faster, from 0.43 to 0.6, an
astonishing 40%. Although Sub-Saharan Africa did not live up to Asia’s growth, HDI still
improved from 0.41 to 0.48, 17%, still higher than the growth rate in the OECD. As a
minor technical point, some of these gains were calculated using an older formula, but the
results are similar no matter how the calculation is made.
The top ranked country by HDI in 2015 was Norway, scoring 0.944. Australia came
in second, followed by Switzerland, Denmark and Holland. These top five places have
proven quite stable over the years. At sixth, Germany was the highest scoring major
economy. The United States, at eighth, was the highest scoring global economy and the
highest scoring country with a nine-figure population. At eleventh, Singapore was the
highest ranked country in Asia (if you exclude Australia and New Zealand). At eighteenth,
Israel was the highest ranked county in the Middle East. Argentina ranked fortieth, the
highest in South America. Unfortunately, no country from Africa ranked in the top 50;
neither did China or India, although Hong Kong and Macau SAR were both in the top
twenty, and Taiwan was twenty-fifth. Over the years, the HDI has remained relatively
stable, suggesting that it keys into a stable characteristic of countries. Norway has ranked
first twelve times (2001-6, 2009-15), Canada eight times (1992, 1994-2000), Japan three
times (1990-1, 1993) and Iceland twice (2005-6).
The HDI is not without criticism. Critics on the left have noted that the HDI ignores
ecological and environmental considerations. On the right, conservatives have criticized a
perceived bias toward egalitarianism as well as a lack of consideration for the development

Page | 170

of lasting technological or cultural achievements that contribute to human civilization. A
more technical criticism focuses on data error. Wolff, analyzing many years of data from
the HDI, found errors due to data updating, formula changes and poor raw data provided to
the Index. Wolff argues that classifications based on HDI data into development categories
is unjustified, because of errors in data and arbitrary cut-off values for each category.
Wolff’s criticism led to a systemic reëvaluation of the methodology of the HDI. Wolff was
not criticizing the fundamental value of the HDI, just the specific division of countries into
development categories, which is irrelevant to my argument.
It seems evident to me that the HDI correlates with aggregate utility in different
societies. Moreover, this relationship seems clearly causal. The HDI tracks a range of
factors from poverty level to educational attainment, and since these goals are widely
(nearly universally) desired, attaining them seems to rather straightforwardly increase the
aggregate utility in a society. I therefore propose this premiss:
(1) Higher scores on the HDI accurately reflect higher utility. [PR]
This is a premiss and is open to empirical dispute, but I really think it
uncontroversial, even among happiness studies experts who prefer different indexes. It is
one thing to say that there are sharper measure of higher utility than the HDI, as many
argue. It is quite another to say that the HDI does not causally track higher utility at all, or
to argue that it does not correlate sharply with real utility improvements.

4.2.2. The Economic Freedom of the World Index (EFI)
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Now, I should like to introduce another index. The Fraser Institute, a Libertarian
think-tank based in Canada, maintains the Economic Freedom of the World Index (EFI).
The EFI aims to measure the level of economic freedom in countries around the world.
According to Dawson, the EFI is the most widely used index of economic freedom in the
world. Milton Friedman originally created the EFI after a series of conferences on
economic freedom and its state throughout the world. Friedman came to define economic
freedom as valuing: (a) voluntary exchange at market prices, (b) freedom to enter contracts,
(c) freedom to make personal choices about livelihood, (d) protection of private property
rights, and (e) stability of the rule of law.
Quantitatively, the EFI measures:
(I) Size of government, by public expenditure, state-owned companies and
cumulative tax burden;
(II) Rule of law and the security of property rights;
(III) Access to stable money without prohibitive rates of inflation;
(IV) Access to international trade and international capital flows;
(V) Ease of incorporating new businesses, ease of working out labor
agreements and ease of access to credit.
These five factors have equal weight in calculating the final score. The EFI has been widely
cited in economic and political research. The index correlates with life expectancy,
negatively correlates strongly with the percentage of children in the workforce, correlates
strongly with income per capita, correlates with growth rate, negatively correlates strongly
with unemployment, correlates strongly with literacy and negatively correlates strongly
with infant mortality. Interesting research on economic freedom has also suggested a link to
conflict prevention, at least in some cases.
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The EFI is not (and does not aim to be) value-neutral. Throughout the world,
various political perspectives cite the EFI for support, a role that, of course, neither
validates nor invalidates the EFI as a research tool. There is quite a bit of criticism of the
EFI in the literature. De Haan has criticized the relationship between the EFI and economic
growth, while Heckelman has attacked the components of the Index. However, these
criticisms do not target the high value for economic growth attributed to the rule of law,
one of the core components of the Index, and the one relevant to my argument.
Hong Kong and Singapore rank the highest on the EFI rankings. Both are small
trading havens known for their robust judicial independence and emphasis on the rule of
law, especially in contracts and property cases. Financial havens like New Zealand and
Switzerland have also tended to place in the top tier. A diverse mix of mostly liberal
democracies occupies the other top spots, with surprises like Jordan and Georgia rounding
out more expected countries like Canada, the UK, Chile, Taiwan and the United States. In
all of these top fifteen countries, a strong component in the ranking is the independence and
reliability of legal judgment, especially in enforcing outcomes in torts, property and
contracts disputes.
At the other end of the spectrum, countries like Iran, Angola, Zimbabwe, the
Central African Republic, Algeria, Syria, Chad, Libya, the Congo and Venezuela join
default-prone wealthier countries like Argentina to round out the bottom of the EFI list.
These countries have very weak rule of law, weak judicial independence, weak
predictability of legal outcomes and, rather clearly, low aggregate utility for citizens.
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The EFI is more controversial than the HDI because it is rather openly tinted with a
policy bias, but all that is necessary for our argument is the discovery, made long ago, that
the EFI and HDI correlate, and that this relationship is causal. The premiss:
(2) Higher scores on the EFI cause higher scores on the HDI. [PR]
It follows then that one way of getting higher scores on the HDI is to get higher
scores on the EFI. Since, from premiss (1), we know that higher scores on the HDI
accurately reflect higher utility for the society earning them, it follows that one way of
increasing the utility of a society is to improve its score on the EFI.

4.2.3. Argument
The EFI has many measures – as a compound index, it reflects a variety of different
inputs. Improving some of these measures comes with clear tradeoffs. For example, one
way of improving scores on the EFI would be to lower the marginal tax rate on highincome earners and on corporations. While that would increase the EFI, it would also
probably increase a society’s Gini coefficient, a measure associated with economic
inequality.
Economic inequality is closely correlated with aggregate utility, as measured by the
HDI and other indexes. So, while lower marginal tax rates for high-income earners would
improve the HDI in some ways (by boosting EFI scores) it might well lower HDI by
boosting inequality. There is no guarantee, in other words, that such a policy would
increase HDI and therefore aggregate utility. It might, we just can’t be sure.
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But tax rates are not the only input used to calculate EFI score. Another important
set of inputs relate to the legal framework underlying the economic system of a country.
Ease of incorporation, protection for property rights, a fair and independent court system
for enforcing legal contracts – these factors can enhance economic freedom, and are major
inputs for the EFI.
Now, with any policy change, there are tradeoffs for some actors involved. But the
tradeoffs involved in improving these EFI inputs are different than the tradeoffs involved
for lowering top marginal tax rates. In countries where there is little by way of the rule of
law, rent-seekers can use regulatory capture to game the system and book extraordinary
profits. These particular individuals are harmed by the move to a rules-based system.
But broad measures of social policy – income inequality, public debt – only benefit
from improving legal certainty as defined by the EFI. In other words, improving rule of law
and contract enforcement standards represents low-hanging fruit for boosting a countries
score on the EFI: they are policy changes with few value-laden downsides, but clear
benefits to score.
I am highly sympathetic to the idea that deep policy choices, especially when they
touch fundamental value questions, should not be resolved by the Court. If society chooses
to modify its tax policy it seems to me that she should make that decision through her
chosen political process. But grabbing low-hanging fruit is quite a bit different; as it
involves no value tradeoffs, it seems very much a reasonable goal of legal policy.
How can legal philosophy or theories of jurisprudence boost these rule-of-law
factors that go into creating the EFI? One way is to make law more predictable, stable and
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reliable. Large and sudden changes to the law, simply because they are large and sudden
changes, make the law less stable and less reliable – although they may serve other
admirable goals. Narrow changes do less harm and, in comparison, make the law more
stable and reliable.
It is easier for legal actors – private persons, corporations, foreign entities – to know
and work with a body of law that is constant, predictable and knowable. Delaware is
famous in the United States for a truly disproportionate number of corporations – by some
accounts, as many as half of all American corporations are legally constituted in the state of
Delaware. Most Americans assume this is for tax reasons, but state tax laws (generally) do
not favour in-state incorporation, so there is no real tax benefit.
Rather, the reason so many American corporations choose Delaware as their home
base is because Delaware’s commercial and especially bankruptcy courts are so well known
and so predictable. A court system that moves swiftly, predictably and can be counted on to
fairly enforce contracts is of immense value to economic actors – so much so that they
choose to locate in such jurisdictions despite logistical hurdles.
What philosophy of judging or theory of jurisprudence does the best job of
promoting the reliability and predictability of law? Naturally, any theory which consciously
aims to change laws minimally, since any theory along these grounds will lead to a slower
and more incrementally changing body of law. This sensible sub-conclusion can be treated
as a premise for the purposes of the broader argument:
(3) Judicial minimalism raises EFI scores. [PR]
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Now the logical reasoning just follows transitivity. If judicial minimalism raises EFI
scores, and higher EFI score cause a rise in HDI score, then it follows that judicial
minimalism causes a rise in HDI score. Since a rise in HDI score accurately tracks a
corresponding rise in aggregate national utility, it follows that judicial minimalism causes a
rise in aggregate utility:
(4) Judicial minimalism raises utility. [3, 2, MP, 1, MP]
Utilitarianism is a complex moral theory, with various definitions, defenders and
opponents. I take Utilitarianism as defined by Bentham and Mill to hold, more or less, that
the moral good consists of promoting utility, by which we mean the greatest good for the
greatest number of persons. Whether Utilitarianism is a true ethical theory or not is a vast
question in modern ethics and far beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Nevertheless, what certainly is true is that a wide variety of scholars and ethicists
are either Utilitarians or hold Utilitarian views. Leading contemporary scholars who
identify as Utilitarians include Peter Singer and Derek Parfit. Major historical Utilitarians
include Sedgwick and Hare. This list is by no means exhaustive – there are hundreds,
probably thousands, of Utilitarian ethicists writing right now in the mainstream of ethics.
Even many ethicists who are not Utilitarians would agree that – absent other
considerations – raising utility is a good thing. This caveat forms a backbone premise of
texts like Animal Liberation, which are written by Utilitarians but aim to put forward
arguments that are persuasive to deontologists, virtue ethicists, contractarians and care
ethicists. Conclusion (4), therefore provides deep persuasive evidence to a nearly all ethical
theorists and deductive proof, if sound, to a significant subset of that class.
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From the perspective of legal policy, this argument is highly significant as well. If it
is sound, and it follows that judges can actually improve the happiness of ordinary
members of society simply by ruling narrowly and incrementally, that strikes me as a
powerful argument that judicial minimalism is the correct theory of judging. Some
questions are still open, since judicial minimalism must be pared with a theory of justice to
function. But the argument over the procedure of achieving the ends of that theory seems
quite robust.

4.3. Assessment
After all this argument, where does judicial minimalism stand? First and foremost,
is judicial minimalism even a theory? We have seen that Berwick, Garbus and others think
it is not. They argue that judicial minimalism is either a fraud (Garbus), a jumbled mess
(Berwick) or at best a cover for deeper value-laden theories (Krakoff). Is this criticism
correct? I think we have sufficient argument to determine that the answer is no.
Attempts to pare judicial minimalism with a substantive ideological component –
Peters’ Substantive Minimalism, Sunstein’s criterion of shallowness – do lead to
unworkable dead ends. But as a theory of judging – as a purely procedural account – I think
judicial minimalism can be defined (as it is in Chapter I) and defended (as it is in this
chapter). It might be wrong, but it’s a theory.
Judicial minimalism does not provide normative guidance by instructing judges on
what is just. But it does provide procedural guidance by instructing judges how to structure
the scope of their decisions. It is not a complete theory, and is long as it is presented that
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way that limitation is no fatal flaw. Moreover, obvious objections (Chapter II) and even
more technical objections (Chapter III) are not dispositive.
Second, is there an argument for judicial minimalism? I think the answer is yes – I
think that there are many arguments for judicial minimalism. There is the argument from
epistemic humility, presented in this chapter. If we properly realize our limited epistemic
position when it comes to judging, I think we come to see the merit in a humble theory of
jurisprudence.
The argument from epistemic humility makes several negative assumptions about
the nature of law and the nature of cases, all of which I think are true. It reasons simply to
modest conclusions, and I think that reasoning is valid. The argument is inductive as it
moves from mosts to shoulds. But it provides evidence for adopting judicial minimalism –
defeasible evidence, but evidence nonetheless.
Second, there is the argument from empirical impact, my argument based on law
and economics. It is always tricky to make arguments based on international indexes and
the imperfect science of global economics. Evidence at such a macro level becomes very
murky, with causation difficult to conclusively demonstrate even in large fields of data.
Again, the evidence provided is, by no means, dispositive.
But, at the end of the day, it is evidence. It is not a surprise to find that the rule of
law and the stability of judgments provides positive momentum to market-based
economies. It is also not particularly controversial to observe the utility-building effects of
economic growth. The value of utility is not universally recognized as a basis for moral
judgment, but almost by definition utility is universally valued.
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Ultimately, a theory of jurisprudence that can show real evidence that it promotes
utility, that can withstand objections, that can satisfy inquiries into jurisprudential
principles and case applications and that ultimately can recommend a proper way to judge
is a worthwhile, well-supported theory of jurisprudence. If this dissertation illuminates the
scope and strengths of that theory, it will seem, to me, a project worth completing.

4.4. Conclusion
Judicial minimalism is a view well represented in practical jurisprudence, but poorly
explored in the philosophical literature. Despite a great deal of influence on the Supreme
Court – with opinions ranging from a significant minority to a strong majority of adherents
at the highest level – the philosophical literature on the subject of judicial minimalism
remains quite limited.
Sunstein and Peters have written about judicial minimalism, but have never
provided a formal definition. I provided the first such definition in Chapter I, defining
judicial minimalism as a strictly procedural thesis about the narrowness of verdicts. I
eschewed Sunstein’s criterion of shallowness, arguing that narrow decisions may
nevertheless be deeply principled.
This formal definition allows me to tackle judicial minimalism with a greater degree
of philosophical rigor. In this chapter, it has permitted me to provide two independent
philosophical arguments in support of judicial minimalism. First, I advanced an argument
from epistemic humility. This argument begins with the premiss that law is a subject where
we should have low epistemic confidence, especially at the Supreme Court.
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Consequently, if we should have a low degree of confidence, it follows that we
should make narrow and limited decisions that are carefully restricted, allowing us the
maximum opportunity for subsequent revision in light of new evidence. By avoiding a
broad, sweeping ruling we minimize the scope for dramatic, potentially highly destructive
legal error, and preserve the machinery and confidence necessary for subsequent revision.
This argument from epistemic humility has been presented before, but previously on
democratic deliberation grounds, rather than on purely epistemic and philosophical
grounds. Second, I proposed a new version of the argument from stare decisis and the rule
of law, arguing that judicial minimalism, by reaffirming the rule of law, maximizes utility,
as seen empirically in comparative international indices like the HDI and EFI.
In Chapters II and III I considered several objections to judicial minimalism. First,
in Chapter II, I considered a blizzard of different objections, discussing each and refuting
each after carefully reconstructing and then attacking the objections in argument form. In
the style of a medieval disputation, I exposed the concept and content of judicial
minimalism to a gauntlet of philosophical challenges, none of which proved overwhelming.
If the objections in Chapter II were primarily of the philosophical variety, the
objections in Chapter III were primarily technical and legal in form. Working from several
cases, both famous and obscure, I put forward several objections based on the logical
consequence of judicial minimalism as a practical theory. In each case I was either able to
dispute the specifics of the case or work through the right answer in the minimalist context.
Over the course of this analysis my research has therefore pointed toward a positive
assessment of judicial minimalism. Judicial minimalism is just one component of a
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complete theory of jurisprudence. But since judicial minimalism is compatible with a wide
range of judicial ideologies, the conclusion of my argument is as broad as a conclusion:
every judge everywhere should be a judicial minimalist. Procedural minimalism is just one
part of a complete judicial philosophy, but it is a part that every single judge ought to share.
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